

THE UNITED STATES
AND THE PEACE

Part I

A collection of documents

August 14, 1941 to March 5, 1945

30



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MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS

Transmitting

Declaration of Principles, Known as the Atlantic Charter

AUGUST 21, 1941*

To the Congress of the United States:

Over a week ago I held several important conferences at sea with the British Prime Minister. Because of the factor of safety to British, Canadian, and American ships, and their personnel, no prior announcement of these meetings could properly be made.

At the close, a public statement by the Prime Minister and the President was made. I quote it for the information of the Congress and for the record:

"The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea.

"They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including high-ranking officers of their military, naval, and air services.

"The whole problem of the supply of munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces

of the United States, and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression, has been further examined.

"Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union.

"The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.

"They have agreed upon the following joint declaration:

"Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

"Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

"Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field

with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

"Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

"Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

"Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

"(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt.

"(Signed) Winston S. Churchill."

The Congress and the President having heretofore determined, through the Lend-Lease Act, on the national policy of American aid to the democracies which East and West are waging war against dictatorships, the military and naval conversations at these meetings made

clear gains in furthering the effectiveness of this aid.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister and I are arranging for conferences with the Soviet Union to aid it in its defense against the attack made by the principal aggressor of the modern world—Germany.

* The press release announcing the Atlantic Charter was dated August 14, 1941.

Finally, the declaration of principles at this time presents a goal which is worth while for our type of civilization to seek. It is so clear-cut that it is difficult to oppose in any major particular without automatically admitting a willingness to accept compromise with nazi-ism; or to agree to a world peace which would give to nazi-ism domination over large numbers of conquered nations. Inevitably such a peace would be a gift to nazi-ism to take breath—armed breath—for a second war to extend the control over Europe and Asia, to the American Hemisphere itself. It is perhaps unnecessary for me to call attention once

more to the utter lack of validity of the spoken or written word of the Nazi government.

It is also unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration of principles includes, of necessity, the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of information. No society of the world organized under the announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 21, 1941.

Declaration by United Nations

JANUARY 1, 1941

A joint declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter;

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

DECLARE:

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other

nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.¹

DONE at Washington,

January First, 1942

¹ ADHERENTS TO THE DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS (together with the date on which an official representative of the country affixed his signature to the Declaration):

Bolivia	May 5, 1943	Liberia	Apr. 10, 1944
Brazil	Apr. 10, 1943	Mexico	June 14, 1942
Chile	Feb. 14, 1945	Paraguay	Feb. 14, 1945
Colombia	Jan. 17, 1943	Peru	Feb. 14, 1945
Ecuador	Feb. 14, 1945	Philippines, Commonwealth	
Egypt	Feb. 28, 1945	of the	June 14, 1942
Ethiopia	Mar. 7, 1944	Saudi Arabia	March 5, 1945
France	Jan. 1, 1945	Turkey	Feb. 28, 1945
Iran	Sept. 14, 1943	Uruguay	Feb. 24, 1945
Iraq	Apr. 10, 1943	Venezuela	Feb. 20, 1945

The date of notification of adherence was, in each case, the following: Bolivia, Apr. 27, 1943; Brazil, Feb. 8, 1943 (the Brazilian notification, a note of Feb. 8, 1943 from the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State, stated, in translation: ". . . by act of the 6th of this month Brazil declared formal adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations"); Colombia, Dec. 22, 1943; Ethiopia, July 28, 1942; Iran, Sept. 10, 1943 (the Iranian notification, a note of Sept. 10, 1943 from the Iranian Minister at Washington, stated: ". . . by act of the 9th day of this month Iran declares the existence of a state of war with Germany and formally adheres to the Declaration of the United Nations"); Iraq, Jan. 16, 1943; Liberia, Feb. 26, 1944; Mexico, June 5, 1942; Commonwealth of the Philippines, June 10, 1942; Chile, Feb. 12, 1945; Ecuador, Feb. 7, 1945; France, Dec. 26, 1944; Paraguay, Feb. 12, 1945; Peru, Feb. 11, 1945; Venezuela, Feb. 16, 1945; Uruguay, Feb. 23, 1945; Turkey, Feb. 24, 1945; Egypt, Feb. 27, 1945; Saudi Arabia, March 1, 1945.

TEXT OF TREATY

Between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom

MAY 26, 1942

Treaty between U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter.

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.S.R. for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow July 12, 1941, and to replace them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to prevent further aggression by

Germany of the States associated with her in her acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention of collaborating closely with one another as well as with the United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made on August 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has adhered;

Desiring finally to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either of the high contracting parties by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part One

Article 1. In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 2. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with Hitlerite Government or any other Government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two

Article 3. (1) The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period.

(2) Pending the adoption of such proposals they will after the termination of hostilities take all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 4. Should one of the high contracting parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article 3 (2) in consequence of an attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance in her power.

This Article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties by mutual agreement shall recognize that it is superseded by the adoption of the proposals con-

templated in Article 3 (1). In default of the adoption of such proposals it shall remain in force for a period of 20 years and thereafter until terminated by either high contracting party as provided in Article 8.

Article 5. The high contracting parties having regard to the interests of the security of each of them agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

Article 6. The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

Article 7. Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 8. The present treating is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at Moscow on July 12, 1941.

Part 1 of the present treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace between the high contracting parties and Germany and the powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part 2 of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years. Thereafter unless 12 months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of 20 years it shall continue in force until 12 months after either high contracting party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

House Concurrent Resolution 25

KNOWN AS THE FULBRIGHT RESOLUTION

SEPTEMBER 21, 1943

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain

a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States there-in through its constitutional processes.

Passed the House of Representatives Sept. 21, 1943.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

Anglo-Soviet-American Communique

RELEASED NOVEMBER 1, 1943

The Conference of Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov, took place at Moscow from the 19th to the 30th of October 1943. There were twelve meetings.

In addition to the Foreign Secretaries the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America: Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States, Major General John R. Deane, United States Army, Mr. Green H. Hackworth, Mr. James C. Dunn, and experts.

For the United Kingdom: Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador, Mr. William Strang, Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay, and experts.

For the Soviet Union: Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. A. Sergeev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Major-General A. A. Gryslov, of the General Staff, Mr. G. F. Saksin, Senior Official of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

The agenda included all the questions submitted for discussion by the three Governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken: these questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by an exchange of views.

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been in close cooperation in all matters concerning the common war effort. But this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers, representing the respective Chiefs of Staff, in order to discuss definite military operations, with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared, and in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the unanimous recognition by the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the Conference and which was signed by the three Foreign Secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of their Governments. This declaration, published today, provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war. It sets forth the principles upon which the four Governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of

all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The Conference agreed to set up machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three Governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose the Conference decided to establish in London a European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three Governments.

Provision was made for continuing, when necessary, tripartite consultations of representatives of the three Governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The Conference also agreed to establish an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy, to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three Governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for the addition to this Council of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This Council will deal with day-to-day questions, other than military operations, and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm, by a declaration published today, the attitude of their Governments in favor of restoration of democracy in Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their Governments to restore the independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make towards its own liberation. The declaration on Austria is published today.

The Foreign Secretaries issued at the Conference a declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German Government those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces will be taken back to the countries in which their abominable crimes were committed to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In the atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the Conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature, but also questions concerning the treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and the assurance of general peace.

The Moscow Conference . . .

Declaration of Four Nations on General Security

RELEASED NOVEMBER 1, 1943

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

United in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

Recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

Jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy

will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations

with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

V. MOLOTOV
ANTHONY EDEN
CORDELL HULL
FOO PING-SHEUNG

MOSCOW,
30th October, 1943.

The Moscow Conference . . .

Declaration Regarding Italy

RELEASED NOVEMBER 1, 1943

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people who shall also be

entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The three Governments parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

The Moscow Conference

Declaration on Austria

RELEASED NOVEMBER 1, 1943

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15th, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent

Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

The Moscow Conference . . .

Declaration of German Atrocities

RELEASED NOVEMBER 1, 1943

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two [*forty-five*] United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated

countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL
STALIN

Senate Resolution 192

KNOWN AS THE CONNALLY RESOLUTION

NOVEMBER 5, 1943

Resolved, That the war against all our enemies be waged until complete victory is achieved.

That the United States cooperate with its comrades-in-arms in securing a just and honorable peace.

That the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world.

That the Senate recognizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest practicable date a general in-

ternational organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

That, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any treaty made to effect the purposes of this resolution, on behalf of the Government of the United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.

THE CAIRO CONFERENCE

United States of America: *President Roosevelt*

China: *Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*

United Kingdom: *Prime Minister Churchill*

RELEASED DECEMBER 1, 1943

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expan-

sion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great

powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony

with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE

Declaration of the Three Powers

DECEMBER 1, 1943

We—The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nation shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round-table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—we are sure that our concord will win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL and STALIN

Signed at Teheran, *December 1, 1943*

The Teheran Conference . . .

Declaration Regarding Iran

DECEMBER 1, 1943

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problem confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration along with those of the other members of the United Nations by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran together with all other peace-loving nations in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have continued to subscribe.

TEXT OF TREATY

Between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia

DECEMBER 12, 1943

Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Collaboration Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, desiring to modify and supplement the

Treaty on Mutual Assistance existing between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic and signed in Prague on May 16, 1935, confirm the provisions of the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic on Joint Actions in War Against Germany signed in London on July 18, 1941, desiring to assist after the war in the maintenance of peace and in averting further aggression on the part of Germany and to insure continuous friendship and peaceful collaboration between themselves after the war, have decided to conclude a treaty with this purpose and appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs; for the President of the Czechoslovak Republic—Zdenek Firlinger, the Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Republic in the Soviet Union, who upon the exchange of their credentials found in due form and good order have agreed upon the following:

Article I

The high contracting parties, having mutually agreed to unite in the policy of continuous friendship and friendly collaboration after the war as well as of mutual assistance, undertake to render each other military and other assistance and support of all kind in the present war against Germany and all those states which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article II

The high contracting parties undertake not to enter in the course of the present war into any negotiations with the Hitler government or with any other government in Germany which does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude without mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or with any other state associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article III

Confirming their prewar policy of peace and mutual assistance expressed in their treaty signed in Prague on May 16, 1935, the high contracting parties undertake that, in the event one of them finds itself in the postwar period involved in hostilities with Germany which would resume her "Drang nach Osten" policy, or

Protocol to the treaty on friendship, mutual assistance and postwar collaboration between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic concluded on December 12, 1943

In concluding the treaty on friendship, mutual assistance and postwar collaboration between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, the contracting parties have agreed that, in the event of some third country which borders on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or on the Czechoslovak Republic and which formed the object of German aggression in the present war, desires to join this treaty she will be accorded the possibility, on the mutual consent of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the Czechoslovak Republic, of signing this treaty

with any other state which would unite with Germany directly or in any other form in such a war, the other high contracting party will immediately render the contracting party thus involved in hostilities every military and other support and assistance within its disposal.

Article IV

The high contracting parties, considering the interests of security of each of them, agree to maintain close and friendly collaboration in the period after the reestablishment of peace and to act in conformity with the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, as well as for non-intervention in internal affairs of the other State. They agree to develop their economic relations on the widest possible scale and to render each other every possible economic assistance after the war.

Article V

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

Article VI

The present treaty comes into force immediately upon being signed and is subject to ratification within the shortest possible time; the exchange of the instruments of ratification shall be effected in Moscow as soon as possible. The present treaty shall remain in force for twenty years from its signature and, if at the end of the said period of twenty years one of the high contracting parties does not declare, twelve months prior to the expiration of the term, its desire to renounce the treaty, it shall remain in force for the next five years, and thus each time until one of the high contracting parties, twelve months prior to the expiration of the current five-year term, presents notice in writing of its intention to discontinue its operation. In testimony whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty and have affixed their seals thereto. Made in two copies, each in the Russian and the Czechoslovak languages. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, December 12, 1943

(Signed)

On authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

MOLOTOV

On authorization of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic

FIRLINGER

which will thus acquire the quality of a tri-partite treaty. The present protocol has been made in two copies, each in the Russian and the Czechoslovak language. Both texts have equal force.

Moscow, December 12, 1943

(Signed)

On authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

MOLOTOV

On authorization of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic

FIRLINGER

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT on the Postwar Security Organization Program

JUNE 15, 1944

The maintenance of peace and security must be the joint task of all peace-loving nations. We have, therefore, sought to develop plans for an international organ-

ization comprising all such nations. The purpose of the organization would be to maintain peace and security and to assist the creation, through international cooperation,

of conditions of stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.

Accordingly, it is our thought that the organization would be a fully representative body with broad responsibilities for promoting and facilitating international cooperation, through such agencies as may be found necessary, to consider and deal with the problems of world relations. It is our further thought that the organization would provide for a council, elected annually by the fully representative body of all nations, which would include the four major nations and a suitable number of other nations. The council would concern itself with peaceful settlement of international disputes and with the prevention of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace.

There would also be an international court of justice to deal primarily with justiciable disputes.

Report to the Secretary of State by the Chairman of the American Delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference

OCTOBER 7, 1944

I take great pleasure in submitting to you the results of the exploratory conversations on international organization held in Washington between representatives of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. The first phase of the conversations, between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, took place from August 21 to September 28; the second phase, between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, was held from September 29 to October 7. The results of the work accomplished in both phases are embodied in the following Proposals which each of the four delegations is transmitting to its respective Government as the unanimously agreed recommendations of the four delegations.

I am happy to report that the conversations throughout were characterized by a spirit of complete cooperation and great cordiality among all participants, the proof of which is evident in the wide area of agreement covered in the proposals. The few questions which remain for further consideration, though important, are not in any sense insuperable, and I recommend that the necessary steps for obtaining agreement on these points be taken as soon as possible.

We are not thinking of a superstate with its own police forces and other paraphernalia of coercive power. We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and of making impossible deliberate preparation for war and to have such forces available for joint action when necessary.

All this, of course, will become possible once our present enemies are defeated and effective arrangements are made to prevent them from making war again.

Beyond that, the hope of a peaceful and advancing world will rest upon the willingness and ability of the peace-loving nations, large and small, bearing responsibility commensurate with their individual capacities, to work together for the maintenance of peace and security.

It is proper to emphasize, at the conclusion of these preliminary conversations, that the Proposals as they are now submitted to the four Governments comprise substantial contributions from each of the delegations. It is my own view, which I believe is shared by all the participants, that the agreed Proposals constitute an advance over the tentative and preliminary proposals presented by each delegation. This has resulted from a single-minded effort of all the delegations at Dumbarton Oaks to reach a common understanding as to the most effective international organization capable of fulfilling the hopes of all peoples everywhere.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my grateful recognition of the contribution to the successful outcome of these conversations made by the members of the American delegation and to commend the advisers and the staff for their most helpful assistance. Above all, I wish to express my profound appreciation to the President and to you, Mr. Secretary, for the constant advice and guidance without which our work could not have been accomplished with such constructive and satisfactory results.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

October 7, 1944

Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, Known as the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

OCTOBER 7, 1944

There should be established an international organization under the title of The United Nations, the Charter of which should contain provisions necessary to give effect to the proposals which follow.

CHAPTER I. PURPOSES

The purposes of the Organization should be:

1. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the

prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems; and

4. To afford a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

CHAPTER II. PRINCIPLES

In pursuit of the purposes mentioned in Chapter I the Organization and its members should act in accordance with the following principles:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.

2. All members of the Organization undertake, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership in the Organization, to fulfill the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.

3. All members of the Organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.

4. All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.

5. All members of the Organization shall give every assistance to the Organization in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

6. All members of the Organization shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken by the Organization.

The Organization should ensure that states not members of the Organization act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER III. MEMBERSHIP

1. Membership of the Organization should be open to all peace-loving states.

CHAPTER IV. PRINCIPAL ORGANS

1. The Organization should have as its principal organs:

- A General Assembly;
- A Security Council;
- An international court of justice; and
- A Secretariat.

2. The Organization should have such subsidiary agencies as may be found necessary.

CHAPTER V. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Section A. Composition

All members of the Organization should be members of the General Assembly and should have a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter.

Section B. Functions and Powers

1. The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the Organization or by the Security Council; and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council.

2. The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the Organization upon recommendation of the Security Council.

3. The General Assembly should, upon recommendation of the Security Council, be empowered to suspend from the exercise of any rights or privileges of membership any member of the Organization against which preventive or enforcement action shall have been taken by the Security Council. The exercise of the rights and privileges thus suspended may be restored by decision of the Security Council. The General Assembly should be empowered, upon recommendation of the Security Council to expel from the Organization any member of the Organization which persistently violates the principles contained in the Charter.

4. The General Assembly should elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council provided for in Chapter IX. It should be empowered to elect, upon recommendation of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the Organization. It should perform such functions in relation to the election of the judges of the international court of justice as may be conferred upon it by the statute of the court.

5. The General Assembly should apportion the expenses among the members of the Organization and should be empowered to approve the budgets of the Organization.

6. The General Assembly should initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare.

7. The General Assembly should make recommendations for the coordination of the policies of international economic, social, and other specialized agencies brought into relation with the Organization in accordance with agreements between such agencies and the Organization.

8. The General Assembly should receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council and reports from other bodies of the Organization.

Section C. Voting

1. Each member of the Organization should have one vote in the General Assembly.

2. Important decisions of the General Assembly, including recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; election of members of the Security Council; election of members of the Economic and Social Council; admission of members, suspension of the exercise of the rights and privileges of members, and expulsion of members; and budgetary questions, should be made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. On other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, the decisions of the General Assembly should be made by a simple majority vote.

Section D. Procedure

1. The General Assembly should meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require.

2. The General Assembly should adopt its own rules of procedure and elect its President for each session.

3. The General Assembly should be empowered to set up such bodies and agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER VI. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Section A. Composition

The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of eleven members of the Organization. Rep-

representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats. The General Assembly should elect six states to fill the non-permanent seats. These six states should be elected for a term of two years, three retiring each year. They should not be immediately eligible for reelection. In the first election of the non-permanent members three should be chosen by the General Assembly for one-year terms and three for two-year terms.

Section B. Principal Functions and Powers

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the Organization, members of the Organization should by the Charter confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and should agree that in carrying out these duties under this responsibility it should act on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

3. The specific powers conferred on the Security Council in order to carry out these duties are laid down in Chapter VIII.

4. All members of the Organization should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

5. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 9, should have the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the Organization.

Section C. Voting

(NOTE.—The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration.)

Section D. Procedure

1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the Organization. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgment may best facilitate its work. There should be periodic meetings at which each state member of the Security Council could if it so desired be represented by a member of the government or some other special representative.

2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional sub-committees of the Military Staff Committee.

3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

4. Any member of the Organization should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the Organization are specially affected.

5. Any member of the Organization not having a seat on the Security Council and any state not a member of the Organization, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute.

CHAPTER VII. AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. There should be an international court of justice which should constitute the principal judicial organ of the Organization.

2. The court should be constituted and should function in accordance with a statute which should be annexed to and be a part of the Charter of the Organization.

3. The statute of the court of international justice should be either (a) the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, continued in force with such modifications as may be desirable or (b) a new statute in the preparation of which the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice should be used as a basis.

4. All members of the Organization should *ipso facto* be parties to the statute of the international court of justice.

5. Conditions under which states not members of the Organization may become parties to the statute of the international court of justice should be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER VIII. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY INCLUDING PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION

Section A. Pacific Settlement of Disputes

1. The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Any state, whether member of the Organization or not, may bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.

3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and, accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5.

5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

6. Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of justice. The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the court, for advice, legal questions connected with other disputes.

7. The provisions of paragraph 1 to 6 of Section A should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned.

Section B. Determination of Threats to the Peace or Acts of Aggression and Action With Respect Thereto

1. Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with procedures indicated

in paragraph 3 of Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made under paragraph 5 of Section A, constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

2. In general the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.

3. The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic, economic, or other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the Organization to apply such measures. Such measures may include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

4. Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowered to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the Organization.

5. In order that all members of the Organization should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, they should undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves, armed forces, facilities and assistance necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or agreements should govern the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. The special agreement or agreements should be negotiated as soon as possible and should in each case be subject to approval by the Security Council and to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes.

6. In order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the Organization there should be held immediately available by the members of the Organization national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in paragraph 5 above.

7. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security should be taken by all the members of the Organization in cooperation or by some of them as the Security Council may determine. This undertaking should be carried out by the members of the Organization by their own action and through action of the appropriate specialized organizations and agencies of which they are members.

8. Plans for the application of armed force should be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in paragraph 9 below.

9. There should be established a Military Staff Committee the functions of which should be to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, to the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, to

the regulation of armaments, and to possible disarmament. It should be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The Committee should be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the Organization not permanently represented on the Committee should be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires that such a state should participate in its work. Questions of command of forces should be worked out subsequently.

10. The members of the Organization should join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

11. Any state, whether a member of the Organization or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of measures which have been decided upon by the Security Council should have the right to consult the Security Council in regard to a solution of those problems.

Section C. Regional Arrangements

1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX. ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

Section A. Purpose and Relationships

1. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in an Economic and Social Council.

2. The various specialized economic, social and other organizations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each such organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the Organization on terms to be determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the General Assembly.

Section B. Composition and Voting

The Economic and Social Council should consist of representatives of eighteen members of the Organization. The states to be represented for this purpose should be elected by the General Assembly for terms of three years.

Each such state should have one representative, who should have one vote. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council should be taken by simple majority vote of those present and voting.

Section C. Functions and Powers of the Economic and Social Council

1. The Economic and Social Council should be empowered:

- a. to carry out, within the scope of its functions, recommendations of the General Assembly;
- b. to make recommendations, on its own initiative, with respect to international economic, social and other humanitarian matters;
- c. to receive and consider reports from the economic, social and other organizations or agencies brought into relationship with the Organization, and to coordinate their activities through consultations with, and recommendations to, such organizations or agencies;
- d. to examine the administrative budgets of such specialized organizations or agencies with a view to making recommendations to the organizations or agencies concerned;
- e. to enable the Secretary-General to provide information to the Security Council;
- f. to assist the Security Council upon its request; and
- g. to perform such other functions within the general scope of its competence as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Section D. Organization and Procedure

1. The Economic and Social Council should set up an economic commission, a social commission, and such other commissions as may be required. These commissions should consist of experts. There should be a permanent staff which should constitute a part of the Secretariat of the Organization.

2. The Economic and Social Council should make suitable arrangements for representatives of the specialized organizations or agencies to participate without vote in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it.

3. The Economic and Social Council should adopt its own rules of procedure and the method of selecting its President.

CHAPTER X. THE SECRETARIAT

1. There should be a Secretariat comprising a Secretary-General and such staff as may be required. The Sec-

retary-General should be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. He should be elected by the General Assembly, on recommendation of the Security Council, for such term and under such conditions as are specified in the Charter.

2. The Secretary-General should act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, and of the Economic and Social Council and should make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

3. The Secretary-General should have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security.

CHAPTER XI. AMENDMENTS

Amendments should come into force for all members of the Organization, when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the members of the Organization having permanent membership on the Security Council and by a majority of the other members of the Organization.

CHAPTER XII. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Pending the coming into force of the special agreement or agreements referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5, and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, the states parties to that Declaration should consult with one another and as occasion arises with other members of the Organization with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

NOTE

In addition to the question of voting procedure in the Security Council referred to in Chapter VI, several other questions are still under consideration.

WASHINGTON, D. C.
October 7, 1944

Statement by the President Regarding the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,

OCTOBER 9, 1944

I wish to take this opportunity to refer to the work of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations between the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China on the plans for an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

The conversations were completed Saturday, October 7, 1944, and proposals were submitted to the four Governments for their consideration. These proposals have been made public to permit full discussion by the people of this country prior to the convening of a wider conference on this all-important subject.

Although I have not yet been able to make a thorough study of these proposals, my first impression is one of extreme satisfaction, and even surprise, that so much could have been accomplished on so difficult a subject in so short a time. This achievement was largely due to the long and thorough preparations which were made by the Governments represented, and in our case, was the result of the untiring devotion and care which the Secretary of State has personally given to this work for more than two and a half years—indeed for many years.

The projected international organization has for its primary purpose the maintenance of international peace

and security and the creation of the conditions that make for peace.

We now know the need for such an organization of the peace-loving peoples and the spirit of unity which will be required to maintain it. Aggressors like Hitler and the Japanese war lords organize for years for the day when they can launch their evil strength against weaker nations devoted to their peaceful pursuits. This time we have been determined first to defeat the enemy, assure that he shall never again be in position to plunge the world into war, and then to so organize the peace-loving nations that they may through unity of desire, unity of will, and unity of strength be in position to assure that no other would-be aggressor or conqueror shall even get started. That is why from the very beginning of the war, and paralleling our military plans, we have begun to lay

the foundations for the general organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

It represents, therefore, a major objective for which this war is being fought, and as such, it inspires the highest hopes of the millions of fathers and mothers whose sons and daughters are engaged in the terrible struggle and suffering of war.

The projected general organization may be regarded as the keystone of the arch and will include within its framework a number of specialized economic and social agencies now existing or to be established.

The task of planning the great design of security and peace has been well begun. It now remains for the nations to complete the structure in a spirit of constructive purpose and mutual confidence.

OCTOBER 9, 1944

Statement by the Secretary of State on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, OCTOBER 9, 1944

The proposals for an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, upon which the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China have agreed during the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, have been submitted to the four Governments and are today being made generally available to the people of this Nation and of the world.

All of us have every reason to be immensely gratified by the results achieved at these conversations. To be sure, the proposals in their present form are neither complete nor final. Much work still remains to be done before a set of completed proposals can be placed before the peace-loving nations of the world as a basis of discussion at a formal conference to draft a charter of the projected organization for submission to the governments. But the document which has been prepared by the able representatives of the four participating nations and has been agreed to by them as their recommendation to their respective Governments is sufficiently detailed to indicate the kind of an international organization which, in their judgment, will meet the imperative need of providing for the maintenance of international peace and security.

These proposals are now being studied by the four Governments which were represented at the Washington conversations and which will give their urgent attention to the next steps which will be necessary to reach the goal of achieving the establishment of an effective international organization.

These proposals are now available for full study and discussion by the peoples of all countries.

We in this country have spent many months in careful planning and wide consultation in preparation for the conversations which have just been concluded. Those

who represented the Government of the United States in these discussions were armed with the ideas and with the results of thinking contributed by numerous leaders of our national thought and opinion, without regard to political or other affiliations.

It is my earnest hope that, during the time which must elapse before the convocation of a full United Nations conference, discussions in the United States on this all-important subject will continue to be carried on in the same non-partisan spirit of devotion to our paramount national interest in peace and security which has characterized our previous consultations. I am certain that all of us will be constantly mindful of the high responsibility for us and for all peace-loving nations which attaches to this effort to make permanent a victory purchased at so heavy a cost in blood, in tragic suffering, and in treasure. We must be constantly mindful of the price which all of us will pay if we fail to measure up to this unprecedented responsibility.

It is, of course, inevitable that when many governments and peoples attempt to agree on a single plan the result will be in terms of the highest common denominator rather than of the plan of any one nation. The organization to be created must reflect the ideas and hopes of all the peace-loving nations which participate in its creation. The spirit of cooperation must manifest itself in mutual striving to attain the high goal by common agreement.

The road to the establishment of an international organization capable of effectively maintaining international peace and security will be long. At times it will be difficult. But we cannot hope to attain so great an objective without constant effort and unflinching determination that the sacrifices of this war shall not be in vain.

OCTOBER 9, 1944

Statement Issued Simultaneously by the Participating Governments in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, OCTOBER 9, 1944

The Government of the United States has now received the report of its delegation to the conversations held in Washington between August 21 and October 7, 1944, with the delegations of the United Kingdom, the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China on the subject of an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

There follows a statement of tentative proposals

indicating in detail the wide range of subjects on which agreement has been reached at the conversations.

The Governments which were represented in the discussions in Washington have agreed that after further study of these proposals they will as soon as possible take

the necessary steps with a view to the preparation of complete proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations conference.

OCTOBER 9, 1944

Statement by Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons,

DECEMBER 1, 1944

MR. EDEN: We in this country believe in democracy. We have already stated that, when the time comes to express the popular will in Yugoslavia, it ought to be done in a really popular way. There should be candidates—I say that word in the plural—and the people should be allowed to express their views. That is the policy for which we stand in these countries. I am sorry to have been so long in saying this, but I hope I have done something to dispel some of the feelings which existed on this subject.

There is another matter to which I must refer, and that is about Italy and Count Sforza. The Member for Keighley (Mr. Thomas) made a very long speech yesterday—not as long as mine—about Count Sforza, and he read a very interesting document, which I must say was new to me. He told us all sorts of things which were novelties, although interesting ones, but any Hon. Member who listened to his speech might have been pardoned at the end of the Hon. Member's defense of Count Sforza for even then being reluctant to see Count Sforza as Foreign Secretary. I do not think the Hon. Member added a great deal to the reputation of Count Sforza in the statement which he made.

I will tell the House very briefly what is the position. The Hon. Member drew a parallel between our attitude to the construction of the Italian Government, on the one hand, and, on the other, the German attack and overthrow of Delcasse, and Hitler's and Mussolini's attacks on me. I do not think there is any such parallel. Italy is a country with whom we have recently been at war, and which surrendered unconditionally, and—let us face it—whose record in the present struggle, under Mussolini's guidance, was a most shameful one, not only towards ourselves and France, but towards Greece and Albania. There was not a sentence in the speech of the Hon. Gentleman which showed any realization of that fact, or of the fact that those countries were subjected to aggression carefully calculated—

MR. IVOR THOMAS: I did not want to say all the obvious things.

MR. EDEN: —but, as it turned out, this aggression was a miscalculating policy. We have now accepted Italy as a co-belligerent, but that country is not an ally. She remains a base for the operation of our troops. In my submission to the House, we are perfectly entitled to emphasize our views about the appointment of any particular statesman by that country. We are absolutely entitled

to do it. We have not expressed a veto, but there is no reason why the British Government should not say: "In our view the appointment of Mr. X to the particular post of Foreign Secretary would not facilitate the smooth working of our relationships." There is no crime in that and it applies particularly to the post of Foreign Secretary.

We do not feel, for a number of reasons, that Count Sforza would be a particularly happy choice as Foreign Secretary. He did tell us some time past that he would pursue a certain course on his return to Italy—I am not dealing with the Royalty question at all, but I may say a word on it later—and he did not pursue it. According to our information, he has been working against the Government of Signor Bonomi, who himself has given us loyal support and has fulfilled all his obligations towards us. Knowing that, I really do not see that there is anything wrong in our saying that we would prefer not to have as Foreign Secretary a man who has been working only lately against a Prime Minister who has been perfectly loyal to us.

MR. THOMAS: Is the right Hon. Gentleman saying that the Italian people must not only not have Count Sforza as their Foreign Secretary, but they must have Signor Bonomi as their Prime Minister?

MR. EDEN: I did not say that. We simply judged on our experience of Count Sforza. We are entitled to observe what happens in Italy, after the experience we have had in that country. We observed that, on his return, he rapidly began to work against the Government of Marshal Badoglio which at that time the Allies supported, and later he proceeded to do exactly the same against the Government formed under Signor Bonomi. We have said that, in those conditions, we should not be very happy to have as Foreign Secretary somebody who had behaved thus. We expressed our view, that, in all the circumstances, we should be happier without that particular appointment and I cannot see why we should not be allowed to say that.

MR. ANEURIN BEVAN: I hope that when the right Hon. Gentleman reads his speech he will realize how this part of it compares with what he said about Belgium . . .

MR. EDEN: . . . There is not the slightest parallel between this matter and Belgium. Belgium has been our ally throughout this war. Italy has not been our ally throughout this war, but the Hon. Member seems unable to discover this fact.

Statement to the Press by the State Department on U. S. Position Toward Italy

DECEMBER 5, 1944

The Department has received a number of inquiries from correspondents in regard to its position concerning the recent Cabinet crisis in Italy.

The position of this Government has been consistently that the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair except in the case of appointments where



important military factors are concerned. This Government has not in any way intimated to the Italian Government that there would be any opposition on its part to Count Sforza. Since Italy is an area of combined responsibility, we have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian

Governments that we expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside. This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories.

Statement on Greece by Prime Minister Churchill in House of Commons DECEMBER 5, 1944

So far as has been ascertained, the facts are as follows: The Greek organization EAM had announced their intention of holding a demonstration on Dec. 3. The Greek Government at first authorized this, but withdrew their permission when EAM called for a general strike to begin on Dec. 2. The strike, in fact, came into force early on Dec. 3.

Later in the morning the EAM demonstration formed up and moved to the principal square of Athens in spite of the Government's ban.

On the evidence so far available I am not prepared to say who started the firing which then took place.

The police suffered one fatal casualty and had three men wounded. The latest authentic reports give the demonstrators' casualties as eleven killed and sixty wounded.

The demonstration continued during the afternoon, but there was no further shooting, and by 4:30 the crowd had dispersed and tranquility was restored.

It is deplorable that an event like this should take place in Athens scarcely a month after the city's liberation and feeding.

Greece is faced with the most desperate economic and financial problems apart from civil war, which we are trying to stop. We and our American allies are doing our utmost to give assistance and our troops are acting to prevent bloodshed.

But sometimes it is necessary to use force to prevent greater bloodshed. The main burden falls on us. The responsibility is within our Allied military sphere—that is, our military sphere agreed upon with our principal allies.

Our plans will not succeed unless the Greek Government and the whole of the Greek people exert themselves on their own behalf. If the damage of four years of war and enemy occupation is to be repaired and if Greek life and economy are to be rebuilt, their internal stability must be maintained and, pending a general election under fair conditions, the authority of the constitutional Greek Government must be accepted and enforced throughout the country.

The armed force must be dependent on the Greek Government. No Government can have a sure foundation so long as there are private armies owing allegiance to a group, party or ideology instead of to the state and the nation.

Although these facts should be clear to all, the left wing and Communist Ministers have resigned from the Greek Government at this dangerous crisis rather than implement measures to which they had already agreed for the replacement of the EAM police and guerrillas by regular national services. . . .

In addition, the EAM leaders have called a general strike which is, for the time being, preventing the food we and America are providing from reaching the mouths of the population we are trying to feed.

Our own position, as I have said, is extremely clear. Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form

a government of the right or left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them. Until they are in a position to decide we shall not hesitate to use the considerable British army now in Greece, and being reinforced, to see that law and order are maintained.

It is our belief that in this course His Majesty's Government has the support of an overwhelming majority of the Greek people. The gaping need is to receive relief for the immediate requirements and conditions which give them a chance of earning a livelihood. In both of these ways we wish to help them, and we are working continually with experts, financial and otherwise, to assist in every possible way, but we cannot do this if the tommy guns which were provided for use against the Germans are now used in an attempt to impose by violence a Communist dictatorship without the people being able to express their wishes. . . .

I quite agree that we take a great responsibility in intervening to preserve law and order in this capital city so lately delivered by our troops from the power of the enemy.

It would be very much easier for us to allow everything to degenerate, as it would, into anarchy or a Communist dictatorship.

But we do not feel, having taken the position we have—having entered Athens and brought food and made great efforts to restore its currency and doing our utmost to give those conditions of peace and tranquility which will enable the Greek people as a whole to vote on their future—having gone so far as that, that we should look back or take our hand from the plow.

It is the Greek Government we are supporting, or perhaps acting in conjunction with would be a better expression, because General Scobie is for the moment in charge of order. We shall certainly take care that that Government is not used to fasten any rule of a faction upon the Greek people. They will have the fullest opportunity of a free election. The Government of Mr. Papandreou three days ago represented all parties, including the Communist and EAM representatives left suddenly on the eve of a quite evident attempt to overthrow settled Government. . . .

It is a shocking thing that there should be firing by the police force on unarmed children; that is a matter we should all reprobate. We should also reprobate the massing or leading of large numbers of unarmed children to a demonstration center which had been banned by the Government in a city full of armed men liable at any moment to an explosion. . . .

The other point of substance is the question of the security battalions. That is not to be dismissed as easily as the Hon. member has done. According to information that I have most carefully sifted, the security battalions came into existence gradually in a large measure to protect Greek villages from the depredations of some of those who, under the guise of being the saviors of their country, were living upon the inhabitants and doing very little fighting against the Germans.

Statement to the Press by Secretary of State Stettinius on the Greek Situation

DECEMBER 7, 1944

I was interested to note that in his statement on the Greek situation on December 5 Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons the following: "Our own position, as I have said, is extremely clear. Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a govern-

ment of the right or left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them." With this statement I am in full agreement. It is also our earnest hope that the people and authorities of Greece and our British Allies will work together in rebuilding that ravished country.

Address by Prime Minister Churchill on Britain's Policy in Liberated Countries in the House of Commons

DECEMBER 8, 1944

The value of Sir Richard Acland's speech (Sir Richard rose just before Mr. Churchill) was that it showed how extremely complex these Greek politics are. He made a very large number of assertions, some of which were accurate and some of which, according to my information, are the reverse. . . .

I address myself to the amendment as a whole.

I must point out that it does not only deal with Greece, but with other parts of Europe and with the suppression of these popular movements which have valorously assisted the defeat of the enemy in other countries besides Greece.

The House will therefore, I am sure, permit me to deal with the whole of this question of our intervention in Europe—the tone, the character, the temper, the object of our intervention where we have to intervene by dealing with other countries besides this one. . . .

Before I come to particular countries and cases, let me present to the House the charge which is made against us.

It is that we are using His Majesty's forces to disarm the friends of democracy in Greece and in other parts of Europe and to suppress these popular movements which have valorously assisted in the defeat of the enemy. Here is a pretty direct issue and one on which the House will have to pronounce before we separate this evening.

Certainly the British Government would be unworthy of confidence if His Majesty's forces were being used by them to disarm the friends of democracy in Greece and other parts of Europe.

The question, however, arises and one may be permitted to dwell on it for a moment: Who are the friends of democracy and also how is the word democracy to be interpreted?

My idea of it is that the plain, humble common man—just the ordinary man who keeps a wife and family, who goes off to fight for his country when it is in trouble and goes to the poll at the appropriate time and puts his cross on the ballot paper showing the candidate he wishes to be elected to Parliament—that is the foundation of democracy.

[Emanuel Shinwell, Laborite, interjected a reference to Spain.]

I am not at all afraid to go into that discussion, but I have a great deal of ground to cover. It is one of those great misinterpretations that I have said pleasant words about Franco. All I said was that Spanish politics did not really consist in drawing rude cartoons about it.

It is really no use for my honorable friend to screw his face up as if he was taking a nasty dose of medicine.

[Shinwell: That is precisely what I and many people in the country are doing.]

Everyone can have their opinion about that, but so far as the honorable gentleman is concerned, I expect there are some other nasty gulps to follow. . . .

We stand upon the foundation of fair, free elections based on universal service and suffrage. That is what we consider the foundation of democracy. I feel quite different about a swindle-democracy—a democracy which calls itself a democracy because it is left wing. It takes all sorts to make democracy, not all left wing or even Communists. . . .

The last thing that resembles democracy is mob law with bands of gangsters armed with deadly weapons forcing their way into Greek cities, seizing police stations and key points of Government, and endeavoring to introduce a totalitarian regime.

The last thing that represents democracy is mob law that attempts to introduce a totalitarian regime and clamors to shoot every one who is politically inconvenient as part of a purge of those who are very often said to be—but often have not been—collaborators with the Germans during the occupation.

Do not let us rate democracy so low as if it were merely grabbing power and shooting those who do not agree with us. That is not democracy. That is the antithesis of democracy. . . .

(William Gallacher, Communist: That is what happened.)

Mr. Gallacher must not get so excited, because he is going to have much the worse of the argument and much the worse of the division. . . .

Democracy is not based on violence or terrorism but on reason, on fair play, on freedom, on respecting other people's rights as well as your own ambition. Democracy is not a harlot to be picked up in the street by a man with a tommy gun.

We have trusted the mass of the people in almost every country, but we would like to make sure that it was the people and not a gang of bandits from the mountains or countryside who thought that by violence they could overturn state authority.

That is a general description of the foundation upon which we should approach the various incidents on which I am going to dwell.

i During the war, of course, we have had to arm anyone who could shoot a Hun. We accepted them as friends and tried to enable them to fulfill their healthy instincts. We are paying for it in having this debate today, which personally I have found rather enjoyable so far. We are paying for it also with our treasure and our blood. We are not paying for it with our honor or by defeat.

But when countries are liberated, it does not follow that those who have received our weapons should use them in order to engross themselves by violence and murder and bloodshed in all those powers and traditions the continuity of which many countries have highly developed. . . .

If what is called in this amendment the action of the Friends of democracy is to be interpreted as a carefully planned coup d'état by murder gangs and by the iron rule of ruffians seeking to climb into the seats of power without a vote ever having been cast in their favor—if that is to masquerade as democracy, I think the House will be united in condemning it as a mockery.

. . . War criminals, the betrayers of their countrymen, the men who sincerely wish Germany might win—these may be the object of popular disgust, of boycott and may-be in extreme cases should be brought before the courts of law and punished with death.

But I hope they will be courts of law with fair trials, not mere expressions of mob juries or political rivals. But let me try to establish this point: That these men who went up into the hills with rifles and machine guns given them by the British Government have by fee simple blaimed the right to govern vast complex communities such as Belgium, Greece, or Holland—it may be next. I say I repulse that claim. They have done good service and it is for the state and not for them to judge the rewards they should receive. It is not for them to claim ownership of the state. It cannot be admitted. That is what is being fought out now.

I say we march along our onerous and painful path. Poor old England, perhaps I should say poor old Britain, we have to assume the burden and the most thankless tasks and be shot at, criticized, and abused from every quarter. But at least we know what is our aim, our object. It is that these countries shall be freed from the German armed power and that, under conditions of normal tranquility, they shall have a free universal vote to decide the Government of their country, except the fascist regime, and whether that Government shall be to the left or to the right.

That is our aim, and we are told we seek to disarm the friends of democracy. Because we do not allow gangs of heavily armed guerrillas to descend from the mountains and install themselves in the great capitals and in power and in office we are told we are traitors to democracy. I repulse that claim, too. I shall call upon the House as a matter of confidence in His Majesty's Government and confidence in the spirit with which we have marched from one peril to another until victory is in sight. I shall call upon them to reject this with the scorn that they deserve.

The amendment on the paper has particular reference to Greece, but it is a general attack on the whole policy of His Majesty's Government as supporting reactionary forces everywhere, trying to install by force dictatorial governments contrary to the wishes of the people.

I deal therefore not only with Greece. I pin myself at this moment in the first instance to other parts of Europe, because this theme is also to some extent opened up in the last sentence of an American press release with which we were confronted a few days ago.

It is not only in Greece that we appear to some eyes to be disarming the friends of democracy and those popular

movements which have assisted the defeat of the enemy. There is Italy; there is Belgium. Let me come to Belgium.

Belgium is another case of what the amendment calls the friends of democracy being disarmed in favor of the organized constitutional administration. If so, that is grave and it deserves scrutiny.

At the end of November there was to be what the Germans called a putsch organized in Belgium to throw out the Government of M. Pierlot, which Government was the only constitutional link with the past and the only link we have recognized during the war. This Government has received a vote of confidence of 132 members to only 12, with six abstentions, from the Belgian Parliament.

However, the friends of democracy, the valorous assistants in the defeat of the enemy, took a different view. They organized an attack upon the Belgian state. A demonstration largely attended by women and children marched up to the Belgian Parliament House and lorry loads of friends of democracy came along from Mons and other places heavily armed.

Here you see the hard-worked Briton whom we are asked to censure. What did this reactionary undemocratic Government do? Its orders were sent to stop the lorries on the way and to disarm their loads. Moreover, we British placed light tanks and armored cars in the streets near the front of the Parliament House, which the Belgian gendarmerie were defending in the name of the Belgian constitutional Government.

Now here was interference in a marked form. Here was an attempt to stand between the friends of democracy and the valorous anarchic overthrow of the Belgian state. And we British stood in the way of that. I have to admit these things to you.

But on whose orders and under whose authority did we take this action? General Erskine, the British officer, made various proclamations like those General Scobie [commander in Greece] has made under the press of the situation. These proclamations had a highly salutary effect, and those concerned in the movement of the Allied force acted accordingly.

Who is General Erskine? He represents, he is directly responsible to, and derives his authority from General Eisenhower, that remarkable American supreme commander, whose wisdom and good fellowship we admire and whose orders we have promised to obey.

I have no hesitation in saying not only did we obey General Eisenhower's orders, but we thought those orders were wise and sensible.

After all, we British who are now said to be poor friends of democracy lost 35,000 to 40,000 men in opening up the great port of Antwerp. And our Navy has cleared the Schelde River. The sacrifice of these men has also to be considered as well as the friends of democracy advancing in lorries from Mons to start up a bloody revolution.

(Aneurin Bevan, Laborite, asked whether the Belgian Premier had not been unwarranted in asking for the intervention of British troops, since there was "no such threat as the Prime Minister pretends.")

I should have thought it was hardly possible to state the opposite of the truth with more precision.

I back up all those who seek to establish democracy and civilization on a basis of law and also popular untrammelled, unintimidated, free universal suffrage voting. It would be pretty hard on Europe if, after four or five years of German tyranny, she liquefied and degenerated and plunged into a series of brutal civil and social wars. If there is a democracy and its various defenders believe they express the wishes of the majority, why can't they wait until the general election—a free vote of the peo-

ple which is our sole policy in every country into which British and American armies are marching?

That, they say, is one of their fundamental rights and it belongs naturally to any country which has unconditionally surrendered even if it has done most grievous injuries to the Allied cause. We have not attempted to put a veto on the appointment of Count Sforza. If tomorrow the Italians were to make him Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary, we have no power to stop it except with the agreement of the Allies. All that we should have to say about it is that we do not trust the man and we do not think he is a true and trustworthy man, nor would we put the slightest confidence in any government in which he is a dominating member.

The story of Belgium, which I submit with the utmost respect and affection to the American people as well as to the House of Commons, carries many lessons which are applicable to other parts of the world.

Now I come to the case of Italy, which as I gather oddly enough embodies in it the case of Count Sforza.

It is a great mistake, as the Foreign Secretary has said, and not only a mistake but quite untrue to say that we have vetoed Count Sforza's appointment to be the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary of the Italian Government. The Italians alone could do that. The Italians, having unconditionally surrendered, have a perfect right to choose anyone they please for any office of the State.

I think we shall have to put a great deal of responsibility of what might happen on those who called him to power.

[Mr. Shinwell, interrupting, asked whether the Prime Minister had not previously made a statement reflecting upon Gen. Charles de Gaulle.]

How little helpful it is to our debate to have such interruptions. I am not speaking about France today. I certainly never felt about de Gaulle the sentiments which experience has engendered in me about Count Sforza.

De Gaulle is a man of honor and has never broken his word, and that is what I am coming to because these things have to come out. I say we should have to put a great deal of responsibility on those who called Sforza to power. We are not averse of becoming deeply involved in the politics of the liberated countries. All we require from them is a government which will guarantee us the necessary protection and facilities for the lines of communication from Naples to Ravenna, lately taken, and to the north.

Our interest in Italy is the front where we have armies engaged under General Alexander and Gen. Mark Clark, that daring and skillful American general under whom we have confidently placed an army which is at least three-quarters British or British-controlled.

We have a joint arrangement with America about Italy, and we should be very sorry if it were proved that we have broken away from this joint arrangement. We have not done so in any way.

When in the shifting tangles and contortions of Italian politics, with six parties druling over one another, with all their personal and political interests, none of them being hampered by having been elected by anyone, in this confused scene we were suddenly told that Count Sforza was to become Foreign Secretary. The British Minister did undoubtedly say to the Italian inquiry that we did not think Count Sforza a particularly good choice, or words to that effect.

We had a perfect right to say this. We could not stop his being chosen, but we had a right to say our say.

I must go back to the time of the Italian collapse and surrender in 1943. Count Sforza had been living for twenty years in America. He was very anxious to get

back to Italy. We did not think this would be a good thing in the disordered and tumultuous state in which Italy was left on the morrow of her revolt against Germany. On Sept. 23 Count Sforza sent the following message to Marshal Badoglio and repeated it in a letter to Mr. Berle, then an American Assistant Secretary of State, from which I have the President's permission to quote.

[Mr. Churchill quoted Count Sforza as writing that he would support Marshal Badoglio fully and that "the only way to destroy the last criminal remnants of fascism" was to adjourn the matter of internal Italian politics for the period after the struggle. He added: 'I pledge my honor to do this myself and urge this course upon my many friends and associates.']

When Count Sforza passed through London I was anxious to ascertain whether this was his sincere resolve. . . . I went through this letter with Count Sforza almost line by line, and he assured me that it was his most profound conviction.

But no sooner, however, had Count Sforza got back to Italy than he began a long series of intrigues which ended in the expulsion of Marshal Badoglio from office.

Now I come to Greece, which forms the mainspring of the vote of censure we have to meet today. I have taken great responsibilities for our foreign policy toward Greece and also in respect of what has taken place in Athens, and the Foreign Secretary and I have worked in the closest agreement. . . .

We have a right to express this point of view on the Greek question because in an attempt to redeem our pledged word we had sustained 30,000 casualties in what might perhaps be called the chivalrous resolve to share the miseries of Greece when she was invaded by Germany and Italy in 1941. At that time we were all alone. . . .

My honored friend, the President, was of the opinion we should certainly have plans made, and accordingly at the Quebec Conference it was proposed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the British should prepare the forces to occupy the Athens area and pave the way for the commencement of relief and for the establishment of law and order and for the installment of the Greek Government which we and the great bulk of the United Nations had formally recognized.

The Americans and ourselves began to accumulate large masses of food and shipping, and the UNRRA began to grow up in Alexandria and other arrangements for food distribution were actively made at the cost of the food of this country. A large part of this and supplies for medical relief were provided by America out of her riches. The rest of the burden fell upon us.

The proposal of the combined chiefs of staff was initiated by the President and me, and on Sept. 14 a directive was issued. . . .

When he [Premier Papandreou] came out, he restored order to the Greek Government, which is the constitutional Government of Greece and can only be displaced by the free vote of the people. At the same time we prepared in deep secrecy our British expedition. We did not think it necessary to tell anyone about it, not even the Greek Government. . . .

Meanwhile the forces of Elass were planning to descend upon Athens as a military political operation and the seizure of power by armed force.

Elass is a mixed body, and it is unfair to stigmatize them all as being self-seeking in their aim and action. Nevertheless, during the years of Greek captivity Elass devoted more attention to beating up and destroying representatives of Elass, commanded by Colonel Zervas, a man of the left by our standards but less extreme than the EAM.

For the last two years Elass have devoted themselves principally to preparations for seizing power. . . .

As to Elas, they did not hesitate on occasions to help the Germans catch and kill supporters of Edes.

From the depredations and ravages of Elas there developed, as we can now well see, a well organized plot by which Elas should march down to Athens and seize it by armed force and establish a reign of terror under the plea that they were purging collaborationists.

How much the Germans knew about this beforehand I cannot tell, but a number had been left behind and are acting in Elas ranks.

. . . We came, therefore, to Greece with American and Russian consent at the invitation of the Government of all parties, bearing with us such good gifts as liberty, order, food and the assurance of an absolute right to determine their own future as soon as conditions of normal tranquility were regained.

I told the House I would be frank with them. I have stated our action in detail. I must admit that not everyone agrees with the course we have taken, for which I accept the fullest responsibility. But the Government . . . agreed that we should see what we could do to give this unfortunate people a fair chance of extricating themselves from their misery and starting on a clear road again.

I repudiate the idea that democracy can stand upon the violent seizure of power by unrepresentative men or by terrorism and the killing of political opponents. No doubt there are others who take a different view. . . .

Moreover, I do not feel it compatible with our honor or with the obligations into which we have entered with many people in Greece in the course of our presence there

to wash our hands of the whole business, make our way to the sea as we easily could, and leave Athens to anarchy, misery and tyranny. We have always been ready to risk our blood in defense of our honor.

In the small hours of Tuesday morning . . . I directed General Scobie to assume complete control of Athens and the districts around and to use what force was necessary to drive out and if necessary to extricate Elas bands. . . .

I also directed our Ambassador to do his utmost to prevail on Papandreou, who seemed to wish to resign, to remain in power. . . .

If I am blamed for this action, I will gladly accept dismissal of the House. But if I am not dismissed, make no mistake, we shall persist in this policy of clearing Athens and the Athens regions of all rebels to the constitutional Government of Greece.

They are mutineers to the order of the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, under whom all guerrillas have undertaken to serve.

I hope I have made the position clear, both generally as it affects the world and the war, and Government.

I have no fear at all that the most searching inquiries into the policy we have pursued in Europe, in Belgium, in Holland, in Italy and in Greece, will entitle any man in whose breast fair play enters to accuse us of a reactionary policy, of hampering the free expression of the national will or endeavoring to enable countries which have suffered the curse of German occupation to resume again the normal free democratic life which they desire and which, as far as this House can act, we shall endeavor to secure for them.

TEXT OF TREATY

Between the Soviet Union and the French Republic

DECEMBER 10, 1944

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, determined to prosecute jointly and to the end the war against Germany, convinced that once victory is achieved, the reestablishment of peace on a stable basis and its prolonged maintenance in the future will be conditioned upon the existence of close collaboration between them and with all the United Nations; having resolved to collaborate in the cause of the creation of an international system of security for the effective maintenance of general peace and for insuring the harmonious development of relations between nations; desirous of confirming the mutual obligations resulting from the exchange of letters of September 20, 1941, concerning joint actions in the war against Germany; convinced that the conclusion of an alliance between the USSR and France corresponds to the sentiments and interests of both peoples, the demands of war, and the requirements of peace and economic reconstruction in full conformity with the aims which the United Nations have set themselves, have decided to conclude a treaty to this effect and appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

The Provisional Government of the French Republic—Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Who, after exchange of their credentials, found in due form, agreed upon the following:

Each of the high contracting parties shall continue the struggle on the side of the other party and on the side of the United Nations until final victory over Germany. Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to render the other party aid and assistance in this struggle with all the means at its disposal.

Article II

The high contracting parties shall not agree to enter into separate negotiations with Germany or to conclude without mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty either with the Hitler government or with any other government or authority set up in Germany for the purpose of the continuation or support of the policy of German aggression.

Article III

The high contracting parties undertake also, after the termination of the present war with Germany, to take jointly all necessary measures for the elimination of any new threat coming from Germany, and to obstruct such actions as would make possible any new attempt at aggression on her part.

Article IV

In the event either of the high contracting parties finds itself involved in military operations against Germany, whether as a result of aggression committed by the latter or as a result of the operation of the above Article III, the other party shall at once render it every aid and assistance within its power.

Article V

The high contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against either of the high contracting parties.

Article VI

The high contracting parties agree to render each other every possible economic assistance after the war, with a view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction of both countries, and in order to contribute to the cause of world prosperity.

Article VII

The present treaty does not in any way affect obligations undertaken previously by the high contracting parties in regard to third states in virtue of published treaties.

Article VIII

The present treaty, whose Russian and French texts are equally valid, shall be ratified and ratification instru-

ments shall be exchanged in Paris as early as possible. It comes into force from the moment of the exchange of ratification instruments and shall be valid for 20 years. If the treaty is not denounced by either of the high contracting parties at least one year before the expiration of this term, it shall remain valid for an unlimited time. Each of the contracting parties will be able to terminate its operation by giving notice to that effect one year in advance.

In confirmation of which, the above plenipotentiaries signed the present treaty and affixed their seals to it.

Done in Moscow in two copies, December 10, 1944.

On the authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Molotov

On the authorization of the Provisional Government of the French Republic

Bidauld

Statement on Poland by Prime Minister Churchill in House of Commons

DECEMBER 15, 1944

In opening this debate I find myself in a position to read to the House again some extracts from the carefully considered statements that I made to them in February, after I had returned from Teheran, and also in October, of the present year. I rely upon those statements, and when I read them over again last night in preparation for this debate I found it very difficult to improve upon them or alter them in any way. This may accuse me of inflexibility of mind, but it also gives me some confidence that I have not misled the House or felt myself stultified, in all respects at any rate, by the harsh and unforeseeable movement of events. It is not often that one wishes to repeat what one said two months ago, and still less 10 months ago, but I propose to do so, because in no other way and in no other words that I can think of can I remind the House and bring home to them the grim, bare bones of the Polish problem.

On February 22nd, I said:

"At Teheran I took occasion to raise personally with Marshal Stalin the question of the future of Poland and I pointed out that it was in fulfillment of our guarantee to Poland that Great Britain declared war upon Nazi Germany and that we had never weakened in our resolve, even in the period when we were all alone, and that the fate of the Polish nation holds a prime place in the thoughts and policies of His Majesty's Government and of the British Parliament. It was with great pleasure that I heard from Marshal Stalin that he, too, was resolved upon the creation and maintenance of a strong, integral, independent Poland as one of the leading powers in Europe. He has several times repeated these declarations in public and I am convinced that they represent the settled policy of the Soviet Union. Here I may remind the House that we ourselves have never in the past guaranteed, on the behalf of His Majesty's Government, any particular frontier line in Poland. We did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920. The British view in 1919 stands expressed in the so-called Curzon Line which attempted to deal, at any rate partially, with the problem. I have always held the opinion that all questions of territorial settlement and readjustment should stand over until the end of the war and that the victorious powers should then arrive at formal and final agreements governing the articulation of Europe as a whole. That is still the wish of His Majesty's Government. However, the advance of the Russian Armies into Polish regions in which the Polish underground army is active makes it indispensable that some kind of

friendly working agreement should be arrived at to govern the wartime conditions and to enable all anti-Hitlerite forces to work together with the greatest advantage against the common foe.

"During the last few weeks"—

I may remind the House that I was speaking on February 22nd—

"the Foreign Secretary and I together have labored with the Polish Government in London with the object of establishing a working arrangement upon which the fighting forces can act, and upon which, I trust, an increasing structure of goodwill and comradeship may be built between Russians and Poles. I have an intense sympathy with the Poles, that heroic race whose national spirit centuries of misfortune cannot quench, but I also have sympathy with the Russian standpoint. Twice in our lifetime Russia has been violently assaulted by Germany. Many millions of Russians have been slain and vast tracts of Russian soil devastated as a result of repeated German aggression. Russia has the right of reassurance against future attacks from the West, and we are going all the way with her to see that she gets it, not only by the might of her arms but by the approval and assent of the United Nations. The liberation of Poland may presently be achieved by the Russian armies after these armies have suffered millions of casualties in breaking the German military machine. I cannot feel that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her Western frontiers goes beyond limits of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the North and in the West."

I said that nearly a year ago. I have nothing to alter in it from the point of view of His Majesty's Government. On October 27, more recently, I reported upon my last visit to Moscow and I said:

"The most urgent and burning question was of course that of Poland, and here again, I speak words of hope, of hope reinforced by confidence."

I am afraid this does not hold in the same degree at the present time.

"To abandon hope in this matter would indeed be to surrender to despair. In this sphere there are two crucial issues. The first is the question of the Eastern frontier of Poland with Russia and the Curzon Line, as it is called, and the new territories to be added to Poland in the North and

in the West. That is the first issue. The second is the relation of the Polish Government with the Lublin National Liberation Committee. On these two points, apart from any subsidiary and ancillary points, we held a series of conferences with both parties. . . .

"I wish I could tell the House that we had reached a solution of these problems. It is certainly not for want of trying. I am quite sure, however, that we have got a great deal nearer to the solution of both."

I say that this part is subject to some review in the light of events.

"I hope Mr. Mikolajczyk will soon return to Moscow, and it will be a great disappointment to all the sincere friends of Poland, if a good arrangement cannot be made which will enable him to form a Polish Government on Polish soil—a Government recognized by all the great powers concerned, and indeed by all those Governments of the United Nations which now recognize only the Polish Government in London. Although I do not underrate the difficulties which remain, it is a comfort to feel that Britain and Soviet Russia, and I do not doubt the United States, are all firmly agreed in the recreation of a strong, free, independent, sovereign Poland loyal to the Allies and friendly to her great neighbor and liberator, Russia. Speaking more particularly for His Majesty's Government it is our persevering and constant aim that the Polish people, after their suffering and vicissitudes, shall find in Europe an abiding home and resting place, which, though it may not entirely coincide or correspond with the prewar frontiers of Poland, will nevertheless be adequate for the needs of the Polish nation and not inferior in character and quality, taking the picture as a whole to what they previously possessed.

"These are critical days and it would be a great pity if time were wasted in indecision or in protracted negotiation. If the Polish Government had taken the advice we tendered them at the beginning of this year, the additional complication produced by the formation of the Polish National Committee of Liberation at Lublin would not have arisen, and anything like a prolonged delay in the settlement can only have the effect of increasing the division between Poles in Poland and also of hampering the common action which the Poles, the Russians and the rest of the Allies are taking against Germany. Therefore, as I say, I hope that no time will be lost in continuing these discussions and pressing them to an effective conclusion."

The hopes which I thought it proper, and indeed necessary, to express in October, have faded. When M. Mikolajczyk left Moscow my hope was that he would return within a week or so with the authority of the Polish Government in London, to agree about the Polish frontiers on the basis of the Curzon Line and its prolongation to the southward called "the Curzon Line A," which comprises, on the Russian side the city of Lvov. I have several times drawn M. Mikolajczyk's attention to the dangers of delay. Had he been able to return after the very friendly conversations which passed between him and Marshal Stalin, and also the conversations which he had with the Lublin National Liberation Committee; had he been able to return, with the assent of his colleagues, I believe that the difficulties inherent in the forming of a Polish Government in harmony with the Lublin Committee, might well have been overcome. In that case he would be at this moment at the head of a Polish Government, on Polish soil, recognized by all the United Nations, and awaiting the advance of the Russian armies moving farther into Poland as the country was delivered from the Germans. He would also be assured in his task of the friendship and help of Marshal Stalin. Thus he could at every stage have established a good relationship between the Polish underground movement and the advancing Russians, and a Polish administration would have been set up by him in the newly delivered regions as they expanded.

I have the greatest respect for M. Mikolajczyk, and for his able colleagues who joined us at Moscow, M. Romer and M. Grabski. I am sure they are more qualified to fill

the place of the late General Sikorski than any other of the Polish leaders. After endless discussions, into some of which we were drawn, on M. Mikolajczyk's return from Moscow the Poles utterly failed to obtain agreement. In consequence, on November 24th, M. Mikolajczyk, M. Romer and a number of other Polish ministers, resigned from the Polish Government, which has been almost entirely reconstituted in a form which in some respects I certainly am not able to applaud. M. Mikolajczyk and his friends remain, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the only light which burns for Poland in the immediate future.

Just as I said that if the Polish Government had agreed, in the early part of this year, upon the frontier there never would have been any Lublin Committee to which Soviet Russia had committed herself, so I now say that if M. Mikolajczyk could swiftly have returned to Moscow early in November, as he hoped and expected to do, with the power to conclude an agreement on the frontier line, Poland might now have taken her full place in the ranks of the nations contending against Germany, and would have had the full support and friendship of Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Government. That opportunity, too, has been, for the time being, suspended. This prospect has vanished like the last. One is reminded of the story of the Sybilline books, in which on every occasion the price remained the same and the number of volumes decreased, until at last they had to be bought on the most unfavorable terms. M. Mikolajczyk's ordeal has been a most severe and painful one. Torn between the love of his country and the intense desire to reach a settlement with her mighty neighbor, which was most abhorrent to many of his fellow countrymen, confronted with the obstinate and inflexible resistance of his London colleagues, whose veto was like the former *Liberum Veto*, which played so great a part in the ruin of Poland, with these circumstances around him, M. Mikolajczyk decided to resign. Almost a month has passed since then, and now I imagine that the prospects of a reconciliation between the Polish Government and the Lublin Committee, with the Soviet Government behind him, have definitely receded; although they might perhaps advance again were M. Mikolajczyk able to speak with authority for the fortunes of the Polish nation.

The consequences of this rescission of hopes of a working agreement between Russia and the Poles have been masked to British eyes by the fact that the Russian armies on the long Vistula Front have been motionless, but when they move forward, as move forward they surely will, and the Germans are expelled from large new tracts of Poland, the area administered by the Lublin Committee will grow and its contacts with the Soviet Government will become more intimate and strong. I do not know what misfortunes will attend such a development. The absence of an agreement may well be grievous for Poland, and the relationship and misunderstandings between the advancing Russian armies and the Polish underground movement may take forms which will be most painful to all who have the permanent well-being of Poland and her relationship with Russia at heart. The fact that a Prime Minister resigns and that a new Government is formed does not, of course, affect the formal diplomatic relationship between states. We still recognize the Polish Government in London as the Government of Poland, as we have done since they reached our shores in the early part of this war. This course has been continued up to the present by all the rest of the United Nations, excepting only Russia which is the power most concerned and the power whose armies will first enter the heart of Poland. It is a source of grief to me that all these forces could not have been joined together more speedily against the common foe.

I cannot accept the view that the arrangements which have to be proposed about the frontiers of the new Poland are not solid and satisfactory, or that they would not give to Poland that "abiding home" of which I spoke to the House in February. If Poland concedes Lvov and the surrounding regions in the South, on the line known as Curzon Line A, which my Right Hon. friend the Foreign Secretary will deal with in more detail later on in the debate—if Poland makes this concession and these lands are joined to the Ukraine, she will gain in the North the whole of East Prussia West and South of the fortress of Königsberg, including the great city and port of Danzig, one of the most magnificent cities and harbors in the whole of the world, famous for centuries as a great gathering place of the trade of the Baltic; and indeed, of the world. This will be hers instead of the threatened and artificial Corridor, which was built so laboriously after the last war, and Poland will stretch broadly along the Baltic on a front of over 200 miles. The Poles are free, so far as Russia and Great Britain are concerned, to extend their territory, at the expense of Germany, to the West. I do not propose to go into exact details, but the extensions, which will be supported by Britain and Russia, bound together as they are by the 20 years' alliance, are of high importance. Thus, they gain in the West and North territories more important and more highly developed than they lose in the East. We hear that a third of Poland is to be conceded, but I must mention that that third includes the vast tract of the Pripet Marshes, a most desolate region, which, though it swells the acreage, does not add to the wealth of those who own it.

Thus I have set before the House what is, in outline, the offer which the Russians, on whom the main burden of liberation still falls, makes to the Polish people. I cannot believe that such an offer should be rejected by Poland. It would, of course, have to be accompanied by the disentanglement of populations in the East and in the North. The transference of several millions of people would have to be effected from the East to the West or North, as well as the expulsion of the Germans—because that is what is proposed: The total expulsion of the Germans—from the area to be acquired by Poland in the West and the North. For expulsion is the method which, so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting. There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble, as has been the case in Alsace-Lorraine. A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed by the prospect of the disentanglement of populations, nor even by these large transferences, which are more possible in modern conditions than they ever were before.

The disentanglement of populations which took place between Greece and Turkey after the last war—my noble friend opposite may remember—was in many ways, a success, and has produced friendly relations between Greece and Turkey ever since. That disentanglement, which at first seemed impossible of achievement, and about which it was said that it would strip Turkish life in Anatolia of so many necessary services, and that the extra population could never be assimilated or sustained by Greece having regard to its own area and population—I say that disentanglement solved problems which had before been the causes of immense friction, of wars and of the rumors of wars. Nor do I see why there should not be room, in Germany for the German populations of East Prussia and of the other territories I have mentioned. After all, 6,000,000 to 7,000,000 Germans have been killed already in this frightful war, into which they did not hesitate, for a second time in a generation, to plunge all Europe. At the present time, we are told that they have 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 prisoners or foreigners used as slaves in Germany, who will, we hope, be restored

to their own homes and lands when victory is gained. Moreover, we must expect that many more Germans will be killed in the fighting which will occupy the spring and summer and which we must expect will involve the largest and fiercest battles yet fought in this war.

When these ideas, which arose at the Teheran Conference, were first foreshadowed by me to the House, the British and American armies had not landed on the Continent. France was not liberated. She was powerless, not like now when she is rising with great rapidity to a strong and fine position among the nations of the world. The armies of General Eisenhower did not stand along the Rhine when these matters were discussed. They were still gathering in this island, not along the Rhine where they are now growing in strength as the waves of American manhood cross the Atlantic and take their places in the crusade and in the line of battle. Nor had the Russians advanced to the Vistula; vast distances separated them even from the frontiers of Poland. Nor was one large German army cut off in Courland, the peninsula which has Memel and Libau at its base. Nor was there that great position which the Russian armies held in the extreme North, with their right hand, nor was their left hand reaching out beyond Budapest in the South, threatening an advance into the very heart of Austria. Nor had Rome been occupied, nor the Apennines pierced.

In those days, the Poles might well have had some show of reason in asking whether the great Allies would have the power, even if they were so minded, to deliver the new territories to Poland which were to compensate her for what she was giving up in the East, but the situation has changed vastly in favor of the Allies and it seems to me extremely unlikely that, after the spring and summer campaigns have been fought—if it be necessary to go so far in the business, and we shall go whatever distance is necessary to complete our object—it seems extremely unlikely that the evil and hateful forces in Germany, who plotted, planned and began this war, will have the power to resist the decisions of a peace or armistice conference, at which the principal victorious powers will be assembled. The prospects of final victory have, in the time that has passed since these matters were first discussed at Teheran, become for the Allies solid and spacious. Therefore, as I say, it has always been said by the Poles, when I have been discussing the matter with them here, "we know what we have to give up: What certainty have we of receiving compensation in other quarters?" They have much more certainty of it now than at this time last year. In fact, I cannot see any doubt whatever that the great powers, if they agree, can effect the transference of population.

I find great difficulty in discussing these matters, because the attitude of the United States has not been defined with the precision which His Majesty's Government have thought it wise to use. The friendship of the United States Government for Poland, no less than our own, the large mass of Poles who have made their homes in the United States, and are, or are becoming, American citizens, the constitutional difficulties of the United States in making treaties and foreign agreements of every kind—all these have not enabled the Government of that great nation to speak in the terms which I have thought it my duty, with the assent of my colleagues, to use in this House. We know, however, that the Government and people of the United States have set their hearts upon a world organization to prevent the outbreak of future wars, and that this world organization will be fatally ruptured by a quarrel between any of the three most powerful empires which compose the Grand Alliance of the United Nations. The President is aware of everything that has passed and of all that is in the minds both

of the Russians and of the British. He had, at Moscow, in Mr. Averell Harriman, the U. S. Ambassador, a most accomplished representative, who in the capacity of observer, was present at all, or nearly all, of our Polish talks on the occasion of our last visit. The President has, therefore, been kept fully informed, not only by His Majesty's Government, but also by his own highly competent and distinguished representatives, and by all the many sources and channels that are open to the unceasing vigilance of the State Department.

I am particularly careful not ever to pretend to speak in the name of any other power unless so directed beforehand, and I hope the House will make allowances for the care with which I pick my words upon this point. All I can say is that I have received no formal disagreement in all these long months upon the way in which the future of Poland seems to be shaping itself—or is being shaped—but no doubt when the time comes the United States will make their own pronouncement on these matters, bearing in mind, as they will the practical aspect which they assume and also that failure on the part of the three greatest powers to work together would damage all our hopes for a future structure, a world government which, whatever else it may fail to do, will at any rate be equipped with all the powers necessary to prevent the outbreak of further war.

It is asked, why cannot all questions of territorial changes be left over till the end of the war? I think that is a most pertinent question and it is, in fact, the answer which I and the Foreign Secretary gave in almost every case that has been presented to us. Well, Sir, I understand the argument. The armies, it is said, may move here and there, their front may advance or recede, this country or that may be in occupation of this space of ground or the other, but it is at the peace table alone that the permanent destiny of any land or people will be decided. Why cannot that be said in this case? It can be said in every case, or almost every case, except in that of Poland. So why should Poland be excepted from this general rule? It is only for Polish advantage and to avoid great evils which might occur. The Russian armies—I know nothing of their intentions, I am speaking only of what is obvious to anyone who studies the war map—will probably, during the early part of next year traverse large areas of Poland, driving the Germans before them. If, during those marches, fierce quarrels and fighting break out between large sections of the Polish population and the Russian troops, very great suffering—which can still be avoided—will infallibly occur, and new poisoned wounds will be inflicted upon those who must dwell side by side in peace, confidence and good neighborliness if the tranquility of Europe is to be assured or the smooth working of the world organization for the maintenance of peace is to be created and maintained.

All these matters are among the most serious which could possibly be examined as far as our present lights allow. Our British principle has been enunciated that, as I have said, all territorial changes must await the conference at the peace table after the victory has been won, but to that principle there is one exception, and that exception is, changes mutually agreed. It must not be forgotten that in the Atlantic Charter is, I think, inserted the exception that there should be no changes before the peace table except those mutually agreed. I am absolutely convinced that it is in the profound future interest of the Polish nation that they should reach agreement with the Soviet Government about their disputed frontiers in the East before the march of the Russian armies through the main part of Poland takes place. That is the great gift they have to make to Russia, a settlement now at this time which gives the firm title of mutual agreement to what might otherwise be disputed at the Peace Confer-

ence. I must, however, say, because I am most anxious the House should understand the whole position, speaking on behalf of His Majesty's Government in a way which I believe would probably be held binding by our successors, that at the Conference we shall adhere to the lines which I am now unfolding to the House, and shall not hesitate to proclaim that the Russians are justly treated, and rightly treated, in being granted the claim they make to the Eastern frontiers along the Curzon Line as described.

The Foreign Secretary and I have labored for many months, we have spared no labor of travel, no risk of political rebuff and consequent censure, in our effort to bring about that good understanding between the Poland whom we still recognize and the mighty ally which has so heavily smitten the German military power. We have never weakened in any way in our resolve that Poland shall be restored and stand erect as a sovereign, independent nation, free to model her social institutions or any other institutions in any way her people choose, provided, I must say, that these are not on Fascist lines, and provided that Poland stands loyally as a barrier and friend of Russia against German aggression from the West. And in this task, of course, Poland will be aided to the full by a Russian and British guarantee and assistance and will also, I cannot doubt, though I cannot declare, be aided by the United States acting at least through the world organization which we are determined to erect—that she and the whole of the United Nations are determined to erect—for the salvation of mankind toiling here below from the horrors of repeated war.

Another great war, especially an ideological war, fought as it would be not only on frontiers but in the heart of every land with weapons far more destructive than men have yet wielded, would spell the doom, perhaps for many centuries, of such civilization as we have been able to erect since history began to be written. It is that peril which according to the best judgment of this National Government of all parties, which has so lately renewed its troth to stand together for the duration of the war against Germany—it is that peril that we have labored and are striving sincerely and faithfully to ward off. Other powerful states are with us on each side, more powerful states perhaps even than the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations. We can only try our best, and if we cannot solve the problem we can at least make sure that it is faced in all its somber magnitude while time remains.

I have spoken of fading hopes and of disappointment at the failure to reach a Russo-Polish agreement, but there has been another disappointment. It has been impossible to arrange any meeting of the three great powers. We had good grounds for believing that we might have met before Christmas. Indeed, I confidently expected that we should, but so far, however, although the prospect is earnestly looked forward to, nothing definite has been settled. Therefore, the strong, authoritative, if provisional decisions which are now required, not only on the Russo-Polish question, but on a host of vital matters, political international, military and economic, apart from such progress as can be made by correspondence and individual visits, stand at the bar and wait. There ought to be a meeting at least of the three great powers at the earliest possible moment. So far as I and my Right Hon. friend the Foreign Secretary are concerned, we can only repeat what has been said so often, that we will proceed to any place at any time, under any conditions, where we can meet the heads of our two chief allies, and we should welcome, above all, a meeting in this island, a meeting in Great Britain, which has waged war from the very outset and has risked, without flinching, national annihilation in the cause of freedom.

STATEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY in President Roosevelt's State of the Union Message to Congress

JANUARY 6, 1945

In the field of foreign policy, we propose to stand together with the United Nations not for the war alone but for the victory for which the war is fought.

It is not only a common danger which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments but of peoples—and the peoples' hope is peace. Here, as in England; in England, as in Russia; in Russia, as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace—a peace that is durable and secure.

It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step—but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight.

The firm foundation can be built—and it will be built. But the continuance and assurance of a living peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an eddy of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the peoples of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with complex problems of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.

Peace can be made and kept only by the united determination of free and peace-loving peoples who are willing to work together—willing to help one another—willing to respect and tolerate and try to understand one another's opinions and feelings.

The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors.

We must not let those differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in winning the war and building the peace.

International cooperation on which enduring peace must be based is not a one-way street.

Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.

In the future world, the misuse of power, as implied in the term "power politics," must not be a controlling factor in international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed. We cannot deny that power is a factor in world politics any more than we can deny its existence as a factor in national politics. But in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power

must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.

Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by a direct attack against international cooperation, but against the alleged imperfections of the peace.

In our disillusionment after the last war, we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfill our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world.

We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same tragic road again—the road to a third world war.

We can fulfill our responsibilities for maintaining the security of our own country only by exercising our power and our influence to achieve the principles in which we believe and for which we have fought.

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and I agreed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, these being later incorporated into the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942. At that time certain isolationists protested vigorously against our right to proclaim the principles—and against the very principles themselves. Today, many of the same people are protesting against the possibility of violation of the same principles.

It is true that the statement of principles in the Atlantic Charter does not provide rules of easy application to each and every one of this war-torn world's tangled situations. But it is a good and a useful thing—it is an essential thing—to have principles toward which we can aim.

And we shall not hesitate to use our influence—and to use it now—to secure so far as is humanly possible the fulfilment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We have not shrunk from the military responsibilities brought on by this war. We cannot and will not shrink from the political responsibilities which follow in the wake of battle.

I do not wish to give the impression that all mistakes can be avoided and that many disappointments are not inevitable in the making of peace. But we must not this time lose the hope of establishing an international order which will be capable of maintaining peace and realizing through the years more perfect justice between nations.

To do this we must be on our guard not to exploit and exaggerate the differences between us and our Allies, particularly with reference to the peoples who have been liberated from fascist tyranny. That is not the way to secure a better settlement of those differences or to secure international machinery which can rectify mistakes which may be made.

I should not be frank if I did not admit concern about many situations—the Greek and Polish for example. But those situations are not as easy or as simple to deal with as some spokesmen, whose sincerity I do not question, would have us believe. We have obligations, not necessarily legal, to the exiled governments, to the underground leaders and to our major Allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did.

We and our Allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. But with internal dissension, with many citizens of liberated countries still prisoners of war or forced to labor in Germany, it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people really want.

During the interim period, until conditions permit a genuine expression of the people's will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the peoples' right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live.

It is only too easy for all of us to rationalize what we want to believe, and to consider those leaders we like responsible and those we dislike irresponsible. And our task is not helped by stubborn partisanship, however understandable, on the part of opposed internal factions.

It is our purpose to help the peace-loving peoples of Europe to live together as good neighbors, to recognize their common interests and not to nurse their traditional grievances against one another.

But we must not permit the many specific and immediate problems of adjustment connected with the liberation of Europe to delay the establishment of permanent machinery for the maintenance of peace. Under the threat of a common danger, the United Nations joined together in war to preserve their independence and their freedom. They must now join together to make secure the independence and freedom of all peace-loving states, so that never again shall tyranny be able to divide and conquer.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, require constant alertness, continuing cooperation, and organized effort.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, can be secured only through institutions capable of life and growth.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding and determination to find a common ground of common understanding, which surrounded the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.

We and the other United Nations are going forward, with vigor and resolution, in our efforts to create such a system by providing for it strong and flexible institutions of joint and cooperative action.

The aroused conscience of humanity will not permit failure in this supreme endeavor.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of inter-communication between peoples over the

past generation offer a practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace and the institutions of peace must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to use these great technological achievements for the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our national life. What we believe in for individuals, we believe in also for nations. We are opposed to restrictions, whether by public act or private arrangement, which distort and impair commerce, transit and trade.

We have housecleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world.

One of the most heartening events of the year in the international field has been the renaissance of the French people and the return of the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations. Far from having been crushed by the terror of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged with stronger faith than ever in the destiny of their country and in the soundness of the democratic ideals to which the French nation has traditionally contributed so greatly.

During her liberation, France has given proof of her unceasing determination to fight the Germans, continuing the heroic efforts of the resistance groups under the occupation and of all those Frenchmen throughout the world who refused to surrender after the disaster of 1940.

Today, French armies are again on the German frontier, and are again fighting shoulder to shoulder with our sons.

Since our landings in Africa, we have placed in French hands all the arms and material of war which our resources and the military situation permitted. And I am glad to say that we are now about to equip large new French forces with the most modern weapons for combat duty.

In addition to the contribution which France can make to our common victory, her liberation likewise means that her great influence will again be available in meeting the problems of peace.

We fully recognize France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the German problem and the contribution which she can make in achieving international security. Her formal adherence to the Declaration by United Nations a few days ago and the proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, whereby France would receive one of the five permanent seats in the proposed Security Council, demonstrate the extent to which France has resumed her proper position of strength and leadership.

Address by Senator Vandenberg on Foreign Policy and Ensuing Debate in U.S. Senate

JANUARY 10, 1945

MR. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, there are critical moments in the life of every nation which call for the straightest, the plainest, and the most courageous thinking of which we are capable. We confront such a moment now. It is not only desperately important to America. It is important to the world. It is important not only to this

generation which lives in blood. It is important to future generations if they shall live in peace.

No man in his right senses will be dogmatic in his viewpoint at such an hour. A global conflict which uproots the earth is not calculated to submit itself to the dominion of any finite mind. The clashes of rival foreign interests,

which have motivated wars for countless centuries, are not likely suddenly to surrender to some simple man-made formula, no matter how nobly meditated. Each of us can only speak according to his little lights—and pray for a composite wisdom that shall lead us to high, safe ground. It is only in this spirit of anxious humility that I speak today. Politics, in any such connection, would be as obnoxious at home as they are in manipulations abroad.

Mr. President, we still have two major wars to win. I said "We." That does not mean America alone. It means the continued and total battle fraternity of the United Nations. It must mean one for all and all for one; and it will mean this, unless somewhere in this grand alliance the stupid and sinister folly of ulterior ambitions shall invite the enemy to postpone our victory through our own rivalries and our own confusion. The United Nations, in even greater unity of military action than heretofore, must never, for any cause, permit this military unity to fall apart. If it does, we shall count the cost in mortal anguish, even though we stumble on to a belated, though inevitable victory. And, getting down to what Mr. Churchill would call the bare bones of the matter, this is an obligation which rests no less upon our allies than upon us, and no less upon us than upon our allies. First things must come first. History will not deal lightly with any who undermine this aim ere it is achieved. Destiny will one day balance any such ghastly accounts.

We not only have two wars to win, we also have yet to achieve such a peace as will justify this appalling cost. Here again an even more difficult unity is indispensable. Otherwise we shall look back upon a futile, sanguinary shambles and—God save the mark—we shall be able to look forward only to the curse of World War No. 3.

Unfortunately, Mr. President, the morale of unity in war is often threatened by sharply clashing and often disillusioning disclosures which threaten this unity in peace. The two considerations cannot be disassociated. President Roosevelt correctly said in his annual message that "the nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we become inevitably conscious of differences among the victors." He also correctly said that "nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue." That applies to us. It applies to each of our allies. But when "differences among the victors"—to use the White House phrase—when "differences among the victors," before they have clinched their victory, threaten both the victory and the peace, the hour cannot much longer be postponed when any such trends shall be reversed. We shall not reverse them by our silence upon the issues that are clearly involved; nor, and I say it with great respect, shall we reverse them merely by a generalized restatement of the high aspirations revocated in the recent presidential message. Certainly we shall not reverse them by a snarling process of international recrimination in which every United Nation's capital tries to outdo the other in bitter back-talk about the infirmities of each. Such bickering is dangerous—over there or over here. It is water on the Axis wheel. Again I agree wholeheartedly with President Roosevelt when he says:

We must not let such differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in winning the war and building the peace.

On the other hand, I hold the deep belief that honest candor, devoid of prejudice or ire, is our greatest hope and our greatest necessity; and that the Government of the United States, above all others, is called at long last to exercise this honest candor not only with its allies but also with its own faithful people.

I hesitate, even now, to say these things, Mr. President,

because a great American illusion seems to have been built up—wittingly or otherwise—that we, in the United States, dare not publicly discuss these subjects lest we contribute to international dissension and thus encourage the very thing we all need to cure. But I frankly confess that I do not know why we must be the only silent partner in this grand alliance. There seems to be no fear of disunity, no hesitation in Moscow, when Moscow wants to assert unilateral war and peace aims which collide with ours. There seems to be no fear of disunity, no hesitation in London, when Mr. Churchill proceeds upon his unilateral way to make decisions often repugnant to our ideas and our ideals. Perhaps our allies will plead that their actions are not unilateral; that our President, as Bevin said, has initiated this or that at one of the famous Big Three conferences; that our President, as Churchill said, has been kept constantly "aware of everything that has happened"; in other words, that by our silence we have acquiesced. But that hypothesis would only make a bad matter worse. It would be the final indictment of our silence—the final obituary for open covenants. We, of course, accept no conception that our contribution to unity must be silence, while others say and do what they please, and that our only role in this global tragedy is to fight and die and pay, and that unity for us shall be the unity which Jonah enjoyed when he was swallowed by the whale.

I hasten to say that any such intolerable conception would be angrily repudiated by every American—from the President down to the last citizen among us. It has not been and is not true. Yet it cannot be denied that our Government has not spoken out—to our own people or to our allies—in any such specific fashion as have the others. It cannot be denied, as a result, that too often a grave melancholy settles upon some sectors of our people. It cannot be denied that citizens, in increasing numbers, are crying: "What are we fighting for?" It cannot be denied that our silence—at least our public and official silence—has multiplied confusion at home and abroad. It cannot be denied that this confusion threatens our unity—yes, Mr. President, and already hangs like a cloud over Dumbarton Oaks. So I venture to repeat, with all the earnestness at my command, that a new rule of honest candor in Washington—as a substitute for mystifying silence or for classical generalities—honest candor on the high plane of great ideals—is the greatest contribution we can make to the realities of unity at this moment when enlightened civilization is our common stake.

Let us not mistake the meaning of unity. Unity does not require universal and peremptory agreement about everything. It does not demand a meeting of all minds now in respect to all the minutiae of a post-war world which will take years to stabilize. The President is wholly right in pleading for tolerance upon this score and to warn that we must not expect what he calls perfectionism overnight. Here in the Senate we do not have perpetual agreement between the two sides of the aisle, but we have never failed to have basic unity when crisis calls. The unity I discuss is the over-all tie which must continue to bind the United Nations together in respect to paramount fundamentals. We had it once in the original spirit of the Atlantic Charter, and we must get it back again before it is too late.

When Mr. Churchill spoke in the British Parliament last December 15, defending his own current course in Greece and Mr. Stalin's proposed partition of Poland, he said:

There is no doubt that when the time comes the United States will make its own pronouncement upon these matters, bearing in mind, as it will, the practical aspects which these matters assume and also how much failure on the part of the

three greatest powers to work together would damage all our hopes for the future structure of a world government which, whatever else it might fail to do, will at any rate be equipped with all powers necessary to prevent outbreak of future war.

I do not like one of the implications in this quotation. It seems to say that unless we acquiesce in these self-serving unilateral arrangements now being made by great European powers, we shall be the scapegoats to be made responsible for the next war. I would respond categorically to any such abortive thesis by saying that, regardless of the future structure of a world government, an unjust peace, built upon the age-old frictions of international power politics, is the most fatal of all threats which our hopes for the future can possibly confront. But that is not the reason I use the quotation at this point. Of even greater importance is the other implication—namely, that the United States has not spoken; that her official attitude is not dependably recorded; and that, until she does speak, the world cannot find its bearings.

There is no doubt—

Says Mr. Churchill—

that when the time comes the United States will make its own pronouncement.

When the time comes. Mr. President, is the time not here right now?

If it is, Mr. President, what shall we say that we have not already said in the Connally resolution in the Senate and the Fulbright resolution in the House and in the presidential utterances?

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the first thing we must say, beyond misunderstanding, is that we have not altered our original commitments; that we have not lowered our sights; that we have not diluted our dedications; that we are not fighting to pull ancient chestnuts out of alien fires; that the smell of victory is not an anaesthetic which puts our earlier zeals to sleep. We will propose to win this war, come what may. We are fighting to defend America. We still propose to help create the post-war world on a basis which shall stop aggressors for keeps and, so far as humanly possible, substitute justice for force among free men. We propose to do it primarily for our own sake. We still propose also, to substitute justice for force—if we can—in writing the peace which terminates this war when we deal with the victims of Axis tyranny. That is the road to permanent peace. We still propose that none of the United Nations shall seek aggrandizement, territorial, or otherwise—though conceding that all change is not necessarily aggrandizement. We still propose, outside the Axis, that there shall be no territorial changes which do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. Similarly we still propose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live. We still propose to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them, if it lies within our power.

In a word, Mr. President, it seems to me that the first thing we must do is to reassert, in high places, our American faith in these particular elemental objectives of the so-called Atlantic Charter, which was officially issued as a signed document by the State Department on August 14, 1941; which was officially communicated to the Congress as a signed document by the President of the United States in his message of August 21, 1941; which was embodied in a joint resolution of all the United Nations on January 1, 1942; which was commemorated by the President on August 14, 1943 in a proclamation on the second anniversary of its "signing"—his word—which had a tragic sinking spell when its formal authenticity was

amazingly depreciated in a White House press conference a fortnight ago, but which the President reembraced in his message of January 6, 1945.

I am sure the President did not anticipate the shocking results of his recent almost jocular, and even cynical, dismissal of the Atlantic Charter as a mere collection of fragmentary notes. It jarred America to its very hearthstones. It seemed to make a mere pretense out of what has been an inspiringly accepted fact. It seemed almost to sanction alien contempts. It seemed to suggest that we have put too much emphasis upon a fighting creed which did not deserve the solemnity which we have been taught to ascribe to it. Coming at a particularly critical moment when these pledges seemed to be at least partially paralyzed in Moscow—and when even Mr. Churchill's memory about the charter was proving to be admittedly fickle—the President's statement was utterly devastating in its impact. He has since sought to repair this damage. I hope he has succeeded. With justification he reminds us in his annual message that there are no rules of easy application—of the Charter—to each and every one of this war-torn world's tangled situations. He now says correctly and bravely, "We shall not hesitate to use our influence—and use it now—to secure so far as is humanly possible the fulfillment of these principles." That is the indispensable point. These basic pledges cannot now be dismissed as a mere nautical nimbus. They march with our armies. They sail with our fleets. They fly with our eagles. They sleep with our martyred dead. The first requisite of honest candor, Mr. President, I respectfully suggest, is to relight this torch.

The next thing we need to do, Mr. President, if I may be so bold, in this spirit of honest candor, is to appeal to our allies, in the name of reason, to frankly face the post-war alternatives which are available to them and to us as a means to preserve tomorrow's peace for them and for us. There are two ways to do it. One way is by exclusive individual action in which each of us tries to look out for himself. The other way is by joint action in which we undertake to look out for each other. The first way is the old way which has twice taken us to Europe's interminable battlefields within a quarter century. The second way is the new way in which our present fraternity of war becomes a new fraternity of peace. I do not believe that either we or our allies can have it both ways. They serve to cancel out each other. We cannot tolerate unilateral privilege in a multilateral peace. Yet, that seems to be the fatalistic trend today. I think we must make our choice. I think we must make it wholly plain to our major allies that they, too, must make their choice.

I hasten to make my own personal viewpoint clear. I have always been frankly one of those who has believed in our own self-reliance. I still believe that we can never again—regardless of collaborations—allow our national defense to deteriorate to anything like a point of impotence. But I do not believe that any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its own exclusive action. Since Pearl Harbor, World War No. 2 has put the gory science of mass murder into new and sinister perspective. Our oceans have ceased to be moats which automatically protect our ramparts. Flesh and blood now compete unequally with winged steel. War has become an all-consuming juggernaut. If World War No. 3 ever unhappily arrives, it will open new laboratories of death too horrible to contemplate. I propose to do everything within my power to keep those laboratories closed for keeps. I want maximum American cooperation, consistent with legitimate American self-interest, with constitutional process and with collateral events which warrant it, to make the basic idea of Dumbarton Oaks succeed. I want a new dignity and a new authority for international law.

I think American self-interest requires it. But, Mr. President, this also requires whole-hearted reciprocity. In honest candor I think we should tell other nations that this glorious thing we contemplate is not and cannot be one-sided. I think we must say again that unshared idealism is a menace which we could not undertake to underwrite in the post-war world.

Now, I am not so impractical as to expect any country to act on any final motive other than self-interest. I know of no reason why it should. That is what nations are for. I certainly intend that intelligent and loyal American self-interest shall be just as vigilantly and vigorously guarded as is amply obvious, from time to time, in their own behalf by the actions of our allies. The real question always becomes just this: Where does real self-interest lie?

Here, Mr. President, we reach the core of the immediate problem. Without remotely wanting to be invidious, I use one of many available examples. I would not presume, even under these circumstances, to use it except that it ultimately involves us. Russia's unilateral plan appears to contemplate the engulfment, directly or indirectly, of a surrounding circle of buffer states, contrary to our conception of what we thought we were fighting for in respect to the rights of small nations and a just peace. Russia's announced reason is her insistent purpose never again to be at the mercy of another German tyranny. That is a perfectly understandable reason. The alternative is collective security. Now, which is better, in the long view? That is the question I pose. Which is better, in the long view, from a purely selfish Russian standpoint: To forcefully surround herself with a cordon of unwillingly controlled or partitioned states, thus affronting the opinions of mankind, as a means of post-war protection against a renaissance of German aggression, or to win the priceless asset of world confidence in her by embracing the alternative, namely, full and wholehearted cooperation with and reliance on a vital international organization in which all of us shall honorably participate to guarantee that Axis aggression shall never rise again? Well—at that point, Russia, or others like her, in equally honest candor, has a perfect right to reply, "Where is there any such alternative reliance until we know what the United States will do? How can you expect us to rely on an enigma?"

Now we are getting somewhere. Fear of reborn German aggression in years to come is at the base of most of our contemporary frictions. It is a perfectly human and understandable fear on the part of all neighboring nations which German militarism has twice driven to the valley of the shadow within one generation. Fear of reborn German aggression in years to come is the cause assigned to unilateral plans for Russian post-war expansion. Fear of reborn German aggression is the reason assigned to the proposed partition of Poland. Fear of reborn German aggression gave birth to the Anglo-Soviet agreement of 1942, the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement of 1943, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 1944, and to similar unilateral and bilateral actions inevitably yet to come. Fear of reborn German aggression is our apple of discord. This second World War plagues the earth chiefly because France and Britain did not keep Germany disarmed, according to contract, after World War No. 1. In other words, when we deal with Europe's fear—her justified fear—of another rebirth of German military tyranny in some future post-war era, we are at the heart of the immediate problem which bedevils our Allied relationships.

I propose that we meet this problem conclusively and at once. There is no reason to wait. America has this same self-interest in permanently, conclusively, and effectively disarming Germany and Japan. It is simply unthinkable that America, or any other member of the

United Nations, would allow this Axis calamity to reproduce itself again. Whether we Americans do or do not agree upon all the powers that shall reside in all ultimate international council to call upon us for joint military action in behalf of collective security, surely we can agree that we do not ever want an instant's hesitation or doubt about our military cooperation in the peremptory use of force, if needed, to keep Germany and Japan demilitarized. Such a crisis would be the lengthened shadow of the present war. It would be a direct epilog to the present war. It should be handled as this present war is handled. There should be no more need to refer any such action back to Congress than that Congress should expect to pass upon battle plans today. The Commander in Chief should have instant power to act, and he should act. I know of no reason why a hard-and-fast treaty between the major Allies should not be signed today to achieve this dependable end. We need not await the determination of our other post-war relationships. This problem—this menace—stands apart by itself. Regardless of what our later decision may be in respect to the power that shall be delegated to the President to join our military force with others in a new peace league—no matter what limitations may commend themselves to our ultimate judgments in this regard, I am sure we can agree that there should be no limitations when it comes to keeping the Axis out of piracy for keeps. I respectfully urge that we meet this problem now. From it stems many of today's confusions, doubts, and frustrations. I think we should immediately put it behind us by conclusive action. Having done so, most of the reasons given for controversial unilateral and bilateral actions by our allies will have disappeared; and then we shall be able, at least, to judge accurately whether we have found and cured the real hazard to our relationships. We shall have closed ranks. We shall have returned infinitely closer to basic unity.

Then, in honest candor, Mr. President, I think we have the duty and the right to demand that whatever immediate unilateral decisions have to be made in consequence of military need—and there will be such even in civil affairs—they shall all be temporary and subject to final revision in the objective light of the post-war world and the post-war peace league as they shall ultimately develop. As President Roosevelt put it in his annual message:

During the interim period, until conditions permit a genuine expression of the peoples' will, we and our allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the peoples' right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live.

I agree to that. Indeed, I would go further. I would write it in the bond. If Dumbarton Oaks should specifically authorize the ultimate international organization to review protested injustices in the peace itself, it would at least partially nulify the argument that we are to be asked to put a blank-check warrant behind a future status quo which is unknown to us and which we might be unwilling to defend.

We are standing by our guns with epic heroism. I know of no reason why we should not stand by our ideals. If they vanish under ultimate pressures, we shall at least have kept the record straight; we shall have kept faith with our soldier sons; and we then shall clearly be free agents, unhampered by tragic misunderstandings, in determining our own course when Berlin and Tokyo are in Allied hands. Let me put it this way for myself: I am prepared, by effective international cooperation, to do our full part in charting happier and safer tomorrows. But I am not prepared to guarantee permanently the spoils of an unjust peace. It will not work.

Mr. President, we need honest candor even with our foes. Without any remote suggestion of appeasement—indeed, it seems to me that it is exactly the contrary—I wish we might give these Axis peoples some incentive to desert their own tottering tyrannies by at least indicating to them that the quicker they unconditionally surrender the cheaper will be unconditional surrender's price. Here again we need plain speaking which has been too conspicuous by its absence, and, upon at least one calamitous occasion, by its error.

Mr. President, I conclude as I began. We must win these wars with maximum speed and minimum loss. Therefore we must have maximum Allied cooperation and minimum Allied frictions. We have fabulously earned the right to be heard in respect to the basis of this unity. We need the earliest possible clarification of our relations with our brave allies. We need this clarification not only for the sake of total Allied cooperation in the winning of the war but also in behalf of a truly compensatory peace. We cannot drift to victory. We must have maximum united effort on all fronts. We must have maximum united effort in our councils. And we must deserve the continued united effort of our own people.

I realize, Mr. President, in such momentous problems how much easier it is to be critical than to be correct. I do not wish to meddle. I want only to help. I want to do my duty. It is in this spirit that I ask for honest candor in respect to our ideals, our dedications, and our commitments, as the greatest contribution which government can now make to the only kind of realistic unity which will most swiftly bring our victorious sons back home, and which will best validate our aspirations, our sacrifices, and our dreams.

MR. AUSTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lucas in the chair). Does the Senator from Michigan yield to the Senator from Vermont?

MR. VANDENBERG. I yield.

MR. AUSTIN. Let me say that I am greatly cheered by the Senator's address, which I regard as one of the most important addresses to the people of America, to our allies, and especially to our enemies that I have ever heard. What I want to ask the distinguished Senator from Michigan is, Does he not believe that the conception of policing the enemy, which he has so clearly pictured to us today, was envisioned in the draft of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and expressly referred to in chapter 12, entitled "Transitional Arrangements," and paragraph 2, which reads:

No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as the result of the present war by the governments having responsibility for such action.

That is my question.

MR. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, I am very happy to respond. First I want to thank my able friend from Vermont for his generous comment. I totally agree that the Dumbarton Oaks agreement contemplates the precise thing I am talking about. The point I am undertaking to make this morning is that obviously it is going to be perhaps many months before Dumbarton Oaks arrives at a finality. Even the preliminary draft in the words of its own authors is only 90 per cent concluded, and the final 10 per cent is the most difficult of all. I agree that the Dumbarton Oaks agreement and the proposed international organization under it contemplates the precise responsibility to which I have referred. Since we now see with our own eyes and hear with our own ears that it is the asserted fear of reborn militarism in Germany after our victory which drives our allies into unilateral and bilateral action to protect themselves, and since it

seems to me that we ought to be able to agree upon this much of a compact instantly, the point I make is only that we should not wait final perfectionism, to borrow the President's word, to achieve this purpose, but that we should do it right now in full measure and full faith for the purpose of clearing the track.

MR. AUSTIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

MR. VANDENBERG. I yield.

MR. AUSTIN. On the practical procedure in arriving at that very much desired objective, does not the Senator regard the bilateral agreements made, between Russia and Great Britain, between Russia and Czechoslovakia, and between Russia and France as steps advancing toward that objective, and that the United States can well afford to associate itself with the countries that surround Germany in the organizations of the nations that are competent to keep the enemies of peace under control and in obedience to law?

MR. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, I agree with the able Senator completely that the three bilateral treaties to which he has referred are in no sense incompatible with the thing we are talking about, and that they are in no degree at odds with the contemplated Dumbarton Oaks formula. But the Senator well knows—and I do not care to survey the field in detail for obvious reasons—that, in addition to these particular bilateral agreements which are the subject of our present colloquy, there has been unilateral actions which in no sense conform either with the dedications to which we gave our original war faith or to the peace aspirations which we hope we may culminate. It occurs to me, if I may reply further to the Senator, that the three bilateral agreements to which he refers merely emphasize the point I make that apparently the predominating motive in the minds of our allies is as quickly as possible to find some way to cinch for themselves protection against the renaissance of German militarism after this war is done; and I am saying that, rather than for us merely to associate ourselves with these bilateral affairs, I think it would be far more effective if we stepped right up to the line tomorrow and took this particular problem, which, obviously, from the record is of major importance to our allies as well as to us, and undertook to answer it beyond any possibility of peradventure now.

MR. AUSTIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I agree with him entirely on that proposition, and I am very glad that he has made clear the distinction between policing our enemies and arranging for a general-security organization which has reference to policing our friends and policing ourselves.

MR. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I have been greatly interested in the remarks of the eminent Senator from Michigan. I shall not at this time undertake to make any comprehensive reply to or comment on his address. I wish to say to the Senator, however, that it occurs to me that, however desirable his suggestion about settling certain aspects of the international situation at the moment may be, I am sure that any mind would conceive that it would be a very difficult thing, with the great multitude of phases and angles of international affairs, ever to induce our allies to segregate and settle parts of these matters at the present time. It seems to me inevitable that most of these issues cannot be settled at the moment but must wait the definitive treaty of peace.

The President has repeatedly said in public that he has made no commitments with regard to these matters. The President is expected to have a conference with Stalin and Churchill at a very early date, and it would seem very well and very appropriate for us to withhold too much discussion, at least, on these matters until that meeting can take place.

The Senator from Michigan makes a very acute sug-

gestion, that if we could settle the question of disarmament with Germany and with Japan immediately, we would take away from our allies their anxiety about the arrangements which they hope to make to protect themselves.

Let me say to the Senator that the greatest inducement we can offer and the greatest guaranty we can give to our allies, and they, in turn, can give to the peace of the world, is the assurance by the United States that we are going to stand by the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, and its improvement by the high officials of the United Nations who will convene at an early date.

It occurs to me that if there is any unrest among our allies as to what may happen in the post-war period it arises from a fear that the United States may not ratify the treaty establishing an international organization for peace, just as we failed to ratify one at the end of the First World War. I wish to say to Senators that criticisms and evidences of disunity here at home are not going to enhance the assurance in the minds of the nations across the sea that we in fact intend to ratify and stand by the creation of an international organization for peace.

I was glad to note that the Senator from Michigan made it clear that in his own mind no nation, in the conditions of modern development of warfare, can of its own edict, of its own will, immunize itself from the horrors and tragedies of war, once the world is engulfed in war. Mr. President, there is no automatic machinery which shuts the door any more against international conflict and war, whether we wish it or whether we do not. We did not wish the present war, yet when Pearl Harbor occurred, with all its tragedy and all its blood, we were inevitably engulfed in the World War, because, so soon as we assumed the right to repel the attack of the Japanese, Germany, of her own volition, because of her alliance with Japan, made a declaration of war against the United States.

So we might as well conclude now that either we go back to the old order, with all its dangers, with all its horrors, with all its blood, and with all its tragedy, or there must be the creation of an international organization, in which we, with the ideals which are spoken of so loftily, shall take the leadership, and say to the world that we are willing to stand by that sort of an organization.

Mr. President, the organization will not be perfect. There will be some places where the critic's sword can find a weak spot. It is out on the frontier, it is in virgin territory, it is more or less experimental; but we shall trust to the genius of those who follow in the years to come, with the right to modify it and adjust it and to add chapters in this rapidly moving world. But it is worth the effort.

No great accomplishment was ever brought about except after conception, and an effort to achieve it. The Thirteen Original States were engulfed in chaos and uncertainty under the Articles of Confederation until a few daring souls assumed to undertake the establishment of the Constitution of the United States. We may say the Constitution was not perfect. Three thousand amendments to the Constitution of the United States have been offered in the Senate. Because there was something about it here and there which men did not like was no reason for its rejection, or for its abolition.

Mr. President, one other word and I shall conclude. I hear much talk about our foreign policy. Orators thrust their hands in their bosoms, columnists grasp their fountain pens and put their typewriters to work and say, "The United States has no foreign policy," and they want to know what our foreign policy is.

When they make such statements and propound such

inquiries they are unconsciously comparing what they call our foreign policy with the foreign policy of some foreign country. We have no foreign policy in the sense that we are all over the earth trying to grab territories here, there, and elsewhere. We have no foreign policy if the idea is to seek preferential trade agreements and advantages all over the earth. But we do have a foreign policy which is known to all who want to know it. It is known to all except a few critics.

Mr. President, is there any doubt among all the peoples of the earth that the United States is earnestly devoted to international peace? I think not, and I hope we shall evidence our devotion to it here in the Senate when we ratify the structure of an international organization for peace.

Is there any idea among the peoples of the earth that we entertain ambitions for forcible accession of territory to the United States? We had Cuba under our control, and in the Platt amendment we said to Cuba, "Take your freedom, establish your own free government. We will retain only such jurisdiction, of an advisory character, as is necessary to see that you are protected in your right to have free government." We later repealed even the Platt amendment. The Philippines belonged to us, and we said to the Filipino people, "If you set up a free government of your own choosing, you may have your liberty from United States rule."

Is there any doubt about that being an element of our foreign policy? Is there any doubt that we have adhered to the principle of arbitration, that we have submitted to numberless arbitrations international quarrels to which we were parties? Is not that an evidence of international peace idealism? Is not that an evidence of a definite foreign policy? When Mr. Monroe gave to the world the Monroe Doctrine, we stated something about our foreign policy. We have a foreign policy, of course we have, and those who desire to know what it is have but to read the brilliant pages of history of the past.

I did not intend to project these remarks to this length, but I do wish to say to the Senator from Michigan that I shall reexamine his speech with care. I realize his interest in international peace, and the construction of an international organization. He has been giving the matter very assiduous attention for more than two years in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I have every hope that, consulting fully his reason, as he always does, and forming his conclusions from the inevitable situation of the world, when the test comes in the Senate the Senator from Michigan will be voting for and advocating the adoption of an international organization in behalf of peace.

MR. WILEY. Mr. President, the subject of my present remarks is The American Charter of today. After listening to the dynamic speech by the senior Senator from Michigan [MR. VANDENBERG], I am sure anyone could speak, even without notes or outline, in relation to the foreign policy situation. I believe he expressed in large measure the hopes and the fears of the American people.

There is just one thing I wish to say before I take up the subject of my thoughts. It is that America has never failed the world. While she did not join the League of Nations, she did join the Nine Power Pact; and when Japan went into Manchuria and the League of Nations was a functioning organization in Europe, it was America that suggested to the other nations that they invoke the power of the Nine Power Pact to stop Japan in Manchuria. America did not fail. It was the other nations that failed.

I again call attention to the fact that when Hitler first violated the Versailles Treaty and went into the Rhine area, we were not a member of the League of Nations. But Britain, France, and other nations were. However, Britain and France could not get together then with

respect to stopping Hitler. Had they done so or had they "played ball" with us when we suggested stopping the Jap in Manchuria, the world situation of today would not be what it is. I mention these matters only because in the debates to follow there will be a tendency to blame America because of the failure of the League.

Last night I sat at dinner, in his home, with a former Senator from my State. He told me a historical fact. He said it was President Wilson who defeated the League. He said that Viscount Grey, the then British Ambassador to the United States, had written a letter in which Britain agreed to the reservations, but nevertheless President Wilson told his Democratic associates in this chamber to vote against the resolution with the reservations. That is a historical fact.

In these early days of the Seventy-ninth Congress, the eyes of the world are upon our two great legislative chambers; the ears of the world are strained to hear our opening deliberations; the minds of the world are geared to note the direction in which this Congress is to move. Would it not be well that we announce to the world the spirit of this occasion? I believe in large measure that the speech of the senior Senator from Michigan was the very heart and essence of that spirit. May I, therefore, as a humble Member of the United States Senate, venture my conception of that spirit?

It is my belief and my hope that the Seventy-ninth Congress is today embarking upon its course in the spirit of what may be called the American Charter. This Charter is written and unwritten. It is as old as the nation itself, and even older. It is the mellow blend of all the great recorded documents, and all the experiences and time-proven teachings of the American past.

It is this spirit of the American Charter which I should like to set forth now, for of late we have heard on every lip only the parallel words, the "Atlantic Charter." We have watched the rising and falling fortunes of that proclamation with great concern. Yet it has become quite obvious that, regardless of its ultimate fate—and God grant that its fate be a kindly one—America needs a restatement of its own charter. It needs to have presented anew the historical guiding principles of our domestic affairs. It needs to see again vividly as "a sign in the sky" the American credo. Moreover, it needs a Congress, this Congress, to apply and fulfill the American Charter as never before.

And so, may I offer to this great body my brief interpretation of the American Charter or, as the modernists would put it, "The American Charter of today"? I offer these thoughts on it in all humility. Let every loyal citizen of this land interpret the legacy of America according to his lights, as I have. Let every citizen, including every schoolboy and schoolgirl, devote a part of his time to a study of the very essence of this charter.

No one need trouble himself about whether the American Charter is a signed document, for it is composed partly of many signed documents. But what is more important, it is engraved in the hearts of our Congress, our judges, our worthy leaders, and our people.

Having just recently gone through a political campaign, I digress here to state that the House in adopting the Fulbright resolution and the Senate in adopting its resolution months before the holding of the campaign, definitely indicated by almost unanimous vote, in this body, at least, their position in relation to collaboration. All the smoke screens since must have been for some diabolical purpose. The utilization of such methods has contributed to the confusion of American thinking, as has the recent attitude of newspapers of Great Britain which thought it was a part of their obligation to publish certain articles and editorials.

No one need trouble himself about the American Charter's authors, for they were the great public servants and

ordinary citizens of the past. No one need trouble himself about its effect. It can do naught but insure eternal vigilance for the preservation of the values which made this Nation great, and which will make it greater yet. A restatement thereof can do naught but reset aright our national compass. Where are we going? Where are we heading? When we get there, what are we to find? A restatement can do naught but stabilize us and end our political jitterbugging in every direction. No one need trouble himself that the American Charter conflicts with the Atlantic Charter, for it complements that Charter on the home front.

Mr. President, you may ask, What is this Charter? You interpret it for your children. You interpret it for yourself. I am giving my interpretation of it because, as in every other activity of human life, it is well to take a refreshment course; it is well to be tuned up; it is well to get a shot in the arm.

Here, then, is the American Charter of today:

First. Our heritage: We Americans proclaim our undying reverence for the ideals expressed in the great documents of the Republic—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, Washington's Farewell Address, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. We proclaim our undiminished respect for the lessons learned and taught in the lives of our forefathers. We proclaim our unyielding faith in the eternal religious truths upon which our nation was founded. We proclaim our continued pride in the physical magnificence of our land and the cultural wonders of our peoples of many origins.

We reject the cynicism, the skepticism, the materialism which violate the cherished loves, traditions, and beliefs of previous generations of Americans.

Second. Our challenge of the present: We Americans proclaim our unswerving determination to win this war quickly and decisively. At the same time, we declare our intention so to strengthen the foundation of the nation as to insure an unqualifiedly joyous homecoming for our millions of service men and women.

We spurn all bitter quarrels which would lead to disunity in war, and to paralysis in peace.

Third. Our opportunity of the future: We Americans proclaim our confidence in the dynamic, progressive future of our growing nation and in its unlimited economic, political, and spiritual frontiers.

We decline defeatism; we foresake fear as to our national destiny. We look to our native ingenuity and our free initiative to result in such research and other achievements in production and distribution as will bring about an abundance of comforts and necessities for all.

Fourth. Our way of life: We Americans proclaim our consecration to the American home and the American family with their traditional tranquillity, independence, freedom, and richness.

We refuse to allow any invasion or weakening of these basic units of our national life through arbitrary action or restraint by government.

Fifth. Our social justice: We Americans proclaim our intention to insure for each toiler—the farmer, the laborer, the miner, the middleman, the manager, the professional—a just portion of the fruits of his labor, not of the labor of anybody else, but of his own labor. We desire that each toiler shall freely advance and prosper according to his individual merit. We desire that in the event of economic misfortune, handicap, or disability, and in his declining years he shall have the appropriate security which he deserves.

We will not deny or take unjustly from any man the bread or pleasure he has earned by the sweat of his brow or the toil of his brain. Nor will we, by conscienceless hand-outs impair the character of any man by depriving him of his initiative and independence.

Sixth. Our Government: We Americans proclaim our desire for courteous, efficient, and economical administration at and between all levels of government. We proclaim our belief in a government of checks and balances, with its mutual safeguards and mutual stimuli. We proclaim our desire for leaders, and, indeed, for citizens, of vision, courage, practicality, and independence.

We will not allow our Government to be our master, rather than our servant. We will not allow it to be a law-unto-itself with extravagance, arrogance, and inefficiency. We absolutely reject communism, fascism, and every other form of stateism which trades liberty for supposed security or power, and ultimately gives neither.

Seventh. Our middle way: We proclaim our faith in our fundamental system of private enterprise. We endorse cooperative endeavor wherever it is desired by our citizens. We believe in Government participation as an operator in the economic field only when absolutely necessary, and then under conditions of fair and helpful dealings to private enterprise.

We refuse to allow public enterprise to swallow up private enterprise by crippling it with arbitrary restrictions, driving it to the wall by ruinous competition or through other devious measures.

Eighth. Our relations with one another: We Americans proclaim our recognition of our responsibilities as citizens, as partners, and as brothers. We will live up to standards of openness, fairness, and reasonableness in all our intercourse with other citizens and other groups.

We forswear the use of physical force, or verbal weapons such as misrepresentation, character assassination, smoke screening, hysteria, or other base means in the relations between management and labor, between political groups, between different income groups, between regions of the nation, and between members of the public.

Ninth. Our defense: We Americans proclaim our intention to be adequately prepared for every future military contingency. After two world wars we have our eyes open; the blinders have been removed, and I do not want any unsound reasoning in this body to put those blinders back. We will not allow our military defenses to deteriorate and another Pearl Harbor to occur.

Tenth. Our relations with foreign nations: We Americans proclaim our willingness to discharge fully our world obligations, which have increased since Pearl Harbor, to the end of serving international justice, peace, and prosperity. We announce we will pursue this end with the same realism, sympathy, and understanding we will practice on the home front.

We reject a double standard for our conduct in home and foreign affairs. We want no dealing under the table. We have become a part of the international picture whether we like it or not, and we are asking of all those with whom we collaborate that there be no double dealing, that the cards be put on the table. We no more desire stealth or injustice by our leaders abroad than we do at home. All the blessings we desire for ourselves, we wish for all other peoples. But we will not arbitrarily intrude in any other peoples' enjoyment of their way of life. Nor will we allow any other people to intrude in our way of life. Nor will we allow our own way of life to be radically changed in order to please any other government or people.

Mr. President, these, then, are what I believe to be the essences of the American Charter of today and of our spirit in this newly convened body.

It is my fervent hope that the ideas contained in the American charter of today—however it be faithfully interpreted—may prove a guiding star. May this star shine brightly for ourselves here in Congress, for our people, for our children and our children's children, as we blaze new trails along the American way. May this star

be particularly visible through the long night of war and post-war to all the men and women in the Halls of Congress, in our homes, our fields, our factories, our farms, and in all our theaters of military training and combat.

It is my firm belief that there is no problem which can arise in this land which cannot be solved quickly and satisfactorily if we apply the principles of the American charter and the great documents, deeds, and words which provided its origin.

It is my earnest conviction that, by applying these principles, we may be able to fulfill that great counsel, "Be ye adequate."

It is my sincere prayer that the revitalized American Charter may inspire every American here and elsewhere to say unto his fellow American:

"I am thy brother. I am thy keeper and thou art mine. Let us join our hands in proud labor and our hearts in proud faith and, under God, we shall make of this land the Eden it was intended to be."

Mr. President, this concludes my remarks on the subject of the American Charter. Now I should like to make a few personal comments which pertain to the field of international relations.

Last week I was honored by my Republican colleagues by being selected as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and that appointment was approved a few moments ago by the Senate. At this time I wish publicly to express my gratitude for this honor. Coming as it does at a time of great international crisis, this assignment presents me with a high challenge and a high opportunity. The challenge is to lend my humble efforts to help guide our ship of state, this beloved America, through the treacherous shoals of disunity within ourselves and with our allies during and after this war. The opportunity to lend my humble efforts to help bring our ship of state safely into a harbor of peace and security.

I enter upon this task with an open mind, not an isolated mind. My vision is not clouded. I have been a student of history; I know something about the human mind, and I am aware of the obstacles; but I have faith that if we make a supreme effort to insure lasting peace we will accomplish it.

I enter upon this task with no grudge, no hatred, no prejudice. I enter upon it with a calm and rational conviction that in the contracted world of today and tomorrow America must not fail to find the way to world peace. Since peace is not a unilateral matter but a multilateral undertaking for the Big Five at the beginning and for all nations later on, you and I know, Mr. President, that all nations, especially the Big Five, must play ball together. Every boy knows what that means. The phrase means there must be collaboration in purpose, in mind, in will, in desire, and in the effort to put back of the objective the economical and physical strength necessary to accomplish it. Another Kellogg-Briand pact, or the like, will not do the job. We attempted once to outlaw war. There must be back of the pact, or treaty, or authority, as I have stated, the desire, the purpose, the will of the nations to live up to their obligations. Are the nations ready for this?

Mr. President, I enter upon this task with no desire other than to safeguard the interests of my country first, last, and always, and, through so doing, to advance the interests of all other likeminded nations.

MR. FERGUSON. Mr. President, the time has come for the Senate to clarify its views, in the interest of national unity, on a strong, effective foreign policy.

The Senate should adopt a resolution embodying a clear minimum statement of principles to which every Senator can subscribe who believes enduring peace depends on teamwork.

I have drafted such a resolution, but I am withholding

t from formal presentation pending conference with some of my colleagues, in the hope that they will join me in presenting and supporting it.

I shall welcome support and sponsorship from both sides of the aisle for this proposed Senate resolution:

Be it resolved, That the Senate of the United States, exercising its right and responsibility under the Constitution to advise the President in treaty making regarding foreign policy; and

Fearing that a third World War would mean the destruction of civilization and freedom everywhere; and

Believing that a strong, clear, and unified United States foreign policy is a practical imperative for the molding of an enduring peace, does hereby declare:

1. That the United States favors the formation, at the earliest possible moment, of a United Nations organization, along the lines tentatively drafted at Dumbarton Oaks.

2. That the United States is prepared to accept its share of responsibility, to the use of force if necessary, to act within the framework of such an organization to keep the peace and prevent aggression.

3. That the United States stands unreservedly on its historic American principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and intends to do its utmost to bring about the application of such principles throughout the world.

4. That the United States will formulate its post-war policies along diplomatic and economic lines which will exert its full influence toward universal application of these principles.

5. Pending final ratification by treaty of a permanent United Nations organization, the United States favors the immediate formation of a United Nations Council to supervise, when necessary, the life of liberated territories until stable governments can be set up by the free choice of the people involved, and to deal with other diplomatic and political issues that may arise and cannot wait until a permanent United Nations organization can be formally ratified.

Mr. President, the hope for an enduring peace will stand or fall, depending on whether the people of the peace-loving nations of the world can find a channel through which they can merge their desires and their efforts to prevent future wars. That channel must be an international organization. It must be an organization established and operating on a basis that is practical and realistic. It must also have its roots deep in the principles of justice and freedom and decency that motivate men of good will in all countries.

The United States of America must take the lead if we are not to run the grave risk that the hopes of preventing a third World War are to crumble away within our grasp. The United States must obviously have a foreign policy of its own, etched so clearly that no one—no one in this country and no one in any other country—can misunderstand it; a foreign policy which has as its aims, first, to win the war, and, second, to set up an enduring peace. To further these aims, our foreign policy should embody a program to set up, at the earliest possible moment, a United Nations organization, to pledge that we will, this time, accept and carry out our share of the responsibility of enforcing that peace, to do our utmost to bring about the application throughout the world of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and to serve notice on other nations that those who are to receive the full post-war economic collaboration of the United States must live up to those principles to a reasonable degree.

Foreign policy is the joint responsibility of the President of the United States and the Senate. It is the responsibility of the President, so far as major treaty-making decisions are concerned, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

Those who drafted the Constitution of the United States did not limit the Senate's part in this picture to a veto power. They imposed on the Senate also the solemn

responsibility to advise the President as to his course. In recent years that responsibility has not, in my opinion, adequately been met.

The Senate, of course, cannot approve a treaty before it is presented or even written. And without the advice of the Senate, the President cannot give assurances that the treaty he is negotiating will be acceptable to the Senate. Is this constitutional division of powers, then, to be an excuse for other nations to say they are forced to return to the old power-politics, spheres-of-influence way of doing business which has always in the end led to war, and which if it leads to another great war may lead to the end of freedoms and even civilization itself?

I do not think there is any need for this to happen. But if we here are to be certain it will not happen through any fault of ours, then we must exercise full responsibility under the Constitution—not only half of our responsibility to consent or refuse to consent by a two-thirds vote after the President has negotiated a treaty, but the other half also, to advise the President, in broad but specific terms, what the Senate of the United States believes our foreign policy should be.

We should discharge our responsibility under the Constitution, clarify our position beyond doubt, as specifically and plainly as is now possible, and then call on the President to discharge his.

MR. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a question?

MR. FERGUSON. I yield.

MR. WILEY. The remarks made by the distinguished Senator from Michigan lead me to wonder if he does not think that from the standpoint of collaboration and obtaining results on the home front as well as the international front, it would be a very good thing for the President of the United States to select one or more members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to accompany him when he participates in conferences with representatives of other nations?

MR. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I think that would be wisdom. However, in the past on similar invitation Members of the Senate have declined to go. I think in a few cases there have been resignations of Members of Congress in order that they might fill positions to deal with foreign relations.

MR. WILEY. The Senator has in mind that Members of Congress have resigned so as to act as plenipotentiaries?

MR. FERGUSON. Yes.

MR. WILEY. That was not my question, Mr. President. My question related to preliminary meetings, where preliminary understandings are had. In view of the fact that we have heard much talk about the lack of collaboration between the Senate and the President, it occurred to me that it would be a very wise thing if the Chief Executive should see fit to take as members of his delegation say, for instance, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and probably a Republican member of the committee.

MR. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I should like to answer that question by saying that, in my judgment, cooperation between the President and the Senate cannot be too close. Anything that will result in advising the Senate as to what is going on, and anything that will result in advising the President as to what the Senate believes should be done, should be effected at an early date, so that there may be unity back of our foreign policy. The people, as was said in the President's message to Congress on last Saturday, must get back of the war which we are now fighting and back of the peace which will come, and the people, speaking through not only the Senate but through the President, should have an opportunity to say what they desire the foreign policy of America to be.

Address by Senator Wheeler on U.S. Foreign Policy in the Senate

JANUARY 15, 1945

MR. WHEELER. Mr. President, I am confident that my colleagues in the Senate share my solemn conviction that, should this tragic war issue end in nothing more than a savage repetition of history, no greater calamity could befall the human race.

In January 1917, President Wilson set forth the principles upon which alone men might be able to build a world of decency, justice, and peace, when he said:

The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. No peace can last, nor ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from potentate to potentate as if they were property. The world can be at peace only if life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is no tranquility of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

I agree with all my heart with these conclusions of President Wilson.

Mr. President, history is repeating itself. The question raised by President Wilson has risen again in these dark hours of the Second World War to plague us: "Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power?" Are people being handed about from potentate to potentate, from dictator to dictator?

Personally I am convinced that whether one has accepted in servile acquiescence the present ominous trend toward power politics and is now urging cooperation with the "inevitable" or whether one still refuses to surrender his self-respect and his struggle to salvage what he can of decency and justice from this mad war, it would be a criminal disservice to America, to our allies, to the world, to confuse, or to tolerate confusion, on these issues for one moment longer.

For long months on end, this confusion has been fostered in the minds of the American people by deliberate suppression of the truth about the international situation and through reams of propaganda which has identified the struggle of our allies to consolidate and extend their spheres of influence in a new balance of power in Europe, with the deep-rooted ideals and hopes for a just and lasting peace of the American people. These techniques in dealing with the truth have led to such confusion and cynicism among our people that they have begun to lose faith in their own Government leaders. As matters now stand, it is doubtful that even the most fervent global do-gooders, the most inflated internationalist impresarios, or the most ardent Anglo- and Russo-philes could continue to mask the brutal realities with which we are now confronted behind any distortion of the English language, no matter how ingeniously conceived.

Even the bloodiest bitter-enders, I am quite convinced, are going to find that any attempt to cover up the ever-widening tracks of power policies in Europe by prating about "unity, beautiful unity" will be like trying to shackle three tornadoes to a palm tree.

Mr. President, I would have it understood at the outset that what I am saying, the dangers to which I refer, the charges I am making, and the proposition which I am going to offer are in no wise just an expression of personal idiosyncrasy. They are not the fiction of an alleged "iso-

lationalist" mind. I am not taking the time of this Senate in so crucial an hour of history to embarrass anyone. I am concerned only to be both frank and fair about the nature of the present crisis now confronting America, our allies, and the world.

For the purpose of proving beyond all question of doubt that the fears which are now being realized concerning the disintegration of the alliance that has bound the nations together in this war have long been uppermost in the minds of some of the most outstanding administration supporters, and for the further purpose of proving how deep are the basic conflicts of interest that occasion the present disunity, I desire now to enter into the record documentary evidence of these fears and protests.

Mr. President, as far back as March 16, 1944, Mr. Arthur Krock wrote in the *New York Times*:

The growing unrest in Congress and elsewhere over the blank spaces in the diplomatic record of the Nation has arisen, not from any lack of statement of our general war and post-war principles, but from absence of information if or how they are being applied. The feeling has been widely expressed that we are being steadily outdistanced by Great Britain, and especially by Soviet Russia, in specific courses, and that these moves and the march of events may draw the United States into policies repugnant to our expressed principles or divide the great Allies on post-war establishments of peace.

Again in March 1944 the following warning appeared in a statement signed and issued by American Friends of Aid to Russia:

The apparent determination of the Soviet Government to insist on a unilateral settlement of the Polish problem, without mediation or consent either of Russia's allies or the Polish Government, has come as a shock to American opinion. . . . If therefore Russia values America's friendship as we believe she does, she must not use her power to impose either an unjust frontier or a puppet government upon the Polish people. Russia must choose. She can impose her will but she cannot impose it without estranging millions of Americans whose opinions will be decisive in the development of our foreign policy. And Russia will estrange others besides Americans, for what will millions of citizens of the small conquered (and satellite) countries have to hope from an Allied victory, if this is how we discharge our obligations to Poland? . . . Therefore, in the interest of all the United Nations we urge the British and American Governments to raise these questions with the Soviet Government, and we ourselves appeal to our Russian allies to take cognizance of the legitimate disquiet of the American people.

On March 22, 1944, more than 20 Republican Members of Congress, every one an ardent supporter of the Roosevelt foreign policy, signed and delivered a note to the State Department, from which I quote:

In Europe and in South America we are distressed to observe our foreign relations suffering serious impairment from a want of definition of American policy.

On April 12, 1944, our new State Department appointee, Mr. Archibald MacLeish, was reported in the *London Times* as saying that:

Nothing had more disturbed him in the last few months at home, and in the last few days in which he had been here, than the collapse of morale among men of good will and of liberal mind in their hope for peace at the end of this war. He did not know one such man who truly believed that the war was going to end in the kind of peace hoped for. The conviction and determination that such a peace should be made were lacking.

On May 3, 1944, the apprehension to which I have been referring rose to great heights in over 100 speeches commemorating the anniversary of the Polish Constitution delivered in both Houses of Congress.

On May 24 Dorothy Thompson was in despair:

What deterioration has set in since Mr. Churchill's great speech of more than a year ago outlining the creation of a Council of Europe.

She exclaimed:

God help us if we leave the peoples of Europe without quick relief and without a vision of their own future.

On June 12, 1944, Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote:

In no phase of the war have political decisions kept pace with military decisions, but the lack of synchronization was never so apparent as now when the invasion brings all the unanswered questions to the foreground. * * * In all these latest attempts to settle political questions what comes out clearly is that whereas last year it seemed they might be postponed until the end of the war, sweeping political obstacles out of the way of the armies becomes a primary military consideration as the last battle begins.

On July 21, 1944, Mr. Sumner Welles declared:

True statesmanship consists in avoiding the impasse. It is not shown by the adoption of policies which lead into one-way streets. The policy so far pursued by the State Department is destructive, not constructive. If persisted in, it will lead inevitably to the obliteration of the good-neighbor policy and of any lasting regional system of the Americas.

On July 25, 1944, the President's personal representative, William Phillips, wrote concerning India:

The peoples of Asia, and I am supported in this opinion by other diplomatic and military observers—cynically regard this war as one between Fascist and imperialist powers. A generous British gesture to India would change this undesirable political atmosphere. . . . And the colonial peoples conquered by the Japanese might hopefully feel they had something better to look forward to than simply a return to their old masters. Such a gesture, Mr. President, will also be positive proof to all peoples . . . that this war is not a war of power politics, but a war for all we say.

Again, on September 1, 1944, Dorothy Thompson asked concerning our policies toward the tragic peoples of Europe:

Do we yet know what policy we shall seek assistance for? Or are we doing all we can to bring about the discouragement and liquidation of any group that might help us?

As this tide of bitter protest concerning the direction in which our diplomacy and political and psychological warfare were moving continued to rise, Walter Lippmann joined in the chorus. On October 3, 1944, he wrote:

At the secondary level in the political conduct of the war, a kind of second-rateness has caused trouble which can become immensely serious. It is as if Messrs. Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt had exhausted the best of their energies on the greatest issues of the war, and then had dealt with issues next in importance—in Poland, France, and Italy—in their odd moments with the residue of their strength, and through lieutenants whose caliber has been much smaller than those who have done the great planning and directing of the war.

On December 13, 1944, Mr. Sumner Welles summed up the nature of the situation of which I speak in the following words:

There is nothing to be gained by holding out to American public opinion any ground for false optimism as to the immediate future in the foreign relations of this Nation. Recent developments in Europe, in the Far East, and in the Western Hemisphere offer no room for illusions as to the gravity of the problems which we confront.

Again, on December 27 last, Sumner Welles wrote:

As the year 1945 dawns, the American people face a future which seems less certain than at any moment since the war began.

At the very time when our armed forces are making their greatest sacrifice to speed the final victory, the objectives for which they fight seem less assured than they did 3 years ago.

There has become evident a wide and growing rift in the basic political understanding between the three major Allies. Unless that rift is repaired, unless unity of policy and unity of purpose between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union can be restored, not only can no valid international organization be established, but no lasting peace settlements can be concluded.

Mr. President, this wide recognition of the failure of our diplomacy when the honor, integrity, and future security of our Nation are at stake strengthens my own conviction that to continue down the road we are traveling cannot lead to anything but disaster. Let us not only document the opinions of administration supporters; let us also document the historical setting in which the present conflicts of interests in international relations are rooted. In order truly to evaluate the present situation, let us recall to mind the long series of principles and proclamations which all three of the greatest of the United Nations have recorded as the minimum essentials for continued peaceful relations among themselves and the other nations of the world if the reign of decency and justice, of law and order, or of governments deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, were to survive. Let us begin with the United States.

The United States Government has time and again proclaimed its strict adherence to principles of noninterference in the affairs of nations, both inside and outside this Hemisphere. The most notable success which has rewarded our efforts to build a world with international relations based on these principles has been known as the good-neighbor policy. Very few Americans are aware of the fact that the South American countries refused to enter into any formal commitment to this policy until we had agreed to repudiate the use of force in the settlement of disputes with our sister republics to the south. On December 24, 1938, at the Eighth International Conference of American States, the following principles were incorporated in the Declaration of Lima as the foundation of the good-neighbor policy:

The Governments of the American republics resolve—

To proclaim, support, and recommend once again the following principles as essential to the achievement of the aforesaid objectives:

1. The intervention of any state in the internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible.

How does that fit in with what is now taking place in Europe and with the actions of both Russia and England?

2. All differences of international character should be settled by peaceful means.

3. The use of force as an instrument of national or international policy is proscribed.

I emphasize—

The use of force as an instrument of national or international policy is proscribed.

4. Relations between states should be governed by the precepts of international law.

5. Respect for and faithful observance of treaties constitute the indispensable rule for the development of peaceful relations between states, and treaties can only be revised by agreement of the contracting parties.

I wish Senators to bear these two declarations in mind when I call attention later to some of the things which are going on.

6 Peaceful collaboration between representatives of the various states and the development of intellectual interchange among their peoples is conducive to an understanding by each of the problems of the other as well as of problems common to all, and makes more readily possible the peaceful adjustment of international controversies.

7. Economic reconstruction contributes to national and international well-being, as well as to peace among nations.

8. International cooperation is a necessary condition to the maintenance of the aforementioned principles.

On October 21, 1944, the President took occasion to reaffirm these principles when he said:

In 1933 we took, as the basis for our foreign relations, the good-neighbor policy—the principles of a neighbor who, resolutely respecting himself, equally respects the rights of others. . . . It is my conviction that this policy can be, and should be, made universal.

Again, even while we have made war an instrument of our national and international policy, this administration has been careful repeatedly to reaffirm the principles and ends toward which our war efforts have been directed. As late as January 4, 1939, the President reaffirmed our traditional foreign policy when he said:

We rightly decline to intervene with force of arms to prevent acts of aggression.

That did not mean that we had no concern for the state of the world in which peace was threatened. The ultimate purposes behind our eventual involvement in this war were summed up by the President in his anxious note to Adolf Hitler of April 14, 1939, in which he asked:

Are you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran?

Again he was asking Hitler to protect those countries.

And when, on September 1, 1939, Hitler struck Poland, in concert with Mr. Stalin, the President asked for repeal of the arms embargo and a change of the Neutrality Act for the purpose, he said, of assuring aid, short of war, to the victims of aggression.

There followed from that point on, in rapid succession, pronouncements by this Government against every act of aggression, and promises of aid to nations who are its victims. On June 10, 1940, the President declared:

We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation.

On June 13 he sent the following word to the French Council of Ministers:

This Government is doing everything in its power to make available to the Allied Governments the material they so urgently require.

On December 5, 1940, this Government forwarded a note to the King of Greece, in which it stated:

It is the settled policy of the United States to extend aid to those governments and peoples who defend themselves against aggressions.

On January 6, 1941, the President said in his speech to Congress:

Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or to keep them.

On March 15, 1941, the President interpreted the passage of the Lend-Lease Act as a historical event. Said the President:

This decision is the end of any attempts at appeasement in our land; the end of urging us to get along with the dictators; the end of compromise with tyranny and of forces of oppression.

It was to be the end of urging us to get along with whom? With the dictators. The word was not used in the singular, but in the plural. It was to be the end of compromise with tyranny and of forces of oppression—not one, but all. The record is filled with similar declarations to every victim of aggression: France, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Poland, Finland, the Baltics, China, and every other nation caught in this maelstrom of madness, whether by Germany, Russia, Italy, or Japan. Behind each one of those declarations lay the same fundamental principle upon which such aid was premised.

Now let us consider the case of Britain. As far as Great Britain is concerned, much the same record of principles and purposes has already been written into the pages of history. On October 3, 1939, Churchill declared:

We are fighting to save the whole world from the pestilence of Nazi tyranny and in defense of all that is most sacred to man. This is no war for domination or imperial aggrandizement or material gain; . . . it is a war . . . to establish, on impregnable rocks, the rights of the individual, and it is a war to establish and revive the stature of man.

On October 4, 1939, Lord Halifax said of France and Britain:

They do seek to reestablish for themselves and for others liberty under the reign of law, the right of peoples to decide their own destinies, to trade freely, and to live without fear. Surely then we are fighting for causes that are vital not only for ourselves, but also for all those everywhere who love liberty.

On October 25, 1939, Lord Lothian said:

There can be no basis for a lasting peace in Europe which does not give to all the nations of Europe—

Not merely to one or two—

their right to autonomous freedom. The status of all nations, great and small, should be equal before the law. The strong and powerful nations have no greater rights than the small and weak.

Lord Halifax said, on November 7, 1939:

We are fighting to maintain the rule of law and the quality of mercy in dealings between man and man and in the great society of civilized states.

Again, on April 19, 1940, Lord Lothian said:

We believe we are fighting not only for our existence but to ensure that the basic institutions and ideals which have been guiding the stars of Western civilization for the last 150 years shall not be wiped off the face of Europe and Asia and Africa by the military victory of the totalitarian dictatorships.

Note the use of the word in the plural.

On November 9, 1940, Mr. Churchill declared:

We have affirmed or defined more precisely all the causes of all the countries with whom or for whom we drew the sword—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, greatest of all France; latest of all Greece. For all of these we will toil and strive, and our victory will supply the liberation of them all.

On March 25, 1941, Lord Halifax precisely defined the nature of the principles for which Great Britain had entered this war, as follows:

The right to think, speak, and act freely within the law, and to have free access to the thoughts of others;

The right of free association, both national and international, with their fellow men;

The right to live without fear of aggression, injustice, or want;

The right to worship as the conscience dictates.

Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Colonies, made the following statement of policy on May 21, 1942:

I can give the House an absolute assurance * * * that there is no question of any departure by His Majesty's Government from the policy of the Atlantic Charter, which remains the fundamental basis for the policy of His Majesty's Government and of the United States and of the United Nations as a whole, who have adhered to that Charter.

Again on June 2, 1943, in the House of Lords, Viscount Cranborne said:

His Majesty's Government regard themselves as absolutely pledged to carry out the Atlantic Charter—all the articles of the Atlantic Charter.

On August 5, 1943, Viscount Simon, the Lord Chancellor, made a very significant speech to the House of Lords.

The excerpt is as follows:

Mr. Cordell Hull * * * pointed out that the Atlantic Charter does not propose to substitute international authority for sovereign rights and self-government. The conception is that sovereign rights and self-government will be preserved and made, as far as self-government is concerned, more authoritative and complete. The conception is not that we should aim at forcing upon as many people as possible the dictates of some international organ, but rather that we should aim at getting agreement between as many sovereign communities as may be, each of them, we trust, enjoying rights of self-government, so that as the result of consent, not as the result of externally applied force, this international authority is able to speak in the name of all well-disposed people. (Referring to Cordell Hull speech of July 23, 1942.)

Mr. President, I have another excerpt from a statement on colonial policy, made on December 3, 1942, by Viscount Cranborne during a debate in the House of Lords, as well as an excerpt from a statement made on July 21, 1940, by Field Marshal Smuts:

We, the citizens of the British Empire, whatever our race, religion, or color, have a mission to perform, and it is a mission that is essential to the welfare of the world. It is to insure the survival of the way of life for which the United Nations are fighting, a way of life based on freedom, tolerance, justice, and mutual understanding, in harmony with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. (Excerpt from statement by Viscount Cranborne, on December 3, 1942, in the House of Lords.)

Freedom still remains our sovereign remedy for the ills from which human society is suffering. We envisage a free Europe, free for the individual and for the nation, free in the sense of giving full scope for personal and national self-development and self-perfection, each according to his own individual lines. (Excerpt from statement by Field Marshal Smuts, on July 21, 1940.)

Mr. President, having looked at the statements made by the United States and Great Britain, now let us look at Russia's statements. What of our powerful associate in this war, Russia? Her record from 1917 up to 1939 is clearly that of an ardent advocate of noble principles of international law which she deemed essential, or said she deemed essential, to the formation of a peaceful society of nations.

"Peace" was made the watchword of the October Revolution of 1917 when, on November 8, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets voted unanimously a "peace decree." In that document the new government "invited all the belligerent peoples and their governments immediately to begin" negotiations to bring about an "equitable democratic peace," defined as "an immediate peace without annexations and without indemnities." Because the

Great Powers categorically refused to heed that request, the new government was compelled to enter into separate negotiations for peace with the Central Powers.

On the 16th of January 1920, the Allied Supreme Council finally raised the economic blockade.

From then on, Mr. President, the written record of Russia's statements of foreign policy, up until the partition of Poland in 1939, on its face, at least, is one of tireless efforts to bring about the abolition of practices and policies on the part of the Great Powers which have led to the century-long outbursts of war among the nations of Europe.

From 1921 to 1927 the Russian Government carried on a vigorous "disarmament offensive." On November 30, 1927, at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, Maxim Litvinov read the declaration of Russia's proposals which laid down the principle and "a plan of general and complete disarmament." The plan included "the complete abolition of all armed forces on land, on the sea, and in the air." It proposed the following:

Dismissal of all armed men, destruction of all means of combat, scrapping of all warships and military airplanes, prohibition of military instruction, abolition of military service, the dismantling of fortresses, demolition of factories for the supply of equipment, the suppression of military budgets, war ministries, the prohibition of military propaganda and giving patents for means of destruction.

It provided that disarmament should be carried through simultaneously by all states within a period of four years. These suggestions met with the stern disapproval of the Disarmament Commission.

Undaunted by this rebuff, the Russian Government continued its effort by suggesting a program for partial disarmament, which met with the same fate. Again the Russian Government rose to the challenge of its own announced ideal for a warless world by seeking to strengthen the draft on disarmament proposed by the League of Nations by the inclusion of prohibition of all preparation for the chemical warfare and of bombing from the air. Those proposals also met with the same fate. Yet, even as late as October 21, 1931, Litvinov declared to the Secretary General of the League that the Russian Government "is ready to assume, with the other governments and under equal conditions, the obligation to cease increasing its armaments during the Conference on Disarmament," as it was always "ready for complete disarmament or the maximum reduction of armaments."

Mr. President, not only is Russia's record as an opponent of armaments and military conscription outstanding among the nations of the world, but up to the time of her attack on Poland in 1939 her record of ceaseless advocacy of nonaggression pacts was without a rival.

On July 3, 1933, Russia signed in Moscow with the official representatives of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Rumania, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan a convention for the definition of aggression, which Russia sponsored and in which is found the clearest and most precise definition of what constitutes aggression that is to be found in the history of international relations. Article II of this remarkable treaty reads as follows:

ART. II. In accordance with the above, the aggressor in an international conflict, with due consideration to the agreements existing between the parties involved in the conflict, will be considered the state which will be the first to commit any of the following acts:

1. Declaration of war against another state;
2. Invasion by armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state;
3. An attack by armed land, naval, or air forces, even without a declaration of war, upon the territory, naval vessels, or aircraft of another state;

- 4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
- 5. Aid to armed bands formed on the territory of a state and invading the territory of another state, or refusal, despite demands on the part of the state subjected to attack to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive the said bands of any aid and protection.

Whatever Russia's motives may have been during this period of her weakness, no one will deny that her declarations of principle were of the highest. Indeed, she went beyond the rest of the world in her lofty profession of idealism. Even after her alliance with Hitler she professed the same high principles while threatening her neighbor nations with military occupation.

Mr. President, On October 6, 1939, Pravda carried the following communique from the Soviet Government interpreting the signing of the pact forced on Latvia:

At the basis of the pacts of mutual assistance are irremovable principles of the treaties of peace and nonaggression. The contracting parties affirm once more their unshaken faith to recognize the sovereign rights of each state as well as their firm desire not to interfere with the inner affairs of another country.

On October 31, 1939, in his speech before the Soviet Supreme Council, Mr. Molotov said:

The pacts with the Baltic states in no way imply the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, as some foreign interests are trying to make believe. * * * These pacts are inspired by the mutual respect for the governmental, social, and economic systems of each of the contracting parties. * * * We stand for and exact an honest fulfillment of agreements signed by us on a basis of reciprocity and declare that foolish talks of sovietization of the Baltics is useful only to our common enemies. (Pravda, November 1, 1939.)

On September 24, 1941, Ivan Maisky, in accepting the Atlantic Charter for the Soviet Government, made the solemn declaration that—

the Soviet Union has applied, and will apply, in its foreign policy the high principle of respect for the sovereign rights of peoples. The Soviet Union was, and is, guided in its foreign policy by the principle of self-determination of nations. * * * Accordingly the Soviet Union defends the rights of every nation to the independence and territorial integrity of its country, and its right to establish such a social order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and necessary for the better promotion of its economic and cultural prosperity.

On November 6, 1941, Stalin said:

We have not nor can we have such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories or the conquest of other peoples, irrespective of whether European peoples and territories or Asiatic peoples and territories including Iran, are concerned.

We have not nor can we have such war aims as the imposition of our will and our regime on the Slavic and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are awaiting our help. Our aim is to help these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny, and then to accord them the possibility of arranging their lives on their own land as they think fit, with absolute freedom. No interference of any kind with the domestic affairs of other nations.

As recently as November 6, 1942, Stalin declared:

The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is: "Abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations, and integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties."

Mr. President, I desire to review briefly the history of the Atlantic Charter. To make the record complete, we

ought to recall the history of the Atlantic Charter, a history which, according to the New York Times, gives it standing in international law as valid as any in existence. The record shows that the first lines of the White House press release of August 14, 1941, as reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin of August 16, 1941, read:

The following statement was signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

On August 21, 1941, the President submitted to Congress a document purporting to be the text of the Atlantic Charter, bearing what appeared to be President Roosevelt's signature along with Mr. Churchill's.

On September 24, 1941, Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, pledged the Soviet Government to these principles.

On January 1, 1942, in Washington, 26 United Nations in a joint declaration of purposes subscribed to—

A common program of purposes and principles embodied in the joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter.

On January 4, 1942, our Department of State issued for the following solemn statement:

In order that liberty-loving peoples, silenced by military force, may have an opportunity to support the principles of the declaration by United Nations, the Government of the United States, as the depository for that declaration, will receive statements of adherence to its principles from appropriate authorities which are not governments.

On January 29, 1942, a treaty of alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Iran was signed having in view—

The principles of the Atlantic Charter jointly agreed upon and announced to the world by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on the 14th August 1941, and endorsed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 24th September 1941.

On May 26, 1942, a treaty of mutual assistance between Great Britain and the Soviet Union was signed—

On a basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made August 14, 1941, by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered.

On June 11, 1942, an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression was signed containing the following solemn preamble:

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as signatories to the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, have subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter, made on August 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the basic principles of which were adhered to by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on September 24, 1941.

The same principles were reaffirmed as the basis of the Moscow Conference on November 1, 1943, which includes the following pledge that these Governments are "united in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942."

On December 1, 1943, the declaration regarding Iran was concluded with the following solemn promise:

They count upon the participation of Iran together with all her peace-loving nations in the establishment of international peace, security, and prosperity after the war in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to which the four Governments have continued to subscribe.

I ask that the text of the Atlantic Charter, as it was printed and sent out by the Department of State, Office of War Information, be inserted in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. * * * Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

The following nations are signatories to the Atlantic Charter: United States of America, Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bolivia, Brazil, Australia, China, Columbia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, the Philippines, France.

Mr. President, such, then, is the record of the principles and purposes of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, which they have proclaimed to the world during two decades, as the indispensable minimum upon which a just, honorable, and lasting peace can be built. And these are the principles: disarmament, abolition of aggression, nonaggression pacts, clear-cut definitions of aggression, the principle of nonintervention in internal or external affairs of another state, the equal sovereignty of all nations large and small, the inviolability of human freedom and personality, proscription of the use of force between nations as a means of settling disputes, an international organization based on consent, guaranties of equal access to raw materials and markets for victor and vanquished, all of which these three great powers have severally and collectively declared to be essential to the

establishment of a lasting peace among the nations of the world.

Mr. President, unhappily, this is not the whole record. One by one, these three great powers have repudiated these principles with what has amounted to a rising stream of exceptions, reservations, and reversals of policy until today, after many long months of preparation, discussion, and deliberation, they have turned up before the world with the Dumbarton Oaks proposal.

Mr. President, keeping in mind the foregoing record of solemn declarations of principle, observe how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, both in spirit and in letter as they now stand, emasculate the good-neighbor policy, override the principle of sovereign equality of all nations, offer in place of a genuinely international society of nations, a grim military alliance, destroy the very concept of neutrality, approve as a cardinal principle the use of brute force and the threat of coercion, without requiring that the security council shall first resort to peaceful methods in dealing with the threat of aggression, deliberately divorce the structure of the proposed security organization from the nature of the peace which it is expected to enforce, and cleverly disguise the deliberate omission of any mention of the Atlantic Charter by referring to a new United Nations charter that is to be formulated in the future.

Mr. President, as these proposals now stand, they constitute nothing more nor less than a plan to underwrite tyranny. The Treaty of Versailles at least tried to guarantee the integrity of independent states, and in a recent issue of an English publication, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, it was pointed out very clearly that the Dumbarton Oaks Conference had all the bad features of the League of Nations and none of the good ones—but these proposals are primarily designed to maintain a status quo in which our conquered enemies will constitute the main concern of every policy, agreement, and act on the part of self-appointed policemen. All other considerations, all other interests and rights on the part of the European nations will of necessity be subordinated to this one concern. Mr. Churchill's speech of May 24, 1944, contains full proof of this charge. Mr. Churchill said:

We intend to set up a world order and organization equipped with all the necessary attributes of power in order to prevent future wars or the planning of them in advance by restless and ambitious nations.

How, in the name of goodness, are they going to stop the planning of future wars unless they intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, and who is going to see what the planning is? Is it going to be Mr. Stalin, Mr. Churchill, and the United States? Of course it is.

MR. PEPPER. The sentiment of the Senator from Montana is perhaps more important than that of any other Senator, and I think the Senator should make it clear to us and clear to the country whether he personally favors the setting up of an international organization with power to stop aggression, if necessary by force.

MR. WHEELER. I appreciate the Senator's compliment, and I should perhaps make a big bow to him. Let me say to the Senator that I was for the League of Nations until I went to Europe, as I have explained a great many times. But I am not going to be for any organization, or the setting up of an organization, before I know what the terms of the peace treaty are to be, and what we are to be called upon to enforce. Secondly, I shall never vote to delegate to one man the power to send American boys into war any place, anywhere, and all over the world.

MR. MILLIKIN. But when this war has been finished, what nations will have the power to wage war? It will be the Allied Nations. The idea that there shall be confided to an international organization, and particularly

to one man in it, the power to involve this country in war—with Russia, let us say, or with Great Britain, let us say, or with China, let us say—falls little short of insanity.

MR. WHEELER. Of course. I agree with the Senator. The only three nations, as the Senator pointed out, which would have power to wage war, would be Russia, England, and the United States, and does he think for one moment that Russia would permit an international organization to say to her, if she wanted to become an aggressor, "You are not going to have the right to take aggressive action"?

MR. MILLIKIN. I do not think Russia would agree, or that Great Britain would agree, or that the United States would agree.

MR. WHEELER. Of course not.

MR. PEPPER. Will the Senator yield further?

MR. WHEELER. I yield.

MR. PEPPER. I wish to be sure I understand and the country understands just what the views of the able Senator from Montana are. Do I understand correctly the Senator to say that he does not favor the establishment of any international organization until after the peace treaty is made, so that its terms may be discovered?

MR. WHEELER. That is correct.

MR. PEPPER. So that the Senator would not favor setting up any international organization until the peace is made and the treaty is written?

MR. WHEELER. That is correct.

MR. PEPPER. And the able Senator would not favor the American delegate, or member of the International Security Council, which is contemplated by the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, having authority to vote in favor of the use of the armed forces put at the disposal of the international organization, without, I assume, the matter being referred by the Executive to the Congress. Would the Senator say to the Senate and the House, or only to the Senate?

MR. WHEELER. I would say to the Congress of the United States.

MR. PEPPER. To the Congress of the United States; and then the Congress—by what vote?

MR. WHEELER. By a majority vote.

MR. PEPPER. By a majority vote, specifically authorizing the use of the forces which are at the disposal of the international organization.

MR. WHEELER. Which would be a virtual declaration of war, and I am not willing to take away from the Congress the right to declare war.

MR. PEPPER. So the Senator would not allow any forces to be at the disposal of the international organization for use against an aggressor, insofar as we are concerned, without the specific consent of the Congress of the United States?

MR. WHEELER. Certainly. In the first place, if the aggression were a serious one, if a great war were started by England or by Russia or by the United States, the small force referred to by the Senator from Florida would be of no use. It would be of no value at all except in a small war or in the case of a small country.

Some individuals have said, "We are perfectly willing to allow the Council to act to stop an aggression if it is a minor aggression." All wars generally have begun on a small scale, with small aggressions. Every large outbreak in Europe has generally started from comparatively small bickerings, and with what we would look upon as a small war.

MR. PEPPER. I thank the Senator for clarifying his position. I wish to make an inquiry relative to the Senator's recent statement respecting the weakness of the League of Nations. Does not the Senator think the weakness of the League of Nations in respect to stopping ag-

gression consisted not so much in the inability or the unwillingness of the League to define the aggressor as the incapacity of the League to use any force against the aggressor?

MR. WHEELER. I certainly do not. Let me say to the Senator that Hugh Gibson, who was appointed to be our representative to the League of Nations, and who took part in many of its proceedings, in a recent book has made answer to the Senator's statement when he says that it was not the lack of force on the part of the League of Nations which prevented it from acting. It seems to me that Hugh Gibson should have more knowledge concerning the League than some of us who never attended any of its meetings.

On the other hand, Mr. Gibson said the real trouble arose because of bickerings between the various nations themselves. He said the large nations could get together respecting what to do with some small nation, but they never could get together respecting what to do with a great nation which had violated any of its agreements.

MR. President, it is only recently that the American people have become conscious of the extent to which the deep cleavages between ourselves and our allies have threatened the whole course of this war and the hope of peace. If we are to be frank and honest about the situation now confronting us, the present trend in power politics would compel us to admit that, in reality, the alleged unity which has existed between ourselves and our allies, Great Britain and Russia, is only an ugly offspring born of the necessities; that actually this new-found harmony was the result of an international shotgun wedding. How else can we explain a continuation of present policies on the part of our allies which appear to a growing body of international opinion as though they were saying to each other, "Carry on; take whatever territory you like; change frontiers to suit your whims and fancies; swap minorities and populations to your heart's content; interfere in the internal affairs of whatever governments you wish; we will talk about principles after we have carved up the world to suit ourselves."

What faith can the other nations of the world have that the Big Three intend to establish a just and decent peace, and what sense is there in talking about an international organization to maintain and enforce treaties, if the Atlantic Charter, which underlies every solemn pledge, promise, and agreement of the most powerful Allied Nations, turns out to be a geopolitical IOU?

In view of the violent contradictions and the basic conflicts with which we are now confronted, there is no point whatever in continuing to pull the wool of propaganda farther down over our eyes. There is just no point in slandering honest and sincere questioning, by indiscriminately pasting the label "Made in Berlin" on every question that arises. It would be an outrage to engage in further recrimination, evasion, or double talk as a substitute for the answers to the serious questions the American people now are asking. Further, it is utter folly to continue to divorce the question of our intentions toward Germany from the question of our intentions toward Europe as a whole, or toward Asia, or toward the whole world.

As I understand the past record of declarations on the part of the Big Three, we are not fighting this war just "to destroy the Nazi tyranny." The continued brandishing of such empty slogans before the eyes of the American people amounts to a deliberate misrepresentation of the real issues on the part of our Government officials. Such phrases as "on to Berlin and Tokyo," "hang Hitler," or "total victory" do not even contain half of the truth. According to our own President, we are not fighting this war just to make it impossible for Germany only to start another war of aggression and conquest that might em-

ruin the world. According to the solemn declarations of purpose on the part of this Government and our allies, we fight to make the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the "four freedoms" to secure that no nation—not even Russia or England—will be able or will have cause to threaten another vicious attack on the civilized world.

Mr. President, there is simply no use in attacking this position as "irresponsible perfectionism." Who was the perfectionist when this matter was originally brought up? On January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt said, in his annual message, to Congress:

The "fourth freedom" is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any nation anywhere in the world.

If that is not perfectionism, I do not know what it is.

Mr. President, as I understand the past record of purposes set down by ourselves and our allies, we are not fighting this war to impose a peace of vengeance upon a conquered people. It is inconceivable to me that the American people would tolerate for one moment any such brutal and savage proposals as those designed by Secretary Morgenthau for the ultimate treatment of the German people or the German nation. Let me repeat what I have said on so many other occasions, that in holding this position I hold no brief for the Nazi brutality, the Hitlerian bestiality and savagery. What I do hold is that such terms will never in a thousand years bring peace to Europe or to the world. Whatever our desires with reference to Germany may be, what we must ultimately consider is not merely what we would like to do in our madness with reference to the German people but what will bring about lasting peace in Europe and throughout the world. Of course, when passions are running high in this country, the popular thing to do is to let madness and hatreds run away with sound judgment; but we must look beyond all that. We in the United States of America, of all people, we who boast of our intelligence and our tolerance, must consider not what we would like to see done but what will be the best for the future of our own country and of the world. What I believe is that for the United States Government to permit the continued use of the basic proposals contained in the Morgenthau "brain child" as representing America's ultimate war and peace aim would cost thousands upon thousands of American lives, as well as the lives of our allies.

Mr. President, I have read a letter from a soldier boy in France which he had written to his uncle, a Texas businessman. I am sorry I do not have the letter with me. In it the boy said, in effect, "The demand for unconditional surrender and Morgenthau's statement are making these Heinies fight like hell from ditch to ditch." A soldier, recently returned from Italy, who was in my office the other day told me practically the same thing.

Mr. President, I believe that in lieu of any basic agreement among the conquerors as to the ultimate treatment of Germany, a continued use of such proposals will only lead to slaughter and carnage. Out of this will arise a savage underground movement over which both of our allies, Great Britain and Russia, will struggle for favor or control. If we do not want Germany ultimately to win this war by holding the real balance in the struggle for the control of Europe between Britain and Russia, if we do not want ourselves sucked into the political, economic, and social vacuum which will exist in Europe when the fighting finally stops, we ought now to agree upon constructive and curative measures.

If I am chided for this stand as being an irresponsible perfectionist or an embittered isolationist, again I ask, Who first brought this issue up?

On January 3, 1940, President Roosevelt solemnly declared:

It is, of course, true that the record of past centuries includes destruction of small nations, enslavement of peoples, and building of empires on the foundation of force. But wholly apart from the greater international morality which we seek today, we recognize the practical facts that with modern weapons and modern conditions, modern man can no longer live a civilized life if we are to go back to the practice of wars and conquests of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Is not that what is taking place today?

Mr. President, if I am not being realistic about the ominous outlook for America in the years ahead, should this war end in the complete disintegration of international morality and decency for which it is now headed, again I ask, Who first brought this matter up?

In the same speech from which I have just quoted, the President went on to say:

It becomes clearer and clearer that the future world will be a shabby and dangerous place to live in—even for Americans to live in—if it is ruled by force in the hands of a few.

A few? Russia, United States, and England.

The President continued:

We must look ahead and see the possibilities for our children if the rest of the world comes to be dominated by concentrated force alone—even though today we are a very large and powerful nation.

I quote further from the President:

We must look ahead and see the effect on our own future if all the small nations of the world have their independence snatched from them or become mere appendages to relatively vast and powerful military systems.

Mr. President, if I am a perfectionist I am following the example of our Democratic leader when he made the statements which I have read.

Mr. President, if any nation ought to understand the futility of following the present course of action and the sheer madness of trying to perpetuate the status quo at the end of this war, that nation is Russia. No other government has so plainly and so fully documented its antagonism toward the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations as instruments of the status quo.

On October 8, 1920, Lenin bitterly declared:

By attacking Poland we are attacking the Allies. By destroying the Polish Army we are destroying the Versailles peace, upon which rests the whole system of present international relations. . . . Had Poland become sovietized, the Versailles peace would have been terminated and the system built on victory over Germany would have been destroyed likewise.

What are they doing now? They are attempting to sovietize Poland. And for what?

On March 15, 1923, in a note sent to the general secretary of the League of Nations, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs expressed the Soviet Government's attitude toward the League in the following words:

It regards it as a coalition of certain states endeavoring to usurp the power over other states and masking their attempt on the rights and independence of other nations in a false appearance of groundless legality and in the form of the mandates issued by the Council or . . . Assembly of the League of Nations. . . . The Soviet Government maintains its conviction that this pseudo-international body really serves as a policy of certain great powers or their vassals. The Soviet Government finds confirmation for its conviction every time that a state assuming the leading role in the League of Nations makes a decision on international questions, touching the interest of the Soviet Republic.

On March 25, 1925, Mr. Manuiski declared to the Third Congress of Communist Parties:

The true function of Poland is to form a barrier preventing the spread of the Communist idea westward. For that reason the international proletariat must consider as its task the smashing of capitalistic Poland and turning it into a Soviet Republic.

On July 1, 1926, in speaking of the formation of an Anglo-Russian Communist Committee, Mr. Stalin declared:

The task of the new bloc consists in the organization of a vast working-class movement against new imperialistic wars in general, and especially against intervention in our country as planned by the great European powers, particularly England.

Again, in 1926 the Soviet Government issued an official Soviet theoretical statement on the League of Nations from which I quote:

Thus the League is, as a matter of fact, a political combination or a group of nations interested in the preservation and utilization of the post-war international status. Its very name and the universal designation ascribed to it are therefore fictitious.

The League, being a continuation of the Entente, did not change its substance because of the fact that neutral countries had been invited to participate and later on the vanquished states—such as Germany in particular—had been admitted. The latter circumstance witness that, together with the preservation of the status created by the Versailles Treaty, another aim of the League is becoming more evident, namely, the establishment of a united front of bourgeois states against the U. S. S. R.

The League can by no means be transformed into a super-state or a federation of states, or even into a loose confederation, because of the irreconcilable contradictions between various capitalistic states, members of the League. The growing antagonism and the concealed struggle among the biggest powers (as, for instance, between Great Britain and France), the constant quarrels and conflicts among the members of the League, the militarist "climate" prevailing in the whole world—all this proves the bankruptcy of the bourgeois pacification.

That conforms to what I said to the Senator a moment ago that the failure of the League of Nations, not only as expressed by the Soviet Government but by our own representatives who attended there, came not because of the fact that it lacked power but because there was bickering from within.

On May 22, 1929, the Fifth Congress of the Union declared in its resolution to the preparatory commission for the Conference on Disarmament of the League:

The rejection of the Soviet proposal by the preparatory commission and refusal of the member states to make the least step in the reduction in land and naval armaments constitute a new proof that those states base their policies on the preparation for a new world war.

On December 28, 1933, Mr. Molotov declared:

That the danger of new wars has become particularly imminent this year is quite clear if only from the following fact. This year Germany and Japan have announced their decision to withdraw from the League of Nations.

On January 26, 1934, Joseph Stalin reported to the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party—and I should like to have the Senate listen carefully to this statement:

I do not think a single period in the last decade has been so rich in events as this. A result of the protracted economic crisis was the hitherto unprecedented acuteness of the political situation in capitalist countries, both within the respective countries as well as between them. Quite clearly things are moving toward a new war.

Mr. President, there is no necessity for burdening my colleagues with further evidence of the mutual suspicion and distrust which form the background of the present war. Suffice it to say that these suspicions attach themselves to all parties to such an extent that on March 10, 1939, Mr. Stalin described the world situation in the following words:

To what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war?

He called it an imperialistic war.

It might be attributed to the fear that a revolution might break out if the nonaggressive states were to go to war and the war were to assume world-wide proportions. But the chief reason is that the majority of the nonaggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention, reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work; not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs; from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union. . . . Cheap and easy. Take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudetan region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then they began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian Army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right."

Such is Russia's interpretation of this present war. Does not this record bear out my contention that Russia, of all countries, will understand and appreciate the realism of my position?

I cannot understand why anyone now, even in the midst of this horrible war, should be condemned for repeating the warnings of the deep conflict of interests and suspicions that divide the Big Three. They have been uttered by prime ministers, dictators, and presidents. As I see my duty, it is to remind my fellow Americans in this crucial hour of our history that our own leaders have continually pointed out the tragedy that is in store for us, should their own fears be realized.

On January 4, 1939, President Roosevelt warned this Nation that:

In a modern civilization, religion, democracy, and international good faith complement each other. Where freedom of religion has been attacked the attack has come from the sources opposed to democracy. Where democracy has been overthrown, the spirit of free worship has disappeared. And where religion and democracy have vanished, good faith and reason in international affairs have given way to strident ambition and brute force.

He was speaking not only of Germany but of Russia as well.

On April 20, 1939, the Soviet Government suggested as the basis for a possible Soviet cooperation with Britain and France what amounted to a partition of Poland. These proposals concluded the admission of Soviet troops into both north and south Poland, Poland's repudiation of her alliance with Rumania and a declaration by the British that their guarantee given Poland applied only to Poland's western frontiers.

When these proposals were refused on August 22, 1939, the Soviets concluded a mutual-aid pact with Germany, which, according to the New York Times of June 22, 1941—

contained the obligation not to attack each other and second-

ly, not to interfere in respective spheres of interest. Finland, the Baltic countries, part of Poland, and part of Rumania were declared Russian spheres.

As can be clearly seen from the following record, the deep conflicts of interest of which I speak have carried up to this present hour, leaving a trail of lawlessness, treaty-breaking, brutality, and suspicion.

On August 22, 1939, William Bullitt reports an interview with Daladier from which I quote:

Daladier said that the action of the Soviet Union in signing a nonaggression pact with Germany, containing many unknown secret clauses, placed France in a most tragic and terrible situation. He could not understand how the French diplomats and negotiators had been so deceived by the Russians.

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland.

On September 17, 1939, Russia stabbed Poland in the back, notwithstanding her agreement to protect that country. Mr. Molotov boldly admits the role Soviet Russia played in this tragedy, for on October 31, 1939, he said:

One swift blow to Poland first by the German Army and then by the Red Army and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty.

And this notwithstanding Russia's nonaggression treaty with Poland.

It is interesting to note that in this same speech Mr. Molotov defended Germany as a state striving for peace, condemned England and France, and asserted it was absurd "to fight for the restoration of the Polish state." Yet some say that if we had belonged to the League of Nations, everything would have been lovely.

On November 30, 1939, Russia attacked Finland, again notwithstanding her nonaggression pact.

On December 14, 1939, the Council of the League of Nations, condemning the Soviet Union as an aggressor, expelled Russia from the League. Then, in rapid succession, came Russia's attacks on Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, condemned vigorously and unequivocally in turn by our State Department.

If we remember that Germany and Russia were engaged jointly in liquidating Poland and extending their spheres of influence when the following statement was made, we shall have a clearer understanding of its significance. Germany did not attack Russia until June 22, 1941. Two months earlier, on April 24, 1941, the former Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, replied to those who were asking whether peace could not be made with the dictators.

The following statement was directed not only against Hitler, but at Stalin as well. I quote:

I wish it were possible. But one obstinate fact stands in the way. One of the contending groups not only does not wish peace, as we understand peace, but literally does not believe in peace. That group uses the word, it is true—as it was used by the aggressor at the time of the Munich arrangement of 1938. Peace to that group is merely a convenient cloak for a continuing undeclared, undercover war, as France and many other nations to their misery have discovered. Behind the deceptive protection of the word "peace" the rulers of that group accumulate vast striking forces. They infiltrate shock troops disguised as peaceful travelers and businessmen. They set up organizations for spying, sabotage, and propaganda. They endeavor to sow hatred and discord. They use every tool of economic attack, bribery, corruption, and local disturbance to weaken the countries with which they are at peace until a military movement can easily complete the task of subjugation. That kind of a peace is nothing more than a trap—a trap into which many nations fell in earlier phases of this movement for world conquest when its true nature was not understood. Indeed the dictator nations make no secret

of their plans. They scornfully state their ideas, arrogantly confident that the law-abiding nations will not take them seriously—until it is too late successfully to resist them.

On June 22, 1941, when Germany marched against Russia, Mr. Churchill said in offering aid to the beleaguered Soviets:

No one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I have been in the last 25 years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken against it.

The attitude of the British toward the present situation now confronting the Allies is clearly stated in a speech by Lord Halifax, then acting as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On January 20, 1940, he said:

The instinct of our people has always throughout their history driven them to resist attempts by any one nation to make itself master of Europe. They have always seen in any such attempt a threat both to their own existence and to the general cause of liberty in Europe.

To those who would charge that I am raking over old coals I would like to say that as recently as May 13, 1944, President Roosevelt permitted Mr. Forrest Davis to speak for him in the Saturday Evening Post. I quote from the article titled "What Really Happened at Teheran":

Stripped to the bare essentials, we fought in 1917 and are fighting now to prevent the mastery of Europe by one aggressive power. Should Russia as the sole European power display tendencies toward world conquest, our vital interests would again be called into account.

I repeat that statement:

Stripped to the bare essentials, we fought in 1917 and are fighting now to prevent the mastery of Europe by one aggressive power. Should Russia as the sole European power display tendencies toward world conquest, our vital interests would again be called into account.

Mr. President, certainly it is not being unrealistic for me to recall to mind historical realities.

MR. PEPPER. Does the Senator see no distinction between the character and the location of the Russian Government and the Russian people, and of Germany, with respect, for example, to the danger to this country they might constitute as a dominant power in Europe?

MR. WHEELER. I shall take that up; I am coming to it, and I have the answer to the Senator's question. It is not my answer to it, but the answer given by the British themselves—what they think about it.

It is not unrealistic for me to warn of the tragic consequences to our civilization if this war ends up in a struggle for the domination of Europe by one or two great powers. It is not unrealistic for me to protest the continuation on the part of my own Government and my own people of policies which our whole history proves will lead to disaster.

There are those who are irritated that I should continue to fight against the extension of power politics, both actual and threatened, into the so-called peace. They want to get on with the bloody business and be done with this fol-de-rol. To them again I say for us such a course is sheer madness. This would mean that we would have to start immediately playing power politics according to the 1945 pattern. We would be compelled to organize resistance groups and to interfere in the internal affairs of governments and nations with brute force, the world around. We would have to start annexing territories, changing boundaries, deporting or liquidating populations, and defying the will of masses of people among our friends and enemies alike. We would have to go in for bigger and more horrible concentration camps, newer and more terrible G. P. U.'s and Gestapos, suppressing all news and communications, distorting truth, and fouling our sacred

honor, until, struggling to hold high the ever-weakening hands of Britain, we finally came to death grips with Soviet Russia. If we really want to commit national suicide, this is the road down which to travel from here on out.

Surely my colleagues have not forgotten the slogan of "All aid, short of war, to our allies." On December 29, 1940, the President set the theme for America's role as the arsenal of democracy when he said:

In a military sense Great Britain and the British Empire are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest.

Sir Harold MacKinder, in founding the science of geopolitics during the last war, issued the solemn warning of what would happen to England if any nation finally succeeded in annexing Poland. His thesis is simply this: Whoever would control Europe must control eastern Europe, the key to which is Poland. Whoever controls Poland controls eastern Europe. Whoever controls eastern Europe controls Europe. Whoever controls Europe controls the great Eurasian Island, and the world.

Mr. President, I quote from an article printed in the September 1943 issue of *The Nineteenth Century and After*. The editor, Mr. F. A. Voigt, said:

To be master of eastern Europe is, therefore, to be master of all Europe. If England were to abdicate in eastern Europe, she would be abdicating in all Europe. Such a policy would lead to her isolation, it would destroy the British ascendancy in the Near and Middle East. It would, by placing the Balkans and the Straits under the domination of one power, bring the British command of the Mediterranean to an end. It would isolate Turkey and eliminate British influence in Iraq and in Iran, and threaten the security of India and of the Persian Gulf. It would compel England to reconsider her attitude toward Germany.

Mr. President, there are those who are now so heartily sick of the terrible problems and conflicts arising out of this war, into which they so idealistically precipitated America, that they are openly urging that we let Europe fall into the hands of Stalin. Perhaps that would be best from our standpoint. They argue in this vein, "England and France have never been able to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe. Let Stalin try his hand." To them I would say, in the words of another, they "are now willing to settle for a nickel on a dollar and they are not so sure but what even the nickel is plugged." Certainly if America wants to gain the everlasting enmity of 350,000,000 people in Europe, and not only in Europe but throughout the world, this is the way to do it, because if we agreed to such a suggestion, what people on the face of the globe could have any faith or confidence in anything the American people might ever say or ever do?

There are those, on the other hand, Mr. President, who declare that Mr. Stalin has changed his tune and his intentions. Say they, "Mr. Stalin does not want to take over Europe. He has too much else on his hands and mind." To them I would say, this is the most unrealistic interpretation of the history I have documented that could be imagined. Whether Mr. Stalin has changed his mind or not, the fact remains that the present situation in Europe is disintegrating morally, socially, and economically, and politically to such an extent it is now obvious that the whole tragic European situation has gotten out of hand. Europe is being forced into Mr. Stalin's embrace whether he wants it or not. Compare the scene that now confronts us in Europe with the picture drawn by President Roosevelt on the Axis "new order," when he said on December 29, 1940:

The proposed new order is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a government based on the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppres-

sion. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate the human race.

Again, I say, Mr. President, it is my studied conviction that whether we or our allies have deliberately intended such an outcome to this war or not, for us to continue down the road we are going will make such an outcome inevitable. Certainly no more personal parleys on the part of three men, no more secret agreements, no more secret or open extensions of spheres of influence, no more identification of our desperate military necessities with ulterior political purposes on the part of ourselves or of our allies can possibly correct the present mortal errors we are now committing.

Mr. President, I desire at this time to urge upon my colleagues with all the strength of conviction at my command support of the principles contained in the resolution (S. Res. 8) submitted by me on January 6, 1945, as embodying the bases upon which a peace of decency, justice, and sanity can be salvaged from this terrible war.

The first principle reads as follows:

The adoption of a universal Bill of Rights to safeguard the inalienable rights of every individual regardless of race, class, or religious belief.

Mr. President, I am certain that in urging the acceptance of this principle I am not speaking in behalf of a "discredited minority." I hold in my hand a map titled "Movements of Non-German Populations in Europe," published by the International Labor Office, Montreal, Canada, in 1943. Herein is contained a general outline of the most terrifying and staggering mass deportation, evacuations, and repatriations that history records. The fate of millions is at stake.

On August 14, 1944, the American Jewish Conference, consisting of delegates from 63 Jewish organizations, in a memorandum submitted to Secretary of State Stettinius, urged the incorporation of an international Bill of Rights in any post-war security system that the four-power parley at Dumbarton Oaks might conceive. The memorandum pointed to "the total disregard of civilized concepts, of individual human rights on the part of some States" and asserted that "herein lie the roots of the international anarchy that contributed to the assault of the Axis Powers on the civilized world."

On October 7, 1943, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, the National Catholic Welfare Council, and the Synagogue Council of America issued a joint statement titled "Pattern for Peace," the second principle of which declares:

The rights of the individual must be assured—the dignity of the human person as the image of God must be set forth in all its essential implications in an international declaration of rights and be vindicated by the positive action of national governments and international organization. States as well as individuals must repudiate racial, religious, or other discrimination in violation of those rights.

Recently the American Jewish Committee issued a statement containing a six-point declaration of human rights that urges promulgation of an international bill of rights to guarantee individual liberties throughout the world. This statement has been signed by 1,326 distinguished Americans of all faiths. Vice President Wallace, Supreme Court Justices Roberts and Murphy, A. F. of L. President William Green, C. I. O. President Philip Murray, Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, and Sidney Hillman, as well as numerous Senators and Representatives and 348 church leaders are listed among the signers.

Mr. President, this map to which I have referred indicates that not only Germany but also our associate Russia has been responsible for the tragic plight of vast num-

bers of so-called liberated peoples. Among the deportations attributed to Russia we find the following: 61,000 Estonians, 60,000 Latvians, 66,000 Lithuanians, and 1,500,000 Poles, Jews, and others from Poland, all of whom have been forcibly removed from their homes and their countries. From the meager reports that trickle through to us from Russian-occupied territories, we know only too well that under the present armistice terms now being forced upon the countries of eastern Europe, one by one, thousands upon thousands more human beings are being subjected to the terrors of a ruthless conqueror. Let us remind ourselves again of what Woodrow Wilson said, "No right exists anywhere to hand peoples about from potentate to potentate as if they were property." Unless there can be reestablished immediately a minimum of humanitarian principles to which the Allies will pledge themselves as a basis for rectifying the evils already committed, this war will prove a hideous mockery so far as liberation of the suffering people of Europe is concerned. There can be no better way to assure the world of the integrity of Russia's intention toward liberated people than for Mr. Stalin to act now in the name of the Russian people in order to hasten the realization of simple and basic humanitarian laws upon which to rebuild the social order of Europe. Certainly, we are convinced that the European peoples take no greater delight in ruthless treatment, inhumanities, or murder, whether perpetrated by ourselves or our allies, than they take in Nazi atrocities. Would it be too much to expect that they were entitled to something more from their liberators? Personally I am convinced there is no possible moral ground upon which Americans can condone their associates and allies for doing what they condemn in others.

The Washington Post of December 13 carried an Associated Press dispatch of December 12 from London, which reads, in part:

There is a growing belief in diplomatic quarters that Russia's proposals, when presented to the European Advisory Commission, would suggest that several million Germans be sent to the Soviet to help in the reconstruction of that country.

I am informed that at least under Nazi occupation the Polish people carried on a desperate underground opposition to their conquerors, but that under the alleged Russian liberation even a great many of the underground forces have been liquidated or sent to concentration camps.

Surely the fanatical German resistance now adding to the already terrible casualties of our own American boys is not lessened by the realization of the fate being visited upon one of our allies by another alleged ally even before the war is over.

Mr. President, the second principle contained in my resolution reads as follows:

The assured survival of democratic principles and institutions and the preservation here of our American way of life.

It has become all too clear that we have reached such a point in our relations with our allies that the English language is in danger of losing its meaning. I would suggest that there is no better time than now to deal with this danger. All about us we hear the words "democracy," "democratic," "fundamental law," "constitutional government" bandied about from pillar to post. I quote from an editorial in Pravda commemorating the eighth anniversary of the U. S. S. R.'s Stalin constitution, in which it is declared—New York Times, December 4, 1944:

Soviet democracy is the most consistent democracy in the world.

Mr. President, when certain Senators sent a cablegram to Stalin congratulating him upon this anniversary a

Communist in my home town whom I happen to know said to me, "The trouble with those Senators is that they do not recognize the difference between a revolution by the proletariat and a revolution such as that which took place in the United States. They make a mockery of the word 'revolution.'" The Russians, the Communists, know what they are after, and they are taking what they want. Certainly I can hardly be accused of being anti-Communist so far as Russia is concerned, because I visited Russia in 1923, and when I returned to this country I advocated recognition of Russia. Some newspapers in this country stated that I ought to be deported because of that fact. I stated at that time that the Russian Government would last just as long as the Army could be kept loyal. The Army could be kept loyal, because the government took millions of boys who were illiterate and gave them shoes, clothes, and food. It made a super-class of them. Then it taught them to read and write and the principles of communism. That is all they know.

Soviet democracy is the most consistent democracy in the world.

The editorial further states:

The victories of the Soviet people are creating foundations for an international policy based on the consent of peoples. . . . The working masses of the whole world regard the Soviet people as a reliable support for the democratic system in their own country.

Anyone who has been to Russia knows differently.

I submit, Mr. President, that we are not fighting for the extension of the policies, practices, and techniques which are peculiar to the Soviet type of totalitarianism. There is a fundamental contradiction between what we know and mean as democracy in the United States and what is meant and known by the term in Russia.

On December 29, 1940, President Roosevelt clearly painted this contradiction when he said:

The history of recent years proves that shootings and chains and concentration camps are not the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a "new order" in the world but what they have in mind is but a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, and no hope.

The difference is so real and so basic that we ought now, without equivocation, to state that it is not our intention to subject the so-called liberated peoples of Europe to Stalin's type of democratic rule any more than we intend to restore Hitler's tyranny. At least, let us make perfectly clear to the peoples of Europe that it is our intention so far as it lies within our power to provide them the opportunity to define and to determine what they mean by the type of political system and government they desire to support.

The third principle contained in my resolution reads:

The immediate creation of a United Nations political council to provide for the democratic settlement in harmony with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, of territorial questions that have arisen in Europe and that may arise elsewhere.

Mr. President, I do not happen to be one of those who believe that they have a simple and easy answer to the grievous questions now burdening us. This much I do believe, namely, that the questions now arising in Europe are so fraught with dangers to the post-war world that they ought not under any condition to be left to the resources, intentions, and discretion of any one nation for settlement. These problems involve the fate of millions of helpless suffering human beings; they bear directly on the settlement of the whole European question; they threaten the very foundation of western civilization, and they are so complicated and so pressing that they consti-

tute a challenge to the combined resources of cultured, civilized, and christianized humanity.

I feel it is my duty to record the course that has been followed and that threatens to be followed where these problems have been left to one or two powers for settlement.

These are the brutal armistice terms that have been imposed on Finland:

The Finns lose Karelia, the area northwest of Leningrad. This includes the city of Viipuri—the most industrially developed region of Finland. In that area lives more than 10 per cent of Finland's pre-1940 population. The agreement also provided for the outright ceding to Russia of the Petsamo area in the far north, with its port and rich nickel mines, and the leasing for 50 years of the Porkkala Peninsula, with its naval base on the Finnish Gulf, for use as a military region. In cash Finland must pay reparations totaling \$300,000,000 within 6 years which is relatively heavier than any demand for reparations made on any country after the last war.

Now we are informed that our Treasury Department has refused to "unfreeze" sufficient Finnish funds in this country to enable her to pay a note on her indebtedness arising out of the last war, because for some strange reason such an act would play havoc with Russia's intention to integrate the economy of Finland with that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. C. L. Sulzberger informs us in the New York Times of December 31, 1944, that the three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have been abandoned to their fate by this Government.

I cannot believe that what Mr. Sulzberger says constitutes one of the real war aims of the United States. The Russian Institute of the Rand School on October 7, 1944, printed in its publication, Russian Affairs, a revealing document showing the treatment of Lithuanians at the hands of Russia in 1939. This document was supplied by the Lithuanian Red Cross as an "order of the people's commissar for the interior of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic" defining alleged anti-Soviet and socially alien elements, in order to permit the Soviets "to determine the strength of the counter-revolution and to direct apparatus for its digestion and liquidation."

These elements include: (a) All former members of anti-Soviet political parties, Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Social Democrats, Anarchists, and the like; (b) all former members of national chauvinistic anti-Soviet parties, organizations, and groups: Nationalists, Young Lithuania, Vol-demarists, Populists, Christian Democrats, members of nationalist terroristic organization, Iron Wolf, active members of the riflemen's association, the Catholic terrorist organization, White Horse; (c) former gendarmes, policemen, former employees of political and criminal police, and of the prisons; (d) former officers of the Czar, Petliura, and other armies; (e) former officers and members of military courts of the armies of Lithuania and Poland; (f) former political bandits and volunteers of the White and other armies; (g) persons expelled from the Communist Party and Communist Youth for antiparty offenses; (h) all deserters, political emigrants, reemigrants, repatriates, and contrabandists; (i) all citizens of foreign countries, representatives of foreign firms, employees of offices of foreign countries, former employees of legations, firms, concessions, and stock companies of foreign countries; (k) former employees of the departments of ministries from referents; (l) former workers of the Red Cross and Polish refugees; (m) religionists (priests, pastors), sectarians, and active religionists of religious communities; (n) former noblemen, estate owners, merchants, bankers, businessmen (who availed themselves of hired labor), shop owners, owners of hotels and restaurants.

It needs no stretch of the imagination to realize that this vast purge does not constitute American intentions toward the people of the Baltic countries.

Quite obviously, Russia intends to continue these tac-

tics in imposing its own unilateral settlement of the Polish dispute on the heroic Polish peoples. Her recent recognition of the Moscow-spawned Lublin committee bears no other interpretation. Russia has twice refused our good offices in the settlement of the Polish dispute and to date the record of her treatment of the Polish people, the Polish Army, and the Polish Government, at least, according to our standards, constitutes one of the blackest pages of modern history.

The extent to which the future peace of the world is threatened is further illustrated from the letter sent by the Coordinating Committee of American-Polish Associations in the East to former Secretary Cordell Hull, from which I quote:

Outside of the actual defeat of the common enemy, American arms are already helping to establish a division of the continent between two rival powers, Great Britain and Russia. The division of Europe between England and Russia is obviously a division into two zones of uneven strength. The very endeavor to level up that strength must inevitably become a source of conflict. Under these circumstances, chaos could be prevented only if American troops were to remain in Europe indefinitely. If such a plan for Europe were the result of United States policy, America would be responsible not only for the distortion of the true aims of this war and for the fifth partition of Poland, but also for the first partition of Europe. Our sons and our grandsons would have to pay for such a crime some day with their blood.

To confirm the extent to which Russia has gone in treating with the Polish problem I quote from William L. White's Report on the Russians in the January Reader's Digest:

In addition to the 180,000 Polish war prisoners, an estimated 1,500,000 civilians were removed from Poland in the early part of 1940 as part of the social engineering program. It was the practice to send men to lumber and mining camps in northern Siberia, women and children to brickyards and cooperative farms in southern Mazakstan. It should be said in defense of the Soviet Government that under similar circumstances it has treated its own people exactly as it did the Poles.

Mr. President, the story of the betrayal of General Mihailovitch by both Russia and Britain, and the fate now being imposed on Yugoslavia is vividly described by Eleanor Packard, United Press correspondent, who has recently been expelled from Russian occupied territory whom I quote:

In Belgrade alone Tito has arrested 40,000 followers of Mihailovitch and has already executed several hundreds. At the same time he has confiscated 2,000 businesses and industrial enterprises, all the banks, and 30,000 small land holdings belonging to Serbian peasants who supported General Mihailovitch. Actually Yugoslavia is now being liquidated literally and the people are being forced under the totalitarian, communist rule of partisan bands supported by the Soviet Union.

Is it any wonder, Mr. President, that some of us want to see what kind of a peace treaty is made before we agree to set up machinery to maintain the status quo? Certainly if any American Government should do so without knowing the facts, the American people would repudiate it at the next election. It is inconceivable to me that we should wish to maintain the status quo if these things are going on, as reported by the labor organization in Canada, the Red Cross, and other organizations.

The story of what is going on in Bulgaria is more of the same. As I understand the situation, Bulgaria has sent delegates to Cairo to negotiate armistice terms with the British and the Americans. Under the terms agreed upon, Russia would not have been able to occupy Bulgaria, for the Bulgarian Army was to be demobilized after evacuating all territory in Greece and Yugoslavia;

ne boundary settlements were to be reserved until a later date; the Government was to remain neutral and without change. When a copy of those terms was forwarded to Russia, she immediately declared war on Bulgaria, voiding the Cairo terms, and imposed surrender and occupation, with Tudor Pavlov, the Bulgarian Communist leader, installed as the King's first adviser.

No word comes that the leading spirit behind the coup d'état of September 2, namely, Eikolai Mushanoff, is being tried in Bulgarian courts as a war criminal. Yet Mushanoff was the leading spirit behind Premier Maavieff and his new Bulgarian Government that decreed amnesty for all anti-Nazi political prisoners, ordered the disbanding of all pro-Fascist organizations, denounced the anti-Comintern pact, revoked all anti-Jewish laws, and declared war on Germany before being attacked by the Soviets. Nevertheless, Russia declared war on that Government, in order to overthrow it. Russia's determination to impose her will upon Bulgaria is further illustrated by the expulsion of two Anglo-American commissions from Bulgarian soil by Red Army officials, and the clamping down of a news black-out by Russia over the entire eastern European area from Finland to the Balkans.

In Greece open violence between Communist-inspired forces and British interests has already provided Americans with a preview of what they can expect as the struggle for the consolidation, extension, and control of two spheres of influence expands and intensifies. The same struggle goes on in various and sundry forms in every country in Europe. Even the neutrals are now feeling the bitter lash of vindictiveness and the sting of selfish interests. Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Palestine—all are caught in the rising tide of conflict. The dismay which accompanies the extension of this struggle for the control of the fate and destinies of nations is not dispelled by the recent news that Dr. Eduard Benes, who has been preaching the gospel of pro-Russian solidarity up and down this land, has been informed, at least through the press, that Russia intends to incorporate all Slovaks into the western Soviet Ukraine, and to that end another government probably will be necessary in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. President, while I speak a harvest of violence, civil war, and death is being reaped in every country in Europe. The middle class and the economic foundations of our enemies and allies alike are being destroyed. If any problem cries out for a sane and reasonable solution, it is the problem which arises from the delegation of power to any one country to solve problems which involve the fate of all the other countries in Europe. As matters now stand, the aim—the sole aim—in Europe of the United Nations is to defeat Germany. As a corollary to that aim, Germany could not be defeated unless she was driven out of the occupied territories. In that sense they had to be liberated—liberated from Germany—but to liberate them for the sake of making them free was with Britain a wholly secondary aim, and with Russia, as matters now stand, not an aim at all.

On December 30, 1938, the former Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Grew, said, in a note to the Foreign Minister of Japan:

This Government does not admit that there is need or warrant for any one power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a new order in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto.

I see no other way of meeting this problem head-on save by establishing at the earliest possible moment a United Nations Political Council. Certainly Russia should agree to it. If she should not do so, we would know what we were in for. I submit that Stalin has the greatest oppor-

tunity of any leader in the world at this moment to show the peoples of the world that he intends to do what was stated in the agreements he made in the name of Russia, what he told Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and all the other countries he would do, namely, that he would not interfere in any way in the internal affairs of those countries, and that he would permit them to have a democratic government, as they saw fit.

The fourth principle in my resolution calls for "free plebiscites under international supervision (not by Russia or England alone but by the combined forces) in all liberated countries to choose their own form of government and leadership, the time and procedure to be determined by the United Nations Political Council."

The Hague Convention of 1907, articles 42 to 56, distinguishes between military occupation as temporary occupation and annexation, or the final taking over of a foreign territory. The Convention states that the occupying authority has not the right to force the population to any acts directed against its fatherland; it must respect the honor, laws, life, religious faiths, and private property of people of the occupied lands. In the case of Poland, after the Soviets had announced that the Polish Government no longer existed, just 11 days were given to the Polish people to study the unfamiliar new election laws and to choose delegates to execute their wish. Pravda reported:

During the period of preparation of the election of delegates to the People's Assembly of the Western Ukraine, thousands of fighting men and officers carried on an immense political work among the population.

On October 22, Pravda stated that in eastern Poland alone there were some 100,000 agitators and other persons preparing for the election, and that number did not include the soldiers, which meant that there was one election worker from Russia for every 27 or 28 persons qualified to vote.

Again, it takes no stretch of the imagination to understand what the word "plebiscite" means under the Soviet's one-party system in which no names can go on the ballots except those proposed by local peasant or workers' committees, which are of course, controlled; a system which provides that, since no other group or party can nominate a candidate, only one name can be presented to the voter. Surely there is a crying need for a United Nations Political Council to provide for genuine plebiscites among the disinherited peoples of Europe.

The fifth principle calls for:

The immediate creation of a United Nations Economic and Social Council "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security."

Mr. President, I wish to quote from an address delivered by Mr. Harry C. Hawkins, formerly State Department Director of Economic Affairs, on April 25, 1944, who stated as one of the two necessities for the establishment of a genuine and secure peace:

The creation of a better world economic order, the essential purposes of which are to eliminate the economic causes of international friction and to reduce the poverty and distress which gangster elements in any nation can so effectively exploit to build up their own strength.

I believe I do not need to illustrate the necessity for the acceptance and implementation of such a council any further than by calling to mind the fact that at this very moment, in spite of all the various conferences that have been called to discuss basic international problems, the tremendous UNRRA organization, which was set up primarily to minister to the basic needs of the civilian vic-

tims of this war, has not yet been able to gain sufficient cooperation from the Allied Governments to permit the extension of its services and supplies into liberated territories. According to press reports, to this moment Russia is withholding payment of her assessment for UNRRA administration expenses of \$1,500,000 until she has studied the way in which UNRRA proposes to use Russian funds. Meanwhile, thousands upon thousands of innocent victims of the ravages of this war are starving.

When food becomes a political weapon it is high time for the Senate of the United States to do everything in its power, at least to make the necessities of life available, on the basis of need alone, to a suffering humanity.

The last principle contained in my resolution warrants the most careful and serious consideration. It reads as follows:

With a view to assuring the security of all nations, large or small, victor or vanquished, and promoting the earliest possible peace and rehabilitation of Europe and the world, the United States Senate favors the creation of a general federation of European nations at the earliest possible date, within which disarmament and economic unification will be combined with sovereign equality and cultural self-determination.

Mr. President, the most clear-cut picture of what is happening throughout Europe is to be found in a dispatch from Herbert L. Matthews, published in the New York Times of December 14, concerning the situation in Italy. He wrote as follows:

The whole set-up is unbalanced by differences of ideas between Washington and London. Our conception of war is an unusual one. Britain and Russia and other European nations see war as an instrument of politics, but for the United States it is something narrowly and purely military—to win the war and then go home. The result is that the United States is furnishing almost all the material and the money, but it is not directing their use.

Not only is the United States unable to direct the use to which its money and matériel are being put, not only are our boys bleeding and dying on the battlefields of Europe to further the intentions and designs of our allies, but it becomes increasingly apparent that our Government has not the slightest idea or purpose behind these sacrifices, other than defeating Hitler on the battlefield.

Now is the time to face boldly the question of what our intentions are toward Germany and Europe. As I see the problem, there are only four possible alternatives:

- (a) Europe dismembered into twenty-odd separate states.
- (b) Europe dominated by Soviet Russia.
- (c) Europe partitioned into British and Russian spheres of influence.
- (d) Europe united in a free and peaceful federation.

The dismemberment of Europe has led our generation into two world wars and already threatens a third. There is no nation in Europe that either could or would dare to have attacked its neighbor states one by one had they been united by federal ties. Europe in this modern age cannot remain broken up into twenty-odd isolated, economic units, without precipitating another world conflict. Actually, to follow such a policy through would mean that we have fought this war merely to restore totalitarian governments and states all over Europe. What is a totalitarian state, Mr. President, but that state in which its cultural, economic, and political power is under the centralized control of a sovereign government which knows and owes no higher allegiance than to itself? A dismembered Europe could not help but become again a chessboard of international intrigue, a breeding ground for revolutions, and an international booby trap in the form of a third World War.

I am sure it was never the President's intention to

rescue the peoples of Europe from Hitler's tyranny at the cost of uncounted American lives in order to turn them over to the control of totalitarian Soviet Russia.

We have only to look across the water to envision the grim prospects for ourselves and for the world if Europe becomes an unhappy hunting ground in which Britain and Russia use 350,000,000 people further to consolidate and extend either ideologies or selfish interests in a bitter struggle to partition and control Europe.

A general federation of European nations, I am convinced, will provide the only sane attempt at a solution to the crucial issues now taxing the resources of the Allies. Such a federation in which disarmament was combined with economic collaboration would constitute no threat either to Britain or to Russia. Already the Soviets are talking and working themselves toward the establishment of an Eastern European and Balkan federation while, as Gen. Jan Smuts advised the British some time ago, Mr. Churchill is trying to establish Britain's sphere of influence under the guise of a western European federation. The very idea of a general federation of European states would at least provide a nobler cause for which both Britain and Russia could strive.

There is no reason why the people of Russia and England, like the people of the United States, should not be interested in helping the suffering peoples of Europe to set up a federation of democratic republics patterned after genuinely democratic ideals, which have brought to our people more freedom, liberty, and prosperity than any other form of government has achieved in the history of the world. To those in our midst who say this cannot be done, I can only say it has never been tried.

I want to go on record again to the effect that I will do everything within my power to further America's participation in a world organization providing guaranties of security for Russia's interest and Russia's territory on the basis of international law in the event of any new threat of aggression from any countries, in exchange for the acceptance by Russia and Great Britain of the only sure way of preserving the peace of Europe and the world, and that is the setting up in Europe of a confederation of European states, or a United States of Europe, and the acceptance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter as the basis upon which all settlements that have been made or are yet to be made in Europe since September 1, 1939, are to be ultimately established.

Mr. President, allow me to invite attention to the fact that the idea of a federation of Europe is not new with me. It was advocated, if you please, by Briand, of France, and Von Schuschnigg, of Austria. Even Mr. Churchill, in 1930, wrote for the Saturday Evening Post an article in which he said that a United States of Europe could do no harm, but should be helpful to Europe, to the United States of America, and to Germany. I am not sure of the exact words which Mr. Churchill used, but I have stated their substance.

I am unwilling, however, to commit this country to a world organization which will seek to enforce an unjust peace upon the people of Europe; a peace which will throw hundreds of millions of people into slavery and degradation; a peace which is contrary to every precept of common decency; and a peace which is contrary to every principle which has ever been enunciated in this country from its inception. This is not what the American people were told they were fighting for; this is not what the American boys are dying for. If we expect to maintain a democratic republic in this country, to say nothing of fighting for it in foreign countries, we must now let it be known that our leaders insist upon our allies keeping their promises, and that we, in turn, keep faith with them and with the boys who are dying upon foreign soil.

Mr. President, I want to straighten out the matter of

"discredited minorities," whose views, we are told, "have been overwhelmingly rejected by their fellow citizens of every party."

I do not know just to whom the Secretary of State had reference when he used the words "discredited minorities," whether he had reference to the people of my State or not. But surely, unless the people have changed their minds considerably since 1940, I am not representing a minority, because I carried every city and county in the State, and received twice as great a majority of votes as did the President himself. Not only was that true in 1940 but it was also true in 1934.

I have made the statement again and again that the demand for "unconditional surrender" has been a mistake. Not only have I said this but so have thousands of other people of high intelligence and of the class you would call "interventionists," if you please, or "internationalists." I believe that the continued use of the brutal, asinine boast of "unconditional surrender" is costing thousands upon thousands of American lives, is contributing to the deterioration of Allied unity, and threatens to lay the foundations for such an impossible situation in Europe, that a third world war cannot possibly be averted. For many long months I have been supported in my conviction that this outcome is certain by statements issued from every quarter.

MR. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. WHEELER. I yield.

MR. LUCAS. The Senator has made the statement that the continuation of the demand for unconditional surrender is, in his opinion, costing thousands upon thousands of lives.

MR. WHEELER. Yes; that is my opinion.

MR. LUCAS. What does the Senator suggest in lieu thereof?

MR. WHEELER. I suggest that the Allies should state their peace terms to the German people just as President Woodrow Wilson stated his Fourteen Points.

MR. LUCAS. In his resolution recently submitted the Senator advocates "the adoption of a universal bill of rights to safeguard the inalienable rights of every individual regardless of race, class, or religious belief."

MR. WHEELER. Of course.

MR. LUCAS. I presume that the Senator was not using that expression in the sense of its applying to the world.

MR. WHEELER. I used it in the sense of its application to the world, and I should like to see it adopted by every country on the face of the globe, including Russia.

MR. LUCAS. I wondered if the Senator meant to apply it to the world, how he would enforce a universal bill of rights or how he would enforce any of the proposals he has included in his resolution. There is nothing in any of them which suggests the use of force.

MR. WHEELER. If the Senator is familiar with the resolution and has read it, he would know what it proposes is to have the United States Senate go on record as favoring the things it sets forth. I felt, and feel now, that if the United States Senate went on record as favoring these things, it would have a profound effect upon Russia and I hope it would have a profound effect upon England, and the British Empire.

On February 22, 1944, the Times, of London, said—and I should like to call the attention of the Senator from Illinois to this:

Unless shattered and dismembered Europe can find some new vision that looks forward rather than back, some leadership bold enough to survey her needs and problems as a whole, the civilization will surely perish. To blot out Germany from among the nations of Europe would be neither practical nor morally acceptable to the civilized world. Germany cannot be allowed to become a cancer at the heart of the European organism.

The London Times is probably the most influential publication in England and is generally recognized as speaking for the British Foreign Office.

On March 26, 1944, the Archbishop of Canterbury and free church leaders in England offered an eight-point program for peace and a warning against "breaches of basic human rights in dealing with Germany." Said they:

We must not lend ourselves in a mood of vengefulness to breaches of basic human rights or the punitive measures against the entire German people, which will be repudiated as unjust by later generations or will permanently frustrate hopes of peace and unity in Europe.

On June 1 Pope Pius XII, who, I presume, was speaking for a "discredited minority," declared:

No just peace can be reached if the victor would by force of arms dictate the terms. A just policy has to give the defeated nation a dignified place.

On June 26 Mr. Raymond Moley wrote:

The trouble with unconditional surrender as an objective is that few Americans or Britons really believe that surrender can be without conditions, while to Germans the slogan means that there will be no distinctions in punishment among the elements in Germany. To them it means that the Nazi party, the army, and the mass of the people are to suffer equally, which can have no effect beyond tying together 80,000,000 Germans in a desperate unity.

On July 29 the London Economist carried the following warning:

Unconditional surrender is becoming a policy of drift, of wait and see, of reliance on what may turn up. But the drift of events may carry Germany, Europe, and the grand alliance itself to a very different conclusion from the one the Allies desire. It may carry them to a military stalemate or prolonged fighting, and then to divided counsels and Allied disputes. No policy for Germany means no policy for peace.

Of course, in the mind of the Secretary of State, the London Economist speaks for a "discredited minority."

MR. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. WHEELER. I yield.

MR. WILEY. I inquire if, to the Senator's knowledge, the term "unconditional surrender" has ever been defined by the President or anyone else in this country?

MR. WHEELER. The President has not defined it, to my knowledge.

MR. WILEY. I am wondering if now the President and Stalin and Churchill should define the conditions and say there could be no other conditions, if that would not be equivalent to unconditional surrender, and drastic, although the terms might be quite lenient.

MR. WHEELER. I cannot answer that, I will say to the Senator.

In the same month of July the National Opinion Research Center of Denver University polling the 48 States on the subject of whether Americans should help to put Germany back on her industrial feet, even at the cost of continued rationing at home, reports that 64 per cent or nearly a two-thirds majority of the American people, believe we should follow this course. The research center comments:

They hold this view because, in the long run, this country would benefit from such a policy, and because the announcement that such help would be forthcoming might speed the German surrender.

I presume that 64 per cent, according to the National Opinion Research Center of Denver University, represents a "discredited minority."

I quote from a war correspondent of the New York Sun, Gault MacGowan, who wrote as far back as August 14:

Our terms to Hitler are unconditional surrender, and only

that prevents a military demand for an armistice. Despite the drastic bombings of German cities, the destruction of thousands of German homes and buildings and the anxiety of the German people to see the end of the war, the Gestapo won't let them demonstrate for peace or raise a questioning voice against their Fuehrer's unchallengeable wisdom. Such are my impressions of the situation tonight. It is no longer a military problem but a political one.

Not only has this man said that, but I have talked with military leaders in this country who have said identically the same thing.

Life magazine on August 21 carried the same message from John Scott, a Time and Life correspondent:

The future looks blacker day by day but those inside Germany who want peace and not national suicide are hindered rather than helped by the Allies. The Anglo-American attitude is still expressed by our determined adherence to the unconditional surrender formula, with which has been coupled a reluctance to make any concrete promise to any German opposition group. As a result, the complaint is made that any opposition group attempting to overthrow Hitler and make peace with western powers has no basic program on which it can talk convincingly to the German people. The Russians on the other hand, indirectly offer the German people that Germany won't be destroyed and that the German Army won't be destroyed. It has resulted in a pro-Russia orientation among a growing number of Germans who, all other things being equal, would be much more inclined to be pro-Anglo-American and pro-democratic.

On September 26, 1944, even Mr. Walter Lippmann plainly pointed out that we no longer deal with reality when we talk about whether we shall impose a soft or harsh peace on Germany. Of course, Mr. Walter Lippmann represents the "discredited" view; but he has been one of the strongest advocates of the President's foreign policy, stronger than almost any other man in this country. He said:

Imagine the mildest conceivable terms of peace, and Germany will still be an economic ruin, incapable in her existing industrial structure of employing all her people, incapable of supporting a tolerable standard of life. Imagine no loss of territory, no reparations, no military occupation, no interference with the internal administration, and the full benefits of the Atlantic Charter, suppose that the only demand of the Allies is that Germany disarm and that she should not take any steps to rearm for the next 15 years. Post-war Germany would nevertheless be an economic ruin.

On October 11, 1944, a group of members of Parliament including 26 labor members, entered a motion in the House of Parliament calling for a government declaration which would—

Encourage the emergence within Germany of a new regime, composed of democratically minded persons in whom the United Nations could have confidence so that a settlement of the problems which caused the present conflict in Europe might be reached on the basis of the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

As far back as the early part of this year the personal confidant of the President, Anne O'Hare McCormick, wrote:

The American Government is silent on every political issue at the moment when as much depends on psychological as on military "softening." This war differs from the last in many respects, but in none more than in the apparent determination of the high strategists to defeat the enemy in the hardest way.

On January 3, 1945, Dorothy Thompson, another who supported the President, who was one of the strongest interventionists and internationalists in this country, one of our greatest authorities on Germany and a most intelligent and consistent opponent of the brutal slogan

"unconditional surrender," and who made a speech for the President during the last campaign, wrote as follows:

There are two conditions under which Germany, as an entity, can surrender. The first is to make clear that a Germany will be left which is economically capable of life. A Germany that is deindustrialized or loses its industrial provinces or is overcrowded by the evacuation of ten to twenty million Germans into a truncated Reich will be more incapable of sustaining life than Puerto Rico. The second condition under which Germany could surrender is: She could become the ward of an already established world organization, operating along clear and established principles. The surrender of a nation must mean the merging of one's identity, but it cannot happen unless some larger identity exists. A Germany conquered by four powers but not surrendered to any one thing is no answer.

Of course, Dorothy Thompson spends much time in Europe. She knows more about Germany than probably almost any Member of the Senate. I now wish to read extracts from an article by Dorothy Thompson which appeared in the Washington Evening Star of January 8, 1945:

There have been three major political errors in this war, all arising out of the first one—the discounting of the Atlantic Charter. The second was the interpretation that has accumulated around unconditional surrender; and the third, the failure to produce any reasonable policy for a post-war Europe.

And what our own Government and some of our publicists have been doing in regard to the Atlantic Charter, since the President's press conference, is most discouraging.

Elmer Davis, as head of the Office of War Information, must be regarded as official. The other day on the air he took the line that the Atlantic Charter (like the Ten Commandments referred to by the President) represents only a lofty ideal, "Nobody ever said it could be put into effect day after tomorrow or even at the end of the war," are his words. The New York Herald Tribune took, editorially, exactly the same line. . . .

Mr. Davis' remarks are senseless. The Atlantic Charter is no lofty ideal. It represents what was universally accepted political principle, and to a large extent political practice, before Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy embarked on a counterprogram. . . .

The unconditional surrender formula has gradually become clothed with concepts that mean the extinction of Germany, as a state, a nation, a functioning economy, and, consequentially, as a people. This interpretation has closed every door to forces that might have arisen in Germany to eliminate top Nazis and effect surrender. Those forces existed; they came to a head; in that moment time was of the essence; but receiving no aid in any form, they were lost, and today the leaders are dead.

Dorothy Thompson, again, represents a "discredited minority."

She supported Mr. Roosevelt in the last campaign.

It now appears that Prime Minister Churchill has begun to see the light—that the futility of the present course of events is slowly dawning on him. As recently as November 10, 1944, he said he thought it was high time that "we had another triple conference and that such a meeting might easily abridge the sufferings of mankind and stop the fearful process of destruction that is ravaging the earth."

Whatever Mr. Stalin's motives may be he has scrupulously avoided in his speeches the term "unconditional surrender" of Germany. The Moscow-sponsored Free Germany Committee has been broadcasting three to six times a day to the German people two terms upon which peace might be concluded between the Soviets and the German people, namely, get rid of the Hitlerites and get off Russian soil.

As recently as November 6, 1943, Mr. Stalin declared:

It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible

to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But the Hitlerite state can and should be destroyed. And our first task, in fact, is to destroy the Hitlerite state and its inspirers.

It is not our aim to destroy all organized military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is not only impossible in regard to Germany, as it is in regard to Russia, but also inadvisable from the point of view of the victor. Comrades, we are waging a great war of liberation.

Mr. President, I am not advocating anything contrary to American traditions when I insist upon the abandonment of this senseless slogan. On December 22, 1848, Mr. Calhoun stood on the floor of the Senate and championed the noble tradition of American statesmanship when he said:

War is made by one party, but it takes two to make peace. If all authority is overthrown in Mexico, where will be the power to enter into negotiation and make peace? Our very success would defeat the possibility of making peace. In that case the war would not end in peace, but in conquest; not in negotiation but in subjugation, and defeat, I repeat, the very object we aim to accomplish—and accomplish that which we disavow to be our intention by destroying the separate existence of Mexico, overthrowing her nationality, and blotting out her name from the list of nations. I must say I am at a loss to see how a free and independent republic can be established in Mexico under the protection and authority of its conquerors. I had always supposed that such a government must be the spontaneous wish of the people; that it must emanate from the hearts of the people and be supported by their devotion to it, without support from abroad.

Mr. President, I desire now to quote from a recent statement made by a Belgian exile, Mr. G. Jensen, who has been through all the horrors and sufferings of this war.

Mr. Jensen was not a candidate for the Senate, subject to popular election by the people, but he went through all the horrors of this war. He said:

Unconditional surrender of Germany means chaos for Europe. All those who knew the German people just before the war know that Germany will never give in. She will fight to the bitter end if no just peace proposals are made. The German people are fighting with the spirit that was Britain's in 1940.

Judging by all the lessons of history, the next last war will be one between the Anglo-Saxon world and Russia, and nothing on earth will prevent an injured Germany from seizing her chance at that moment.

It should by now be clear to everyone that the politicians who started this war and pretend to be leading it have themselves become the slaves of the destructive powers they have let loose, and are no longer in a position to control them. How in such circumstances dare they talk about controlling the future of the world for years to come?

Unless people everywhere wake up and themselves take control of their future, they will be deceived again and again by those who pretend to be leading them and willfully mislead them.

Victory is the most dangerous of poisons. Only a just and righteous peace can save humanity in the next generation from a new and far worse calamity.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McMAHON in the chair). Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from Florida?

Mr. WHEELER. I yield.

Mr. PEPPER. I am not quite clear concerning the statement about the politicians who started this war. Was that a quotation?

Mr. WHEELER. That was a quotation.

Mr. PEPPER. The quotation is from whom?

Mr. WHEELER. From Mr. G. Jensen, a Belgian exile. I suppose he is talking about Mr. Hitler as a politician; I suppose he is talking about Mr. Stalin as a politician; I suppose he is talking about all of us as politicians.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me say that I am convinced that these principles I have advocated are in complete uniformity with all that is best and most enduring in America's traditions. In spite of all the equivocation and evasion and deception that has been practiced, we have, I say, pledged our solemn word that this war would not end in a new struggle of power politics but in a just and lasting peace. There is no point whatsoever in talking about future international agreements, future world organizations, future world charters, if the very basis upon which the present precarious unity of the United Nations rests is repudiated.

It was President Franklin D. Roosevelt who in 1937—in the very same "quarantine" speech which launched us on the course of action that broke down our neutrality and involved us in two great wars simultaneously, solemnly laid down the principle which underlies this speech of mine:

There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or future security of every nation large or small. It is therefore a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored.

MR. PEPPER. The able Senator from Montana refers to a resolution which he offered in the Senate on January 6, this year, which sets out what in his opinion should be the peace aims of this country upon which hostilities should cease, because in the early part of his resolution, on the first page, as I have it before me, the Senator uses this language:

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States, in order to affirm our faith in the uncompromised principles of the Atlantic Charter, and in the integrity of its coauthors and 35 or more signatories, and in order that the ideals which sustain and guide our role in the present conflict shall continue to strengthen a victorious hope in the hearts of the suffering peoples of the world, a noble magnanimity of purpose within the United Nations, and an enduring bulwark of unity among the people of these United States; and in order to avert the further loss of the lives of hundreds of thousands of American boys as well as those of our allies, the wastage of our natural resources and the further break-down of the moral fiber of our people.

Proposes the following statement of peace aims believing them to represent the aspirations of the American people and the essential features of a just and lasting peace:

1. The adoption of a universal bill of rights to safeguard the inalienable rights of every individual regardless of race, class, or religious belief.

2. The assured survival and extension of democratic principles and institutions and the preservation here of our American way of life.

3. The immediate creation of a United Nations political council to provide for the democratic settlement, in harmony with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, of territorial questions that have arisen in Europe and that may arise elsewhere.

4. Free plebiscites under international supervision in all liberated countries to choose their own form of government and leadership, the time and procedure to be determined by the United Nations political council.

5. The immediate creation of a United Nations economic and social council "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security."

6. With a view to assuring the security of all nations, large or small, victor or vanquished, and promoting the earliest possible peace and rehabilitation of Europe and the world, the United States Senate favors the creation of a general federation of European nations at the earliest possible date, within which disarmament and economic unification will be combined with sovereign equality and cultural self-determination.

The able Senator from Montana says that those should be the peace aims that the United States Senate should declare to the world.

MR. WHEELER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. PEPPER. I yield.

MR. WHEELER. Will the Senator tell me with which one of those points he disagrees?

MR. PEPPER. Mr. President, I very distinctly—

MR. WHEELER. Will the Senator tell me with which one he disagrees?

MR. PEPPER. I disagree with No. 6, which limits the international organization to keep the peace of the future to European nations, and very definitely keeps us out of it.

MR. WHEELER. Is that the only one with which the Senator disagrees?

MR. PEPPER. Mr. President—

MR. WHEELER. Will the Senator tell me with which of the other points he disagrees?

MR. PEPPER. Point No. 2, which refers to preserving the American way of life in the United States, has very little to do with peace terms. I did not know that that had to be one of the peace terms.

MR. WHEELER. Does the Senator disagree with it?

MR. PEPPER. No; I do not; but I do not consider it very relevant to the peace terms.

MR. WHEELER. Does the Senator disagree with any of the other points?

MR. PEPPER. On their face the other points are not objectionable; but the able Senator proposes them as an alternative to unconditional surrender.

MR. WHEELER. No. The Senator is entirely mistaken.

MR. PEPPER. That is what the resolution says.

MR. WHEELER. The Senator is trying to put words in my mouth, which I will not permit him to do.

MR. PEPPER. I read from the resolution of the able Senator. I did not quote his words.

MR. WHEELER. The resolution is not in lieu of unconditional surrender. I have repeatedly stated, and I now repeat, that I am not suggesting a negotiated peace. I have so stated to the Senator from Florida, and he knows that I have made that statement on the floor of the Senate time and time again.

What I am suggesting is that the President, Mr. Churchill, and the other Allied leaders state their terms to the German people, as suggested by Dorothy Thompson, by the London Times, by the London Economist, by the Nineteenth Century and After, and by members of

the British Parliament. They call upon us to state our peace aims. Soldiers who are dying upon the battlefield have said that the fact that we have not stated our peace aims to Germany is costing the lives of American boys. In my judgment, the reason we have not stated them—and I say it advisedly—is that the Big Three have not been able to agree upon them.

MR. PEPPER. Today the able Senator from Colorado has been cooperating with the Senator from Montana, and I do not know with whom else he cooperates. Maybe he has in mind the inevitable dead when he says he would not join an effective international organization to keep the peace.

MR. MILLIKIN. I cooperated with the Senator from Montana in his statements of fact as to the present state of foreign affairs. I have not indicated any conclusion as to his thesis. I defined to the Senator from Florida where I would use force and where I would not use it. I believe that when the Senator attempts to put a gag upon any Senator in this Chamber by urging that one line of argument is divisive and another line patriotic, he is merely scratching an unwholesome itch.

MR. WHEELER. Mr. President, I shall not attempt to answer the statements which have been made, but I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a statement appearing in The Progressive of January 1, 1945, quoting Mr. Sulzberger, of the New York Times, in which he states, among other things, as follows:

At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference in Casablanca early in 1943 the President "ardently urged the adoption of an unconditional-surrender policy by the Allies," Sulzberger informs us. "Mr. Churchill was reluctant to support such an out-and-out statement . . . It was felt that this would tend to negate the moral effect of the Allies' aerial bombings of Germany by stiffening the Germans' morale."

Of course, Mr. President, when I made my statement I expected that at any time I disagreed with my friend, the Senator from Florida, I would be charged by the internationalist crowd, which was so anxious to take us into this war, with doing something to injure the war effort. But, so far as I am concerned, I can "take it," and nobody will stop me from expressing my honest views upon this floor by a statement that by doing so is to help Goebbels. I am not interested in helping Goebbels; I am not interested in helping Churchill. I am interested only in helping the boys who are dying upon the battlefields of Europe.

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

FEBRUARY 11, 1945

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea.

In addition to the three heads of government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State;
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the President;
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;

General of the Army George C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army;

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet;

Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;

Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;

Major General L. S. Kuter, U.S.A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces;

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.;

H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;

Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;

Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport;
Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow;
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs;

Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet;
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff;

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal,
Chief of the Air Staff;

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First
Sea Lord;

General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Min-
ister of Defense;

Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre;

Field Marshal Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff
Mission at Washington;

Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington,
together with military and diplomatic advisors.

For the Soviet Union:

V. M. Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R.;

Admiral Kuznetsov, Peoples Commissar for the Navy;
Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General
Staff of the Red Army;

A. Y. Vyshinski, Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the U.S.S.R.;

I. M. Maiski, Deputy Peoples Commissar of Foreign Af-
fairs of the U.S.S.R.;

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov;

F. T. Gusev, Ambassador in Great Britain;

A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U.S.A.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister
of Great Britain, the President of the United States of
America, and the Chairman of the Council of Peoples
Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the results of the Crimean Conference:

THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans
of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the com-
mon enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied na-
tions have met in daily meetings throughout the Confer-
ence. These meetings have been most satisfactory from
every point of view and have resulted in closer coordina-
tion of the military effort of the three Allies than ever be-
fore. The fullest information has been inter-changed.
The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more
powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces
into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and
South have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only
as we execute them, but we believe that the very close
working partnership among the three staffs attained at
this Conference will result in shortening the War. Meet-
ings of the three staffs will be continued in the future
whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only
make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by at-
tempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for en-
forcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall
impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed
resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not
be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been
accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the
three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany.

Coordinated administration and control has been pro-
vided for under the plan through a central control com-
mission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the
three powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been
agreed that France should be invited by the three powers,
if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation,
and to participate as a fourth member of the control com-
mission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by
the four governments concerned through their repre-
sentatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German mili-
tarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never
again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are
determined to disarm and disband all German armed
forces; break up for all time the German General Staff
that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German
militarism; remove or destroy all German military equip-
ment; eliminate or control all German industry that could
be used for military production; bring all war criminals
to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind
for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the
Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, re-
move all Nazi and militarist influences from public office
and from the cultural and economic life of the German
people; and take in harmony such other measures in
Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and
safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the
people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism
have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life
for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of na-
tions.

REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused
by Germany to the Allied nations in this war and recog-
nized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compen-
sation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent pos-
sible. A commission for the compensation of damage will
be established. The commission will be instructed to con-
sider the question of the extent and methods for compen-
sating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries.
The commission will work in Moscow.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establish-
ment with our allies of a general international organiza-
tion to maintain peace and security. We believe that this
is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the
political, economic and social causes of war through the
close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving
peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the
important question of voting procedure, however, agree-
ment was not there reached. The present Conference has
been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of United Nations
should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United
States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an
organization, along the lines proposed in the informal
conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Govern-
ment of France will be immediately consulted and invited
to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the
Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the con-
sultation with China and France has been completed, the
text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made
public.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Presi-

dent of the United States* of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

POLAND

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National

Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favour of Poland. They recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new government should be formed on the basis of that agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare that:

(1) The anti-Fascist assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisors have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organization.

UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all

the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Signed: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
J. STALIN

February 11, 1945.

A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimea Conference providing detailed arrangements for the pro-

tection, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each Ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to ensure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

Address on the Crimea Conference by Senator Connally, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations

FEBRUARY 20, 1945

The attention of the world has been centered upon the recent conference between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill at Yalta in the Crimea. The tremendous questions with which the conference dealt challenge the interest of all enlightened peoples. The heads of three great powers whose armies in war are marching side by side in triumph against Hitlerite Germany met in harmony and unity in making plans for the further prosecution of the war and for settlements which would follow the cessation of hostilities.

It must be borne in mind that during the prosecution of the war President Roosevelt, Premier Churchill and Marshal Stalin, as chiefs of their respective governments, may make military agreements with respect to the war and with respect to all matters relating thereto in their capacities as military commanders. Agreements which they make as to postwar matters are of course not final or binding until they may be incorporated in the definitive treaty of peace to follow the war.

Among the agreements which were effectuated is one for the complete demilitarization of Germany and the rendering it impossible for Germany to again disturb the peace of the world. In pursuance of this purpose, provisions were adopted for the regulation and control of factories and facilities for the manufacture of arms or war materials. It has been generally agreed by the United Nations and their peoples that these steps would be taken as a result of the pending struggle. Therefore this particular agreement meets with the general approbation, not alone of the peoples of the three great powers represented, but of all the United Nations and the people thereof.

In order to accomplish these objectives, an agreement was reached that, upon the defeat of Germany, Allied troops would occupy her territories. This is not an unusual provision. Some similar arrangement usually follows the surrender of an enemy. For the purposes of occupation certain areas of Germany are to be administered by Russia, another area by Great Britain and another area by the United States. It is possible that France may be allowed to occupy certain territories. However, the general administration of all of the German territories shall be under the joint supervision and control of the three great powers.

Another agreement which was reached was as to vot-

ing in the Council of the international organization which it is expected will emerge from the conference to be held at San Francisco on April 25. The agreement must be carried forward and incorporated in the treaty creating the international organization before it can become binding upon members of the organization. Because of lack of time, it is impossible in any detail to discuss the particular provisions relating to such voting. It is important, however, that agreement of the three great leaders was secured.

As I view it, harmony and unity between the three great powers who are bearing the burdens of this war are absolutely necessary, not alone for its successful prosecution and triumph over our enemies, but for the accomplishment of our peace objectives following the war. We have been fighting the war together. We must continue that comradeship until victory is achieved. Having fought the war together, we must now make the peace together. We must, in the same spirit of comradeship in a war to destroy aggression and tyranny, carry that comradeship forward to destroy that other aggressor and that other tyrant, the war god. Comrades in war, we shall also be comrades in peace.

Another agreement reached was the determination to extirpate Nazism and Fascism in enemy countries. These noxious doctrines inspired and instigated that terrible and bloody war. These poisonous and destructive growths must be completely uprooted and destroyed.

In the matter of liberated nations and territories, agreement was had that the great powers would aid and assist the peoples of such nations or territories in re-establishing governments and institutions according to their own wishes under open and free elections by their peoples. This war has been waged in behalf of democracy and free government. It is in conformity to that high concept that we take measures to re-establish democracy and free government in the ravished and prostrate countries which have been the victims of Nazi aggression and the destructive weapons of war.

On the whole, the agreements reached at Yalta in the Crimea have met with the enthusiastic approval of most of our people. There will be objections as to this or that detail.

In the matter of temporary arrangements with respect to boundaries, it must be borne in mind that they are not

valid until finally incorporated in a treaty of peace. Ethnographic, geographic considerations must be taken into account in dealing with such questions. History and tradition are factors of the utmost importance. In the case of Poland, it may be observed that there have been two governments in that unhappy land, the exiled government in London and the so-called Lublin government. It was agreed at Yalta that Poland should have a new government. Recognition was not to be given to either the London or the Lublin governments. A new government incorporating representatives of the various parties and groups is to be established under the supervision of the three great powers. It is further provided that free elections shall be held by the Polish people to choose their government and to establish their institutions. These are among some of the agreements achieved at Yalta.

It was also provided that the Allied nations should hold a conference at San Francisco on April the 25th with a view to perfecting the work done at Dumbarton Oaks with the purpose of establishing a permanent international organization for the preservation of the peace of the world and for the prevention of war. That conference will embody the hopes of peace-loving peoples of all the earth. They have been encouraged by what was accomplished at Dumbarton Oaks, but they shall look forward to San Francisco in the lofty expectation that from it will emerge an instrumentality that may make impossible another war such as that in which we are now staggering.

There have been in the long history of the past many plans proposed looking to the achievement of this noble objective. Prior to World War I, ex-President Taft proposed and advanced the "League to Enforce Peace." In the treaty ending World War I, the brilliant and devoted Woodrow Wilson, reaching toward a splendid conception of peace and good-will among the nations, had written the structure of a League of Nations. We now keenly realize the failure of the United States to adhere to this pact. World War II has indelibly imprinted upon our minds the ambitions and the desire that we shall exert every ounce of brain and nerve to co-operate with other peace-loving nations in the establishment of such an organization.

It cannot, it must not, wait until the end of the war. We have already begun, in the Dumbarton Oaks conferences, heroic efforts to establish such an organization. We look forward with keen anticipation to convening at the earliest possible moment all representatives of all of the United Nations, for the purpose of adopting in final form the organization based upon the Dumbarton Oaks conference, and to settle those particular features which were not finally determined in that conference. It is believed that such an organization, consisting of a permanent Council, an Assembly composed of the representatives of all United Nations, with its necessary and desirable commissions will give gigantic service to the cause of peace. It will afford a forum greater than any in which men have participated in the long roll of history. Here can be debated, through conciliation, mediation and diplomacy, the delicate and yet dangerous issues that may threaten the peace of the world.

It is planned that the peaceful agencies of the organization, such as diplomacy, mediation and conciliation, shall first be employed and exhausted before any harsh or violent measures shall be adopted by the international organization.

However, the crystallized opinion of the world has come to the realization that the mad ambitions of aggressors cannot always be curbed by peaceful measures, and that there must reside in the international organization the employment of armed forces to prevent despotic and tyrannical action in emergencies. The international organization must be endowed with power—military and

naval power when needed—to suppress international criminals and outlaws. It is not intended that military forces be employed except as a last extremity. No arbitrary authority to recklessly use military force is contemplated or permitted.

In addition, the international organization provides for a World Court to which justiciable disputes shall be submitted for judicial determination.

It is proposed that all peace-loving nations are eligible to membership. The security and the rights of small nations are to be recognized and respected. The support and co-operation of the small nations are to be courted and made available in building up a tremendous world opinion in behalf of peace and orderly procedure and the prevention of armed aggression against the weak and helpless peace-loving peoples.

It is my conviction that the overwhelming majority of the American people are for an international organization to preserve the peace. There will be those who object to this or that detail. I know of no piece of legislation or even any constitution which pleases every citizen in every respect. Three thousand amendments to the Constitution of the United States have been offered from time to time. The international structure will not attain perfection. It is being builded out on the frontier. It is being erected in territory where no traveller has left his footsteps. It is a great new enterprise, magnificent in its conception and mighty in its influence. The proposed treaty must be considered in its entirety on the ground of its tremendous effect upon world policy and world peace. It will be subject to amendment or modification or change in the light of experience of future years. It must grow and develop and be shaped to meet the needs of a rapidly moving world.

In this tremendous enterprise the United States must assume its obligations and duties. We cannot expect to be able to order over the world telephone world peace. It will cost effort. It will cost co-operation. It will cost sacrifice. It cannot be attained without toil and trouble and tribulation. America, with no ambition for world domain, with no thirst for spoils, with no hunger for conquered lands and the subjugation of their people, is qualified to lead in the dedication of this grand instrument for peace and co-operation and the security of the world. When we contribute to world peace, we contribute to the peace of our own country—to the life of our own people. When we contribute to the security of nations, we contribute to our own security. When we strengthen the forces of peace we are increasing our own safety, our own freedom from wasting our treasure and spilling our blood.

I desire to repeat and to stress the provisions of the work of Dumbarton Oaks in providing for peaceful processes before resort may be had to the use of armed force. It is my expectation that these provisions will be ratified and confirmed at San Francisco. They require that diplomacy, conciliation, arbitration and other peaceful measures shall be resorted to to settle international quarrels and disputes prior to the use of armed force by the international organization. We are building for peace and not for war.

Some question may arise at San Francisco with respect to the voting power in the Council of the United States representative. This is a matter, however, which I feel will be settled by the United States alone by statute of the Congress. Upon the ratification of the treaty establishing the international organization, it will be the duty of the Congress to provide by law for the appointment of our delegate or representative on the Council. In that statute, powers may be prescribed and delimited, if found necessary. In the main I may say that my own view is that our representative on the Council should have rather

wide authority. He will, of course, be a representative of the President of the United States, who will appoint him. He will in the nature of things be responsible to the sentiment in the Congress and in the country with relation to the matters with which he may deal. I cannot believe that such a representative, with constant contact with the President and constantly advised as to the sentiment of the people of the United States and the Congress, would go contrary to their wishes or to their interests.

There have been many notable charters in the long history of the earth. When the Barons gathered at Sunnyside, they probably had little conception of the tremendous concepts that were to flow from their exacting from King John the guarantees of Magna Carta. That great document has shaped and influenced not alone the history of the English-speaking peoples, but of many of the peoples of the earth. When the Constitution of the United States was adopted at Philadelphia in 1787, it was the result of the struggle of a small and weak group of colonists to achieve their own domestic difficulties. The members of that Convention were wise and educated and

patriotic men. In adopting the Constitution which solved their immediate local problems, they were writing a charter that would in the years to come profoundly affect the civilization and institutions of the entire earth. It stands out in the history of the world as a great milestone, as a magnificent monument in the field of government and statesmanship.

Today peace-loving people are turning their eyes to San Francisco and the conference to assemble there in the hope that there shall emerge from that meeting another great political document that shall give assurance to war-weary peace-loving peoples of all the earth that hereafter international settlements are not to be effectuated by the sword but by logic and reason and by the processes of peace. We hope that they are to be given security—security against bloody-handed aggressors—security against hungry despots who would despoil their peaceful neighbors. We are looking to San Francisco to finish the work begun in Dumbarton Oaks. We confidently expect that the work of that great conference will measure an era—a great and glowing era—in the history of the world.

Report on Crimea Conference by Prime Minister Churchill in House of Commons

FEBRUARY 27, 1945

The recent conference in the Crimea faced realities and difficulties in so exceptional a manner that the results constitute an act of state on which Parliament should formally express its opinion.

The Government feel that they have the right to know where they stand with the House of Commons. A strong expression of support by the House will strengthen our position among the Allies. The intimate and sensitive connection between the executive Government and the House of Commons will thereby be made plain, thus showing the liveliness of our democratic institutions and the subordination of Ministers to parliamentary authority.

The House should not shrink from its duty of pronouncing. We live in a time when the quality of decision is required from all who take part in our public affairs. In this we also see the firm, tenacious character of the present Parliament and generally of our parliamentary institutions, emerging as they do fortified from storms of wars, and they will be made manifest.

We have therefore thought it right and necessary to place a positive motion on paper in support of which I should like to submit facts and arguments to the House as the opening of this three days of debate.

The difficulties of bringing about a conference of the three heads of government of the principal Allies are only too obvious. The fact that, in spite of all modern methods of communication, fourteen months elapsed between Teheran and Yalta, is a measure of those difficulties. It is well known that the British Government greatly desired a triple meeting in the autumn. We rejoiced when at last Yalta was fixed.

On the way there, the British and United States delegations met at Malta to discuss the wide range of our joint military and political affairs. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of the two countries were for three days in conference upon the great operations now developing on the western front and upon plans against Japan that it was appropriate to discuss together.

The Foreign Secretary, accompanied by high officials and assistants—some of whom unfortunately perished

on the way—also met Mr. Stettinius there. On the morning of the second, a cruiser which bore the President steamed majestically into the battle-scarred harbor.

The meeting of the combined chiefs of staffs was held in the afternoon, at which the President and I approved proposals which had been so carefully worked out in the preceding day for carrying out joint war efforts to the highest pitch and for the shaping and timing of military operations.

Meanwhile the Ministry of War Transport and American authorities concerned had been laboring on a vessel all to themselves at the problems of shipping which govern our efforts at the present time and which affect employment and the reserve of oil, food, munitions and troops.

On all of these matters complete agreement was reached—very difficult complicated matters, like making an international Bradshaw in which the times of all trains have to be varied if half a dozen unforeseen contingencies arise.

No hard and fast agreements were made on any of the political issues. Those naturally were to form the subject of the triple conference and they were carefully kept open for the full meeting.

The reason why shipping is so tight at present is because the peak period of the war in Europe has been prolonged for a good many months beyond what was hoped for last autumn and meanwhile the peak period against Japan had been brought forward by American victories in the Pacific.

But instead of one peak period fading out or dovetailing into another, there is an overlap or double-peak period in two wars which we are waging together on opposite sides of the globe.

Though for a couple of years our joint losses by U-boats have ceased to be an appreciable factor in our main business and although the shipbuilding output of the United States flows on gigantically and although the Allies have today far more shipping than they ever had at any time previously during the war, we are, in fact, more hard pressed by shipping shortages than ever before in the war.

The same double peak of war effort, of course, affects all of our preparations for a turnover to peace, including housing and much needed supplies for civilians.

All of these facts call for most stringent and searching economies on the military side, where indulgence or miscalculation or extravagance of any kind is grave injury to the common cause.

They also lamentably hamper our power to provide for the dire needs of liberated territories. I am not prepared to have this island cut below its immediate safety reserves of food and oil except in cases where sure and speedy replacement can be made. Subject to this, we shall do everything in our power to help the liberated countries.

It is easy to see the rigorous character of discussions which Lord Leathers, who is highly competent in these matters, has conducted on our behalf, and we may be satisfied today with a fair and friendly distribution of the burden and hardship which has been agreed upon between Great Britain and the United States over the whole field of the inter-Allied shipping pool.

There were diplomatic conferences proceeding on one vessel, military discussions proceeding on another, and there was this long business of shipping going forward on a third vessel. Then, at the end, the President arrived and the results were submitted to him and to me.

I kept in touch with what was going on and we jointly approved all these matters, on which action is immediately being taken. After that we all flew safely from Malta to airfields in the Crimea and motored over the mountains, about which very alarming accounts had been given but which proved to be greatly exaggerated.

We found shelter on the southern shores of Crimea, which, protected by mountains behind them, form the beautiful Black Sea Riviera and where there still remain undestroyed by the Nazis a few of the villas and palaces of the vanished imperial and aristocratic regime.

By extreme exertions and every form of thoughtfulness and ingenuity our Russian hosts restored these dwellings to good order and had provided for our accommodation and comfort in the true style of Russian hospitality.

In the background were precipices of mountains and beyond them devastated fields and shattered buildings of Crimea, twice crossed by armies which surged in deadly combat. Here on this shore we labored for nine days and grappled with many problems, while friendship grew.

I have seen criticisms in this country that France was not invited to participate in the conference at Yalta. The first principle of British policy in Western Europe is a strong France and a strong French Army. It was, however, felt by all three Great Powers assembled in the Crimea that while they were responsible for bearing to an overwhelming degree the main brunt and burden of the conduct of the war and the policy intimately connected with the operations, they could not allow any restriction to be placed on their right to meet together as they deemed necessary in order that they might effectively discharge their duties to the common cause.

This view does not, of course, exclude meetings on the highest level to which other Powers will be invited. France may, therefore, find many reasons for contentment with the Crimea decisions. Under these decisions France is to be invited to take over a zone of occupation in Germany which we will immediately proceed to delimit with her, and to sit on the Allied Control Commission in Germany which will regulate the whole affairs of the country after unconditional surrender has been obtained.

France is to be invited to join the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and China in sponsoring invitations to the San Francisco Conference, which has been arranged for April 25 this year. She is invited to join the United States, the United

Kingdom and the Soviet Union in operating the procedure laid down in the declaration of liberated Europe.

She is also a member of the European Advisory Commission to which most of the important tasks have been relegated—including advice to the Governments upon the most important matters connected with the treatment of Germany—and which with French assistance has already completed in great detail all the terms upon which unconditional surrender will be received and accepted. Everything is provided for in that sphere.

If we were confronted tomorrow with the collapse of German power there is nothing which has not been foreseen and arranged beforehand by this important European Advisory Commission, consisting of Mr. Winant, Ambassador Gousev and Sir William Strang of the Foreign Office, which is also to advise us on various matters connected with Germany apart from the actual taking over by our military authorities.

All these arrangements show clearly the importance of the role which France is called upon to play in the settlement of Europe and how fully it is realized she must be intimately associated with the other Great Powers in this task.

In order to give a further explanation of the proceedings of the conference, we invited M. Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to visit London at the earliest opportunity. He was good enough to come, and during the last few days we have had the pleasure of a series of clarifying talks with him in which he has been able to become fully informed of the whole position, and to express in the most effective manner the views and wishes of France upon it.

Of the world organization there is little I can say beyond what is contained in the report of the conference and, of course, in the earlier reports which emanated from Dumbarton Oaks. At the Crimea the three Great Powers agreed on the solution of a difficult question of voting procedure to which no answer had been found at Dumbarton Oaks.

Agreement on this vital matter has enabled us to take the next step forward in the setting up of a new world organization, and arrangements are in hand for the issue of invitations to the United Nations Conference which, as I have said, will meet in a couple of months at San Francisco.

I wish I could give the House the full particulars of the solution of this question of voting procedure to which representatives of the three Great Powers, formerly in disagreement, have now wholeheartedly agreed to. We thought it right, however, that we should consult both France and China and should endeavor to secure their acceptance before the formula was published. For the moment, therefore, I can only deal with the matter in general terms.

Here is the difficulty which has to be faced. It is on the Great Powers that the chief burden of maintaining peace and security will fall. A new world organization must be so framed as not to compromise their unity or their capacity for effective action if it is called for at short notice. At the same time a world organization cannot be based on a dictatorship of the Great Powers.

It is their duty to serve the world and not to rule it. We trust that the voting procedure on which we agreed at Yalta meets these two essential points and provides a system which is fair and acceptable, having regard to the evident difficulties which will meet anyone who gives prolonged thought to the subject.

The conference at San Francisco will bring together upon the invitation of the United States, of Great Britain, of the British Commonwealth, of the Union of Soviet Republics, of the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Republic of China, all those representa-

tives of the United Nations who have declared war upon Germany or Japan by the first of March, 1945, and who have signed the United Nations Conference Declaration.

Many are declaring war or have done so since Yalta and their act should be treated with respect and satisfaction by those who have borne the heat and burden of the day. Our future will be consolidated and enriched by the participation of these Powers together as founder members. We should all take the opening steps to form a world organization to which it is hoped ultimately and in due course all states will belong.

It is to this strongly armed body we look to prevent wars of aggression, or preparation of such wars, and to enable disputes between states, both great and small, to be adjusted by peaceful and lawful means, by persuasion, by pressure of public opinion, by legal methods and eventually by another category of methods which constitute principles of this new organization.

The former League of Nations which was so hardly used and found to be inadequate for the tasks it attempted, will be replaced by a far stronger body in which the United States will play a vitally important part. It will embody much of the structure of the characteristics of its predecessor. All the work that was done in the past, all the experience that has been gathered by the working of the League of Nations, will not be cast away; but the new body will differ from it in the essential point that it will not shrink from establishing its will against the evil doer or the evil planner in good time and by the force of arms.

This organization, which will be capable of continuous progress and development, is at any rate appropriate to the phase into which the world will enter after the present enemies have been beaten down, and we may have good hopes—and more than hopes, a resolute determination—that it shall shield humanity from the third renewal of its agony.

We have all been made aware in the interval between the two world wars of weaknesses of international bodies whose work is seriously complicated by the misfortune which occurred in building the Tower of Babel. Taught by bitter experience, we hope now to make the world conscious of the strength of the new instrument and of the protection which it will be able to afford to all who wish to dwell in peace within their habitations.

This new world structure will, from the outset and in all parts of its work, be aided to the utmost by the ordinary channels of friendly diplomatic relations, which it in no way supersedes. We are determined to do all in our power to insure the success of the conference.

On such an occasion it is clearly right that the two leading parties of His Majesty's Government and the British nation should be represented and, as all parties are bound for the future in this decision, I am glad to inform the House that His Majesty's chief representatives at this conference will be the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Lord President of the Council and Leader of the Labor party.

I, myself, am anxious that this principle should be established even in what are perhaps the closing stages of this memorable coalition. I am anxious that all parties should be united in this new instrument so that this supreme force should be, in Mr. Gladstone's words, high and dry above the ebb and flow of party politics—I have not verified that quotation and I ask for indulgence if I should prove to have made any slip.

The Crimea Conference finds the Allies more closely united than ever before, both in the military and political sphere. Let Germany recognize that it is futile to hope for divisions among the Allies and that nothing can divert her utter defeat. Further resistance will only be cause of needless suffering.

The Allies are resolved that Germany shall be totally disarmed; that nazism and militarism in Germany shall be destroyed; that war criminals shall be tried justly and quickly punished; that all German industries capable of military production shall be eliminated or controlled; and that Germany shall make compensation in kind to the utmost of her ability for damage done to Allied nations.

On the other hand it is not the purpose of the Allies to destroy the people of Germany or to leave them without the necessary means of subsistence. Our policy is not revenge, but to take such measures as may be necessary to secure the future peace and safety of the world. There will be a place one day for Germans in the community of nations, but only when all traces of nazism and the military have been effectively and finally extirpated.

In the general plan there is complete agreement. As to measures to give effect to it there is much which still remains to be done. Plans for the Allied Control Commission will come into operation immediately on the defeat of Germany. On the longer term measures are many points of great importance on which detailed plans have yet to be worked out between the Allies.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that questions of this kind can be thrashed out and solutions found for all the many intractable and complex problems involved while the armies are still on the march, and to hurry and press matters of this kind might well be to risk causing disunity between the Allies.

Many of these matters must await the time when the leaders of the Allies, freed from the burdens of direction of the war, can turn their whole or main attention to the making of wise and farseeing peace which will, I trust, become the foundation for greatly facilitating the work of the world organization.

I now come to the most difficult and agitated part of the statement I have to make to the House—the question of Poland.

For more than a year past and since the tide of war has turned so strongly against Germany the Polish problem has been divided into two main issues—frontiers of Poland and the freedom of Poland. The House is well aware from the speeches I have made to them that freedom, independence, integrity and sovereignty of Poland have always seemed to His Majesty's Government more important than the actual frontiers.

To establish a free Polish nation with a good home to live in has always far outweighed in my mind the actual tracing of a frontier line or whether those boundaries should be shifted on both sides of Poland further to the west.

The Russian claim, first advanced at Teheran in November, 1943, has always been unchanged for the Curzon Line in the east, and the Russian offer has always been that ample compensation should be gained for Poland at the expense of Germany in the north and west.

All these aspects are tolerably well known. The Foreign Secretary explained in detail last December the story of the Curzon Line. I have never concealed from the House that, personally, I think the Russian claim to it is just and right.

If I champion this frontier for Russia it is not because I bow to force; it is because I have believed in the fairest division of territory, that can in all circumstances be made between two countries whose history has been so checkered and intermingled.

The Curzon Line was drawn in 1919 by an expert commission on which one of our most distinguished foreign representatives of those days, Sir Eric Crowe, was a member. It was drawn at a time when Russia had few friends among the Allies. Indeed, I may say she was extremely unpopular. One cannot feel that either circumstances or

personalities concerned would have given undue favor to Soviet Russia. They just tried to find out what was the right and proper line to draw. The British Government of those days approved this line, including of course, the exclusion of Lwow from Poland.

Apart from all that has happened I cannot conceive we should not regard it as a well-informed and fair proposal. There are two things to be remembered in justice to our great ally. First, I can look back to August, 1914, when Germany first declared war against Russia under the Czar. In those days Russia's frontiers on the west were far more spacious than those Soviet Russia is now asking after all her sufferings and after all her victories.

The Russian frontiers included all Finland and the Warsaw salient stretching to within sixty miles of Breslau. Russia is, in fact, accepting a frontier which over immense distances is 200 or 300 miles farther to the east of that which was Russian territory and had been for many generations under the Czarist regime.

Marshal Stalin told me one day that Lenin objected to the Curzon Line because Bialystok and regions around it were taken from Russia. Marshal Stalin and the modern Soviet Government make no such claim and freely agree to that view taken by the Allied Commission in 1919, that the Bialystok region should go to Poland because of the Polish population predominating there.

A line is not a frontier. If it is a frontier it has to be surveyed and traced on the ground and not merely cut in on a map by pencil and ruler. When we were at Moscow in October Marshal Stalin made this point to me and told me he thought there might be deviations of eight to ten kilometers in either direction to follow the course of streams or hills or actual sites of particular villages. It seems to me this was an eminently sensible way of looking at the problem.

However, when we met at Yalta the Russian proposal was changed. It was made clear that all such minor alterations would be at the expense of Russia and not at the expense of Poland in order that the Poles might have their minds set at rest once and for all and that there should be no further discussion about that part of the business. We welcomed the Soviet proposal.

We must regard these things as part of one story. I have been through the whole story since 1911, when I was sent to the Admiralty to prepare the fleet for the impending German war. In its main essentials it seems to be one story of a thirty-year war in which the British, Russians, Americans and French have struggled to their utmost to resist German aggression, which caused the most grievous sacrifices to all of us, but none more frightful than to the Russian people, whose country has been twice ravaged over whole areas and whose blood has been poured out in tens of millions of lives in the common cause now reaching its final accomplishment.

There is a second reason which appears to be apart from this sense of continuity which I feel. But for the prodigious exertions and sacrifices of Russia, Poland was doomed to utter destruction at the hands of the Germans. Not only Poland as a state and nation, but the Poles as a race were doomed by Hitler to be destroyed or reduced to a servile state.

Three and a half million Polish Jews are said to have been actually slaughtered. It is certain that enormous numbers have perished in one of the most horrifying acts of cruelty—presumably the most horrifying act of cruelty—which have ever darkened the passage of man.

When the Germans clearly avowed their intention of making the Poles a subject and lower-grade race under the Herrenvolk, suddenly, by a superb effort of military force and skill, Russian armies in little more than three weeks—since in fact we spoke on these matters here—have advanced from the Vistula to the Oder, driving the

Germans in ruins before them and freeing the whole of Poland from the foul cruelty and oppression under which the Poles were writhing.

In supporting the Russian claim for the Curzon Line I repudiate and repulse any suggestion that we are making a questionable compromise or yielding to force or fear, and I assert with the utmost conviction the broad justice of the policy upon which, for the first time, all the three great Allies have now taken their stand.

Moreover, the three Powers have now agreed that Poland should receive a substantial accession of territory both in the north and west. In the north she will certainly receive in place of the precarious Corridor the great city of Danzig and the greater part of East Prussia west of Königsberg and south, and a long wide seafront on the Baltic.

In the west she will receive the important industrial province of Upper Silesia and in addition such other territories to the east of the Oder as may be decided at the peace settlement to detach from Germany after the views of a broadly based Polish Government have been ascertained.

Thus it seems to me that this talk of cutting half of Poland off is very misleading. In fact, the part which is to be east of the Curzon Line cannot in any case be measured by its size. It includes the enormous dismal region of the Pripet Marshes which Poland held between two wars and it exchanges for that far more fertile and developed land in the west from which a very large proportion of the German population have already departed.

We need not feel that the task of holding these new lands will be too heavy for Poland, or that it will bring about another German revenge, or that it will—to use a conventional phrase—lay the seed of future wars. We intend to take steps far more drastic and effective than those which followed the last war, because we know much more about this business so as to render all offensive action by Germany impossible for generations to come. Finally under a world organization of nations great and small, victors or vanquished will be secure against aggression by indisputable law and overwhelming international force.

The published Crimea agreement is not a ready-made plan imposed by the Great Powers on the Polish people. It sets out the agreed view of the three major Allies on means whereby their common desire to see established a strong, free, independent Poland may be fulfilled in co-operation with the Poles themselves and whereby a Polish Government which all the United Nations can recognize may be set up in Poland, which will become for the first time a possibility now that practically the whole country has been liberated by the Soviet armies.

The fulfillment of the plan will depend upon the willingness of all sections of democratic Polish opinion in Poland or abroad to work together to give it effect. But the plan should be studied as a whole and with the main common objective always in view. The three Powers are agreed that the acceptance by the Poles of the provisions of the eastern frontiers, and so far as now can be ascertained on the western frontiers, is an essential condition of the establishment and future welfare of a strong, independent, homogenous Polish state.

The proposals on the frontiers are in complete accordance, as the House will remember, with the views expressed by me in Parliament on behalf of the British Government many times during the past year. I ventured to make announcements upon this subject at a time when a great measure of agreement was not expressed by other important parties to the affair.

The eastern frontier must be settled now if the new Polish administration is to be able to carry on its work

in its own territory and to do this in unity with the Russians who are behind their fighting front.

The western frontiers, which will involve substantial accession of German territory to Poland, cannot be fixed as part of the whole German settlement until after the Allies have occupied German territory and until after a fully representative Polish Government has been able to make its wishes known.

It would be a great mistake to press Poland to take a larger portion of these lands than is considered by her and her friends and allies to be within her compass to man, to develop, and with the aid of the Allies and the world organization to maintain.

I have now dealt with the frontiers of Poland. I must say I think it is a case which I can confide with the greatest of confidence to the House of Commons—to take an impartial line drawn long ago in which the British commission took a leading part, the moderation with which the Russians have strictly confined themselves to this line, the enormous sacrifices they have made and the sufferings they have undergone, the contribution they have made to our present victory, the great victory in which Poland has a vital interest to have complete agreement with her powerful neighbor to the east—when you consider all these matters and the way they have been put forward and the temperate, patient manner in which they have been put forward and discussed, I have rarely put a case in this House which I could commend more confidently to the good sense of members of all parties.

Even more important than the frontier of Poland within limits now disclosed is the freedom of Poland. The home of the Poles is settled. Are they to be masters in their own house? Are they to be free, as we in Britain or the United States or France are free? Is their sovereignty and independence to be untrammelled or are they to come to the mere protection of the Soviet state, forced against their will by an armed majority to adopt a Communist or totalitarian system? I am putting the whole case now. This is a touchstone far more sensitive and vital than the drawing of frontier lines. Where does Poland stand and where do we all stand on this?

A most sovereign declaration has been made by Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Union that the sovereign independence of Poland is to be maintained, and this decision is now joined in by Great Britain and the United States. Here also a world organization will in due course assume a measure of responsibility. Poles will have their future in their own hands with the single limitation that they must honestly follow in harmony with their Allies a policy friendly to Russia.

The procedure which the three Great Powers have united to adopt to achieve this vital aim is set forth in unmistakable terms in the Crimea declarations. The agreement provides for consultations with a view to the establishment in Poland of a new Provisional Government of National Unity, with which the three major Powers can all enter into diplomatic relations instead of some recognizing one Polish Government and the rest another—a situation which, if it had survived the Yalta Conference, would have proclaimed to the world disunity and confusion. We had to settle it and we settled it there.

No binding restrictions have been imposed on the scope and method of these consultations. The British Government intend to do all in their power to insure that they shall be as wide as possible, and representative Poles of all democratic parties are given full freedom to come and make their views known.

Arrangements for this are now being made in Moscow by a commission of three, comprising Mr. Molotoff and Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, representing the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain respectively.

It will be for the Poles themselves, with such assistance as the Allies are able to give them, to agree upon the composition and constitution of the new Polish Government of National Unity. Thereafter His Majesty's Government, through their representatives in Poland, will use all their influence to insure that the free election to which the new Polish Government will be pledged shall be fairly carried out under all proper democratic safeguards. Our two guiding principles in dealing with all these problems on Continent and with liberated countries have been clear.

While the war is on we will give aid to anyone who can kill a Hun. When the war is over we will look to the solution of free, unfettered, democratic elections. These are the two principles which this Coalition Government has applied to the best of its ability to the circumstances in this infinitely tangled and varied situation.

[At this point Lord Dunglass, Conservative, interposed: "Very much depends on the interpretation which the Prime Minister is now putting on these words. Can he perhaps develop this a little more? For instance, is there going to be for some time some kind of international supervision? His interpretation will make a great difference in many places."]

We will have to wait until the new Polish Government is set up and see what are the proposals they will make for the carrying out of this free, unfettered election to which they will be pledged and to which we are pledged by the responsibility we assume. But I have not finished yet on this point and it may be that some further words of mine may give comfort to the noble lord. I should be sorry if I cannot persuade him that the course we have adopted is simple, direct and trustworthy.

The agreement does not so far affect the recognition by His Majesty's Government of the Polish Government in London. This will be maintained until such time as His Majesty's Government considers that the new Provisional Government has been properly formed in Poland in accordance with the agreed provision. Nor does it involve a previous or immediate recognition by His Majesty's Government of the present Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland.

But let me remind the House and those Honorable Members who undertake the honorable task of being careful that our affairs in Poland are regulated in accordance with the honor and dignity of this country, that I have no quarrel with them. We ought to make known all the facts, which I hope will clear away any difference that there is between us. But there would have been no Lublin committee or Lublin Provisional Government if the Polish Government in London had accepted our faithful counsel of a year ago.

They would have entered into Poland as its actual Government. They would have entered with the liberating armies of Russia. Even in October, when the Foreign Secretary and I toiled day and night in Moscow, Monsieur Mikolajczyk could have entered Poland with Marshal Stalin's friendship and become Prime Minister of a more broadly constructed Government which could now be set up at Warsaw, or wherever, in view of the ruins of Warsaw, the center of Government is placed. But these opportunities were cast aside and meanwhile complete expulsion of Germans from Poland has taken place.

Of course the Lublin Government advanced with the victorious Russian armies, who were received with great joy in large areas of Poland. Many of its great cities changed hands without a shot being fired, and none of that terrible business of underground armies being shot by both sides which we feared. So much has actually in fact taken place during the great forward advance.

But these opportunities were cast aside. Russians who are executing and preparing military operations on the

largest scale against the heart of Germany have a right to have their communications, the communications of their armies, protected by an orderly countryside under a government acting in accordance with their needs.

It was not, therefore, possible, so far as recognition was concerned, to procure dissolution of the Lublin government simultaneously and to start from a swept table. To do that would have been to endanger the success of the Russian offensive and consequently to prolong the war, with increased loss of Russian, British and American blood.

The House should read carefully again and again—those members who have doubts—the terms of the Declaration, every word of which was the subject of the most profound and searching attention by the heads of the three states and by their Foreign Secretaries and their experts.

How will this Declaration be carried out? How will phrases like “free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot” be interpreted?

Will the new government be properly constituted with a fair representation of the Polish people as far as can be made practicable at the moment and as soon as possible? Will the elections be free and unfettered? Will candidates of all democratic parties be able to present themselves to the electors and conduct their campaigns?

What are democratic parties? People always take different views on that. Even in our own country there have been from time to time feeble efforts by one party or the other to claim that they are the true democratic party and the rest are either Bolsheviks or Tory landlords.

What are democratic parties? Obviously that is capable of being settled. Will the elections be what we should say was free and fair in this country, making some allowance for the great disorder and confusion which prevail?

[Here a member asked: “Will there be any caucuses?”]

We cannot entirely avoid some nucleus of party inspiration being formed, even in this country, and no doubt sometimes very able members find themselves a little out of joint with party arrangements. But there are a great number of parties in Poland and we have agreed that all those who are democratic parties—not Nazi or Fascist parties or collaborators with the enemy—will be able to take their part.

These are questions upon which we have the clearest views in accordance with the principles of the Declaration on liberated Europe to which all three Governments have subscribed. It is on that basis that the Moscow commission of three was intended to work, and it is on that basis that it has already begun to work.

The impression that I brought back from the Crimea and from all my other contacts is that Marshal Stalin and the other Soviet leaders wish to live in honorable friendship and democracy with the Western democracies. I also feel that no government stands more to its obligations than the Russian Soviet Government.

I decline absolutely to embark here upon a discussion about Russian good faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world. Terrible, indeed, would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian people, if all future world organizations were rent asunder and a new cataclysm of inconceivable violence destroyed what is left of the treasures and liberties of mankind.

His Majesty's Government recognizes that large forces of Polish troops, sailors and airmen now fighting gallantly, as they have fought during the whole of the war under British command, owe allegiance to the Polish Government in London. We have every confidence that once a new government more fully representative of the will of the Polish people than either the Government in London

or the Provisional Government in Poland can be established and recognized by the Great Powers, means will be found to overcome these difficulties in the wide interests of the people of Poland.

Above all, His Majesty's Government are resolved that as many as possible of the troops shall be enabled to return in due course to Poland of their own free will and under every safeguard to play their part in the future life of their country.

In any event His Majesty's Government will never forget the debt they owe to the Polish troops who fought so valiantly and for all those who fought under our command. I earnestly hope it will be possible for them to have citizenship and freedom of the British Empire if they so desire. I am not able to make a declaration on that subject today because all matters respecting citizenship are required to be discussed between this country and its dominions, and that takes time. So far as we are concerned, we should think it an honor to have such faithful and valiant warriors dwelling among us as if they were men of our own blood.

[Here Churchill asked for the indulgence of his audience and suggested adjournment until 2:15 P.M. The House then adjourned until that time. The Prime Minister's speech was resumed at 2:17 P.M.]

The brief interval which has separated us enables me to carry the House through altogether differing fields. We leave the Crimean shores and travel southward to warmer winter climes in which also we find many matters where British interests are important and where we are involved.

President Roosevelt invited the Emperor of Ethiopia, King Farouk of Egypt and the King of Saudi Arabia to meet him at Ismailia before sailing for home and conferences upon his cruiser were accordingly arranged by him.

I myself took leave of the President on the 15th of this month in Alexandria Harbor after long and most agreeable talks about the state of our affairs in the light of the Crimea Conference and also talk about our special business in the Far East, in which, as the Japanese are aware, we both take some interest.

We also spoke of our joint occupation of Italy and of our policy there. Upon this, as the House is aware, there was a great deal of misunderstanding in large sections of the American press some weeks ago. During our recent talks I have repeatedly asked both the President and Mr. Stettinius to state whether there are any and, if so, what complaints by the United States Government against us for any steps we have taken in Italy or not taken in Italy, and I have received categorical assurances that there are none.

Moreover I must place it on record that when I visited Italy in August last I made a series of proposals to the British Government, of which I informed the President, for mitigating the severity of Allied occupation of Italy and generally for alleviating the hard lot of the Italian people.

These matters were discussed at our second Quebec Conference and it was at Hyde Park, the President's private country home, that he and I drafted the declaration of Sept. 28, which was and is intended to make very definite mitigation in the attitude of the victorious Powers toward the Italian people and to show our desire to help them in due course to resume their place among the leading nations of Europe.

Last Saturday Mr. MacMillan (Harold MacMillan), acting president of the Allied Commission (for Italy) and Admiral Stone (Commodore Ellery Stone), who is its chief commissioner, were received by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and announced to them the new measures decided upon in favor of the Italian Government in fulfillment of this September Declaration.

As I myself had taken the lead in bringing these proposals forward and eventually in securing their adoption, I am not prepared to accept suggestions from any quarter that, although we had suffered so much injury and ill usage at Italy's hands in the days of Mussolini's power, Great Britain has fallen behind other victorious powers in taking a generous view toward Italy or that we nourish any design of power politics which involve Italy. (Churchill referred to a sentence he had used in a recent speech that we had no need of Italy and said this was wrested from its context.)

As a matter of fact, it was merely a reply which I was bound to make to suggestions in some quarters of the United States press that we were embarking on some power politics, whatever they may be, in the Mediterranean. I am glad to say that the facts I am now setting forth have been explicitly accepted by the United States, or at any rate in all responsible quarters, and that this view was thoroughly endorsed by the President and by Mr. Stettinius and I received quite definite assurances that no complaints of any kind were or are professed against us which would call for any reply on my part such as certainly would be forthcoming.

Our two nations can therefore proceed on their joint task in Italy, which in the future will be burdened with many new complications and difficulties, but at any rate we can proceed in closest confidence and unity.

We look forward to Italy's return under a truly democratic regime to a community of industrious and peace-loving people. In her efforts to help herself Italy can count on British good-will and on Allied good-will. She can count also upon such material aid as is at our disposal and she will certainly continue to receive her fair share.

I said some time ago that Italy would have to work her passage home. She has some way to go yet. It would be less than just if I did not pay tribute to the invaluable services, the full tale of which cannot be told, of the Italian men and women in the armed forces, on the seas, in the countryside and behind the enemy lines in the north which are being rendered steadfastly to the common cause.

New difficulties may be cast upon us when the great districts in the north are cleared and when the problem of feeding the great masses for whom we shall then become responsible is cast upon us, and the Provisional Government itself may be called upon to undergo changes as a consequence of the greatly increased constituency to which it will become responsible as a result of the liberation.

The Foreign Secretary and I thought it would be becoming as well as convenient and agreeable that we should also see the two rulers who had made long journeys to come to Egypt at the President's invitation and that we should pass under friendly review with them the many matters with which we have common concern.

It was our duty also to pay our respects to King Farouk of Egypt and we thought it right to seek a talk with the President of Syria in order to calm things down as much as possible in the Levant. It should not be supposed that anything in the nature of general conference on Middle East affairs took place. The mere fact that the Regent of Iraq and the Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordania were not upon the spot should make this perfectly clear.

Any conference would naturally include such authorities. There was no question of shaping a new policy for the Middle East but rather to make those friendly, personal contacts by which public business between various states is often helped.

I must at once express our grief and horror at the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister, with whom the Foreign Secretary had a long and cordial interview only a few days before he fell victim of the foul blow.

His death is a serious loss to his Government and country. The sympathy of Great Britain for the widow and family of the late Prime Minister of Egypt has of course, been expressed, not only in telegrams from the Foreign Office but also by various personal visits of our Ambassador. I am sure the House will associate itself with those expressions.

There is little doubt that security measures in Egypt require considerable tightening and above all that the execution of justice upon the men proved guilty of this political murder should be swift and exemplary.

The Egyptian Government have, we feel, acted rightly and wisely in declaring war upon Germany and Japan and to sign unanimous declarations. We did not press the Egyptian Government at any time to come into the war and indeed on more than one occasion in the past our advice had been to the contrary. There were evident advantages in sparing the populous and famous cities of Egypt from wholesale bombardment.

The Egyptian troops have during the war played an important part. They have maintained order throughout the Delta and guarded many strong points and depots and in all kinds of ways have been of assistance to our war effort, which has once again proven successful in sheltering the fertile lands of the Delta from all assaults by foreign invaders.

We have had every facility from the Egyptians under our treaty of alliance, and successive Egyptian Prime Ministers and Governments have given us support in a manner which we deemed most effective. Egypt is an associate power and she should take her rightful place as a future member of the world organization and as one of its founders when the occasion is reached at San Francisco at the end of April.

We are also glad to welcome Turkey into the ranks of the United Nations. Turkey declared herself firmly on our side by the treaty of alliance in 1939 at a time when gathering dangers were only too apparent.

As I explained to the House on a former occasion, Turkey became conscious of unexpected military weaknesses after war had started in earnest on account of the decisive influence of new weapons with which she was quite unprovided and which we were not in a position to supply.

As these weapons exercised a dominating effect upon the modern battlefield the Turks felt that they could no longer confide their safety to their renowned infantry and artillery of the last war. We did not, therefore, for a long time press for a Turkish declaration of war. It was not until after the Teheran Conference that we felt the moment had come when Turkey could enter the struggle without great imprudence.

The Turkish Government did not feel able to do so at that time, but they have aided us in various ways which it would not be profitable to recount and we have never had the slightest doubt where their hearts lay. They also will be welcomed by Great Britain into the ranks of the United Nations and I do not consider that the tie renewed between our two countries after the disaster of the last war has been in any way impaired.

I was greatly interested in meeting King Ibn Saud, famous ruler of Saudi Arabia. I had the honor of entertaining this most remarkable man at luncheon at the Fayoum Oasis. I expressed to him the thanks of Great Britain for his steadfast, unswerving and unflinching loyalty to our country and to the common cause which never shone more brightly than in the darkest hours of the day of mortal peril.

Although we did not reach a solution of the problems of the Arab world and of the Jewish people in Palestine, I have hopes that when the war is over good arrangements can be made for securing the peace and progress of the Arab world and generally of the Middle East and

that Great Britain and visitors who are taking an increasing interest in those regions will be able to play a valuable part in proving the well-known maxim of the old free trader "all legitimate interests are in harmony."

My discussions with the Emperor of Ethiopia raised no serious difficulty because agreement for the next two years had already been reached as a result of the mission to Ethiopia which Lord de La Warr had just completed with much patience and address.

It was satisfaction for me to see for the first time in the flesh Haile Selassie, that historic figure who pleaded the cause of his country amid the storms of the League of Nations. He was the first victim of Mussolini's thirst for power and conquest and he was also the first to have restored his ancient throne by the heavy exertions of our British and Indian armies in the far-off days of 1940-41.

Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri of Syria in which we did the utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude toward the French and to encourage the negotiation of a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but also Lebanon.

I must make clear the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and Lebanon and in relation to our French allies. The position is governed by a settlement made in 1941 in which the independence of these Levant states was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time and ever since His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant states.

We trust these states will be firmly established by the authority of a world organization and that French privilege will also be recognized. However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian and Lebanon independence or French privilege. We seek both and do not believe they are incompatible.

Too much must not be placed, however, upon the shoulders of Great Britain alone and we have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States have recognized and favor Syrian and Lebanon independence, but do not favor any special positions for any foreign countries.

All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are necessary subjects for a peace conference at which we must resolutely strive for a final settlement and a lasting peace between all states and races comprised in the Middle East and the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean.

On my way back from the Crimea to say good-by to the President at Alexandria the Foreign Secretary and I stopped at Athens. I must say from my point of view this was the high spot of the whole journey.

I cannot help recalling the grim conditions of our visit only seven weeks before, when guns were firing and bullets continually struck the wall and people were killed and wounded in streets not far away.

The contrast between these violent scenes and the really rapturous welcome we received from vast crowds of delighted citizens was one of the most vivid and impressive and agreeable experiences of my life. [Cheers.] Peace reigned over this beautiful, immortal city. Its citizens were wild with joy. His Beatitude the Archbishop was seated in the regency firmly grasping the reins of power.

Together we drove through crowds on the streets lined by the first installment of the new national Greek Army until I found myself called upon to address what was incomparably the largest and most enthusiastic gathering that in my very long experience of such demonstrations I have ever seen.

There is no subject in which the policy of His Majesty's Government has received more complete vindication. [Cheers.] Nor has there been any on which greater prej-

udice and misrepresentation have been poured out against them in the United States.

[Replying to an interjection Mr. Churchill said, "and with some assistance from this side."]

All this was done with a wanton disregard of ill effects produced on the spot and encouragement given to the resistance of terrorists in Greece. I am sure we rescued Athens from a horrible fate and I believe the Greek people will long acclaim our actions, both military and political.

Peace without vengeance has been achieved. A great mass of arms has been surrendered. Most of the prisoners and hostages have been restored. The great work of bringing in food and supplies has resumed its former activity. Public order and security are so established that UNRRA is about to resume its functions. [Laughter.]

The popularity of British troops and those who have guided the course of policy, such as Mr. Leeper and General Scobie, is unbounded, and their conduct continues to receive the approbation of His Majesty's coalition Government. I could, however, by no means lead the House to suppose our difficulties are over. The Greek national Army has still to be formed and to be effective to maintain impartial order. The Greek budget has to be balanced in some way or other.

The drachma has to be restrained within reasonable limits. Raw materials have to be provided to enable industries of various kinds to get to work in Athens, where there are considerably more than 1,000,000 people. The sense of unity and responsibility has to grow stronger with the Greek people. Here I must remark that the future of Greece is in their own hands. The Greeks must not expect that the whole process of their restoration can be accomplished by British labors or American assistance.

The Foreign Secretary remained a day longer in Athens than I did and he was at pains to bring home to Greek authorities the fact that, now that political stability had been achieved, financial and economic problems must take first place and that the burden and responsibility are upon the Greek Ministers and that they must on no account sit back and leave these tasks to foreigners.

I am sorry if those remarks should in any way detract from the great kindness and enthusiasm with which I was received a little time ago, and if my words cause pain I'm not entirely sorry for it.

The intense political activity of the Greek mind must continue to give way to practical problems. As soon as possible they must reach that election, fair, free and unfettered, in a secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage, to which everyone is looking forward and which alone can regulate and adjust all that has been done.

I look forward in the greatest confidence and particularly welcome with the Greek Government that Russian, British and American observers shall be free on the spot to make sure the will of the people will find complete and sincere expression. So much for that episode, on which we have had so many exciting, even momentarily heated, debates in recent times.

I thank the House very much for their courtesy and attention. I refer, before sitting down for a moment or two, to the conference as a whole and in relation to the grave matters which I mentioned before the interval wherein the House indulged me.

It was the custom of the conference at Yalta to hold its meetings of the heads of the three Governments and their Foreign Secretaries in the late afternoon and sit for several hours each day. Here important issues were deployed and measures, both in agreement and on which there were differences, were clearly revealed.

I remember particularly one moment when a prolonged silence fell upon our small body and was maintained for

two or three minutes, but it was immediately found very convenient to remit measures of agreement, or of difference, wherever our discussion had carried them to morning meetings of Foreign Secretaries.

Each Foreign Secretary was president over the meetings in rotation. So excellent was the combined work of the Foreign Secretaries that our problems were returned nearly every day for the combined meeting in a form in which final agreement could be reached and lasting decisions taken.

There was a proposal on the agenda for institution during the present anxious period of regulation of the meetings of the Foreign Secretaries. Improvement of combined and collective work has been often asked for here in order to prevent avoidable divergencies of view and to concert actions of the three Great Powers.

This was to me a felt want and one to serve to bridge the inevitable gap in the meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries showed itself to be so valuable, efficient and indispensable that its continuing collective activity was acclaimed by all.

It is of course only a temporary arrangement appropriate to these times of special stress when so heavy a burden—military burden—is resting on three Great Powers, and we may expect it eventually to merge in a larger and permanent organization which will be set up in San Francisco once that organization is in full working order and the peace conference has finished its labors. In the intervening period these meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, to whom from time to time the Foreign Secretaries of other countries will be added, will prove of undoubted advantage.

Here is a moment when the House should pay tribute to the work of the Foreign Secretary. I cannot describe to the House the aid and comfort he has been to me in all our difficulties.

A hard life when quite young, in the last war in the infantry, in constant self-preparation for the task which has fallen to him, his unequalled experience as Minister at the Foreign Office, his knowledge of foreign affairs and its past history, his experience of conferences of all kinds, his breadth of view, his power of exposition, his moral courage, have gained for him a position sec-

ond to none among the Foreign Secretaries of the Grand Alliance.

It is not only my personal debt but that of the House to him which I now acknowledge.

I suppose that during these last three winter months the human race all the world over have undergone more physical agony and misery than at any other period through which this planet has passed.

In the Stone Age numbers were fewer and primitive creatures little removed from animal origin knew no better. We suffer more. We feel more. I must admit in this war I never felt so grave a sense of responsibility as I did at Yalta. In 1940 and 1941, when we in this island were all alone and invasion was so near, the actual steps we ought to take and our attitude toward them seemed plain and simple. If a man is coming across the sea to kill you, you do everything in your power to make sure he dies before he finishes his journey. That may be difficult and it may be painful, but at least it is simple.

Now we enter into a world of imponderables, and at every stage self-questioning arises. It is a mistake to look too far ahead. Only one link in the chain of destiny can be handled at will.

I trust that the House will feel that hope has been powerfully strengthened by our meeting in the Crimea. The ties that bind the three Great Powers together and their mutual comprehension of each other have grown.

The United States has entered deeply and constructively into the life and salvation of Europe. We all three set our hands to far-reaching engagements, at once practical and solemn.

The United Nations are an unchallengeable power to lead the world to prosperity, freedom and happiness. The Great Powers must seek to serve and not to rule. Joined with other states, both large and small, we may found a large world organization which, armed with ample power, will guard the rights of all states, great and small, from aggression or from the gathering of the means of aggression.

I am sure that a fairer choice is open to mankind than they have known in recorded ages. Lights burn brighter and shine more broadly than before. Let us walk forward together.

Report on Crimea Conference by President Roosevelt at Joint Session of Congress

MARCH 1, 1945

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress, I hope you will pardon me for the unusual posture of sitting down during the presentation of what I wish to say, but I know you will realize it makes it a lot easier for me in not having to carry about 10 pounds of steel around the bottom of my legs [laughter] and also because of the fact I have just completed a 14,000-mile trip. [Applause.]

First of all, I want to say that it is good to be home. It has been a long journey and, I hope you will also agree, so far a fruitful one.

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is entirely fruitful or not lies to a great extent in your hands, for unless you here in the Halls of the American Congress, with the support of the American people concur in the general conclusions reached at that place called Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results. And that is why I have come before you at the earliest hour I could after

my return. I want to make a personal report to you and at the same time to the people of the country.

Many months of earnest work are ahead of us all, and I should like to feel that when the last stone is laid on the structure of international peace it will be an achievement toward which all of us in America have worked steadfastly and unselfishly together.

I am returning from this trip that took me so far, refreshed and inspired. I was well the entire time. I was not ill for a second until I arrived back in Washington, and here I heard all of the rumors which had occurred in my absence. [Laughter.] Yes; I returned from the trip refreshed and inspired. The Roosevelts are not, as you may suspect, averse to travel [laughter]; we seem to thrive on it. [Applause.]

And far away as I was, I was kept constantly informed of affairs in the United States. The modern miracles of rapid communication have made this world very small. We must always bear in mind that fact when we speak

or think of international relations. I received a steady stream of messages from Washington, I might say from not only the executive branch with all its departments, but also from the legislative branch in its two departments; and except where radio silence was necessary for security purposes I could continuously send messages any place in the world; and, of course, in a grave emergency we could even have risked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimean Conference with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace. There were two main purposes in this Crimean Conference: The first was to bring defeat to Germany with the greatest possible speed and the smallest possible loss of Allied men. That purpose is now being carried out in great force. The German Army, the German people are feeling the ever-increasing might of our fighting men and of the Allied armies; and every hour gives us added pride in the heroic advance of our troops in Germany on German soil toward a meeting with the gallant Red Army.

The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an international accord that would bring order and security after the chaos of the war, that would give some assurance of lasting peace among the nations of the world. Toward that goal a tremendous stride was made.

At Teheran a little over a year ago there were long-range military plans laid by the Chiefs of Staff of the three most powerful nations. Among the civilian leaders at Teheran, however, at that time there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. No political arrangements were made, and none was attempted.

At the Crimean Conference, however, the time had come for getting down to specific cases in the political field.

There was on all sides at this Conference an enthusiastic effort to reach an agreement. Since the time of Teheran, a year ago, there had developed among all of us—what shall I call it?—a greater facility in negotiating with each other that augurs well for the peace of the world; we know each other better.

I have never for an instant wavered in my belief that an agreement to insure world peace and security can be reached.

There were a number of things that we did that were concrete, that were definite; for instance, the lapse of time between Teheran and Yalta without conferences of representatives, of civilian representatives of the three major powers, has proved to be too long—14 months. During that long period local problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia.

Therefore, we decided at Yalta that even if circumstances made it impossible for the heads of the three governments to meet more often in the future, we would make sure that there would be more frequent personal contacts for exchange of views between the secretaries of state and the foreign ministers of these three powers.

We arranged for periodic meetings at intervals of 3 or 4 months. I feel very confident that under this arrangement there will be no recurrences of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world-wide co-operation and collaboration.

When we met at Yalta, in addition to laying out strategic and tactical plans for the complete and final military victory over Germany, there were other problems of vital political consequence.

For instance, first there was the problem of the occupation and control of Germany after victory, the complete destruction of her military power, and the assurance that neither Nazi-ism nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and civilization of the world. [Applause.]

Secondly, again for example, there was the settlement of the few differences that remained among us with respect to the international security organization after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. As you remember, at that time and afterward, I said we had agreed 90 per cent. That is a pretty good percentage. I think the other 10 per cent was ironed out at Yalta.

Thirdly, there were the general political and economic problems common to all of the areas that would be in the future, or which have been, liberated from the Nazi yoke. We over here find it very difficult to understand the ramifications of many of these problems in foreign lands, but we are trying to.

Fourth, there were the special problems created by Poland and Yugoslavia.

Days were spent in discussing these momentous matters, and we argued freely and frankly across the table. But at the end on every point unanimous agreement was reached. And more important even than the agreement of words, I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together. [Applause.]

We know, of course, that it was Hitler's hope and the German war lords' hope that we would not agree—that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of Allied unity, a crack that would give him and his fellow gangsters one last hope of escaping their just doom. That is the objective for which his propaganda machine has been working for many months. But Hitler has failed. [Applause.]

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united—not only in their war aims but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united, to be united with each other—and with all peace-loving nations—so that the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality.

The Soviet, and British, and United States Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings with each other. They conferred frequently with Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and with me on the problem of co-ordinating the strategic and tactical efforts of the Allied powers. They completed their plans for the final knock-out blows to Germany.

At the time of the Teheran Conference, the Russian front, for instance, was removed so far from the American and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategic co-operation was possible, there could be no tactical, day-by-day co-ordination. They were too far apart. But Russian troops have now crossed Poland. They are fighting on the eastern soil of Germany herself; British and American troops are now on German soil close to the Rhine River in the west. It is a different situation today from what it was 14 months ago. A closer tactical liaison has become possible for the first time in Europe. That was something else that was accomplished in the Crimean Conference.

Provision was made for daily exchange of information between the armies under the command of General Eisenhower on the Western front and those armies under the command of the Soviet marshals on that long Eastern front, and also with our armies in Italy—without the necessity of going through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington or London as in the past.

You have seen one result of this exchange of information in the recent bombings by American and English aircraft of points which are directly related to the Russian advance on Berlin.

From now on, American and British heavy bombers will be used—in the day-by-day tactics of the war. We have begun to realize, I think, that there is all the difference in the world between tactics on the one side and strategy on the other—day-by-day tactical war in direct support of Soviet armies as well as in the support of our own on the Western Front.

They are now engaged in bombing and strafing in order to hamper the movement of German reserves, German materials to the Eastern and Western fronts from other parts of Germany or from Italy.

Arrangements have been made for the most effective distribution of all available material and transportation to the places where they can best be used in the combined war effort—American, British, and Russian.

The details of these plans and arrangements are military secrets, of course; but this tying of things in together is going to hasten the day of the final collapse of Germany. The Nazis are learning about some of them already, to their sorrow, and I think all three of us at the conference felt that they will learn more about them tomorrow, and the next day, and the day after that. [Applause.]

There will be no respite from these attacks. We will not desist for one moment until unconditional surrender. [Applause.]

You know, I have always felt that common sense prevails in the long run—quiet, over-right thinking. I think that is true in Germany just as much as it is here. The German people as well as the German soldiers must realize that the sooner—the sooner they give up and surrender—surrender by groups or as individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to re-establish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

We made it clear again at Yalta, and I now repeat—that unconditional surrender does not mean the destruction or enslavement of the German people. The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta Declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta Declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them. They are working at it day and night, for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins—to deceive their people into continued and useless resistance.

We did, however, make it clear at the conference just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany—and the administration of the four zones will be co-ordinated—co-ordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of the representatives of the four nations.

Unconditional surrender means something else. It means the end of Nazi-ism. [Applause.] It means the end of the Nazi Party and all of its barbaric laws and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence in the public, private, and cultural life of Germany.

It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is speedy and just—and severe.

It means the complete disarmament of Germany; the destruction of its militarism and its military equipment; the end of its production of armament; the dispersal of all its armed forces; the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Germany will have to make reparations—reparations in kind for the damage which it has done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind—in plants, in machinery, in rolling stock, in raw materials—we shall avoid the mistakes that we and other people—other nations—made after the last war, the demanding of reparations in the form of money which Germany could never pay.

We do not want the German people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objective in handling Germany is simple—it is to secure the peace of the rest of the world now and in the future. Too much experience has shown that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive warfare. [Applause.]

These objectives will not hurt the German people. On the contrary, they will protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on them before, and which Hitlerism is now imposing upon them again a hundredfold. It will be removing a cancer from the German body politic, which for generations has produced only misery, only pain, for the whole world.

During my stay in Yalta, I saw the kind of reckless, senseless fury and terrible destruction which comes out of German militarism. Yalta on the Black Sea had no military significance of any kind. It had no defense.

Before the last war it had been a resort—a resort for people like the Czars, and princes, and aristocracy, and the hangers-on. However, after the war, after the Red Revolution, and until the attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler a few years ago, the palaces and the villas of Yalta had been used as a rest and recreation center by the Russian people.

The Nazi officers took over the former palaces and villas for their own use. The only reason that the so-called palace of the former Czar was still habitable when we got there was that it had been given—or he thought it had been given—to a German general for his own property and his own use. And when the rest of Yalta was destroyed, he kept soldiers there to protect what he thought had become his own personal villa.

When the Red Army forced the Nazis out of the Crimea almost a year ago last April, it was found that all of the palaces were looted by the Nazis, and then nearly all of them were destroyed by bombs placed on the inside. Even the humblest of the homes of Yalta were not spared.

There was little left of it except blank walls, ruins, destruction.

Sevastopol—that was a fortified port about 40 to 50 miles away—there again was a scene of utter destruction of a large city and great navy yards and great fortifications. I think less than a dozen buildings were left intact in the entire city.

I had read about Warsaw and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coventry, but I saw Sevastopol and Yalta! And I know there is not room enough on earth for both German militarism and Christian decency. [Applause.]

But—to go on with the story which I hope to do in under an hour—of equal importance with the military arrangements at the Crimean Conference were the agreements reached with respect to a general international organization for lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. There was one point, however, on which agreement was not reached. It involved the procedure of voting—of voting in the Security Council. I want to try to make it clear by making it simple. It took me hours and hours to get the thing straight in my own mind—and many conferences.

At the Crimean Conference, the Americans made a proposal—a proposal on the subject which, after full discussion, I am glad to say was unanimously adopted by the other two nations.

It is not yet possible to announce the terms of it publicly, but it will be in a very short time.

When the conclusions reached with respect to voting are made known I think and I hope that you will find them fair—that you will find them a fair solution of this complicated and difficult problem—I might almost say a legislative problem. They are founded in justice, and will go far to insure international co-operation for the maintenance of peace.

There is going to be held, you know—after we have straightened that voting matter out—in San Francisco a meeting of all the United Nations of the world on the 25th of April. There, we all hope, and confidently expect, to execute a definite charter of organization under which the peace of the world will be preserved and the forces of aggression permanently outlawed.

This time we are not making the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to win the war finally, we work together to keep it from happening again.

As you know, I have always been a believer in the document called the Constitution. I spent a good deal of time in educating two other nations of the world with regard to the Constitution of the United States—that the charter has to be and should be approved by the Senate of the United States under the Constitution. I think the other nations of the world know it now. [Laughter.] I am aware of that fact and now all the other nations are. And we hope the Senate will approve what is set forth as the charter of the United Nations when they all come together in San Francisco next month.

The Senate of the United States, through its appropriate representatives, has been kept continuously advised of the program of this Government in the creation of the International Security Organization.

The Senate and the House will both be represented at the San Francisco Conference. The congressional delegates will consist of an equal number of Republican and Democratic members. The American delegation is, in every sense of the word, bipartisan because world peace is not exactly a party question. I think that Republicans want peace just as much as Democrats. [Applause.] It is not a party question any more than is military victory—the winning of the war.

When the republic was threatened, first by the Nazi clutch for world conquest back in 1939 and 1940 and then by the Japanese treachery in 1941, partisanship and politics were laid aside by nearly every American, and every resource was dedicated to our common safety. The same consecration to the cause of peace will be expected, I think, by every patriotic American—by every human soul overseas, too.

The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation. It cannot be just an American peace, or a British peace, or a Russian, French, or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large nations—or of small nations. It must be a peace which rests on the co-operative effort of the whole world.

It cannot be a structure complete. It cannot be what some people think—a structure of complete perfection at first. But it can be a peace—and it will be a peace—based on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter, on the conception of the dignity of the human being, and on the guaranties of tolerance and freedom of religious worship.

As the Allied armies have marched to military victory they have liberated peoples whose liberties had been crushed by the Nazis for 4 long years and whose economy had been reduced to ruin by Nazi despoilers.

There have been instances of political confusion and unrest in these liberated areas—that is not unexpected—as in Greece, or in Poland, or in Yugoslavia, and there may be more. Worse than that, there actually began to grow up in some of these places queer ideas of, for instance, “spheres of influence” that were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go on unchecked, these developments might have had tragic results.

It is fruitless to try to place blame for this situation on one particular nation or on another. It is the kind of development that is almost inevitable unless the major

powers of the world continue without interruption to work together and assume joint responsibility for the solution of problems that may arise to endanger the peace of the world.

We met in the Crimea, determined to settle this matter of liberated areas. Things that might happen that we cannot foresee at this moment might happen suddenly—unexpectedly—next week or next month. And I am happy to confirm to the Congress that we did arrive at a settlement and incidentally, a unanimous settlement.

The three most powerful nations have agreed that the political and economic problems of any area liberated from the Nazi conquest, or of any former Nazi satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three governments. They will join together, during the temporary period of instability after hostilities, to help the people of any liberated area or of any former satellite state to solve their own problems through firmly established democratic processes.

They will endeavor to see to it that interim governments—the people who carry on the interim governments between the occupation of Germany and the day of true independence—will be as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population, and that free elections are held as soon as possible thereafter.

The responsibility for political conditions thousands of miles away can no longer be avoided, I think, by this great nation. Certainly, I do not want to live to see another war. As I have said, the world is smaller—smaller every year. The United States now exerts a tremendous influence in the cause of peace. Whatever people over here think or talk in the interests of peace is, of course, known the world over. The slightest remark in either House or Congress is known all over the world the following day. We will continue to exert that influence only if we are willing to continue to share in the responsibility for keeping the peace. It will be our own tragic loss if we were to shirk that responsibility.

Final decisions in these areas are going to be made jointly, and, therefore, they will often be the result of give-and-take compromise. The United States will not always have its way 100 per cent—nor will Russia, nor Great Britain. We shall not always have ideal solutions to complicated international problems, even though we are determined continuously to strive toward that ideal. But I am sure that—under the agreement reached at Yalta—there will be a more stable political Europe than ever before. Of course, once there has been a true expression of the people's will in any country, our immediate responsibility ends—with the exception only of such action as may be agreed upon by the International Security Organization we hope to set up.

The United Nations must also begin to help these liberated areas adequately to reconstruct their economy—I do not want them to starve to death—so that they are ready to resume their places in the world. The Nazi war machine has stripped them of raw materials, machine tools, trucks, locomotives, and things like that. They have left the industry of these places stagnant and much of the agricultural areas unproductive. The Nazis have left complete or partial ruin in their wake.

To start the wheels running again is not a mere matter of relief. It is to the national interest of all of us to see that these liberated areas are again made self-supporting and productive so that they do not need continuous relief from us. I should say that was an argument based upon common sense.

One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allied powers was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source of trouble in postwar Europe, and we came to the conference determined to find a common ground for its solution. We

did. We know everybody does not agree with it—obviously.

Our objective was to help create a strong, independent, and prosperous nation—that is the thing we must all remember—those words agreed to by Russia, by Britain, and by me: The objective of making Poland a strong, independent, and prosperous nation with a government ultimately to be selected by the Polish people themselves.

To achieve this objective, it was necessary to provide for the formation of a new government much more representative than had been possible while Poland was enslaved. There are, you know, two governments; one in London, one in Lublin, practically in Russia.

Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing Provisional Government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include democratic leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized government will be recognized by all of us as the temporary government of Poland, Poland needs a temporary government in the worst way—an interim government is another way to put it. However, the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will be pledged to holding a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on Russia have been made. Twice in this generation, Germany has struck at Russia through this corridor. To insure European security and world peace, a strong and independent Poland is necessary to prevent that from happening again.

The decisions with respect to the boundaries of Poland were frankly a compromise. I did not agree with all of it by any means. But we did not go as far as Britain wanted in certain areas; we did not go as far as Russia wanted in certain areas; and we did not go as far as I wanted in certain areas. It was a compromise.

While the decision is a compromise it is one, however, under which the Poles will receive compensation in territory in the North and West in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon Line in the East. The limits of the Western border will be permanently fixed in the final peace conference. Roughly, this will include in the new, strong Poland quite a large slice of what is now called Germany. It was agreed also that the new Poland will have a large and long coast line and many new harbors; also that East Prussia—most of it—will go to Poland. A corner of it will go to Russia; also—what shall I call it—the anomaly of the free State of Danzig—I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.

It is well known that the people east of the Curzon Line—this is an example of why it is a compromise—the people east of the Curzon Line are predominantly White Russians and Ukrainians—a very great majority—not Polish; and the people west of that line are predominantly Polish, except in that part of East Prussia and Eastern Germany which would go to the new Poland. As far back as 1919, representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon Line represented a fair boundary between the two peoples. You must remember also that there was no Poland or had not been any Polish Government before 1919 for a great many generations.

I am convinced that this agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent, and prosperous Polish state.

The Crimean Conference was a meeting of three major military powers on whose shoulders rests the chief responsibility and burden of the war. Although, for this reason, another nation was not included—France was not a participant in the Conference—no one should detract from recognition which was accorded there to her role in the future of Europe and the future of the world.

France has been invited to accept a zone of control in Germany, and to participate as a fourth member of the Allied Control Council on Germany.

She has been invited to join as a sponsor of the International Council at San Francisco next month.

She will be a permanent member of the International Security Council together with the other four major powers.

And, finally, we have asked France that she be associated with us in our joint responsibility over the liberated areas of Europe.

There were, of course, a number of smaller things I have not time to go into on which joint agreement was had. We hope things will straighten out.

Agreement was reached on Yugoslavia, as announced in the communique; and we hope that it is in process of fulfillment.

We have to remember that there are a great many prima donnas in the world all wishing to be heard before anything becomes final; so we may have a little delay while we listen to more prima donnas. [Laughter.]

Quite naturally, this conference concerned itself only with the European war and with the political problems of Europe—and not with the Pacific war.

At Malta, however, our Combined British and American Staffs made their plans to increase their attack against Japan.

The Japanese war lords know that they are not being overlooked. They have felt the force of our B-29s, and our carrier planes; they have felt the naval might of the United States and do not appear very anxious to come out and try it again.

The Japs know what it means to hear that “the United States Marines have landed.” [Applause.] And I think I may add, having Iwo Jima in mind, that “the situation is well in hand.” [Applause.]

They also know what is in store for the homeland of Japan now that General MacArthur has completed his magnificent march back to Manila. [Applause.] And with Admiral Nimitz establishing air bases right in their own back yard. [Applause.] But lest somebody lay off work in the United States I can repeat what I have said—a short sentence even in my sleep: “We haven’t won the wars yet,” with an “s” on wars. It is a long, tough road to Tokyo; it is longer to Tokyo than it is to Berlin in every sense of the word.

The defeat of Germany will not mean the end of the war against Japan; on the contrary, we must be prepared for a long and a costly struggle in the Pacific.

But the unconditional surrender of Japan is as essential as the defeat of Germany. [Applause.] I say that advisedly with the thought in mind that that is especially true if our plans for world peace are to succeed. For Japanese militarism must be wiped out as thoroughly as German militarism.

On the way back from the Crimea, I made arrangements to meet personally King Farouk, of Egypt; Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia; and King Ibn Saud, of Saudi Arabia. Our conversations had to do with matters of common interest. They will be of great mutual advantage because they gave us an opportunity of meeting and talking face to face, and of exchanging views in personal conversation instead of formal correspondence. For instance, from Ibn Saud, of Arabia, I learned more of the whole problem of the Moslems and more about the Jewish problem in 5 minutes than I could have learned by the exchange of a dozen letters.

On my voyage, I had the benefit of seeing the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force at work.

All Americans, I think, would feel as proud of our armed forces as I am if they could see and hear what I did.

Against the most efficient professional soldiers and sailors and airmen of all history, our men stood and fought—and won. [Applause.]

I think that this is our chance to see to it that the sons and grandsons of these gallant fighting men do not have to do it all over again in a few years.

The conference in the Crimea was a turning point, I hope, in our history and, therefore, in the history of the world. There will soon be presented to the Senate and the American people a great decision that will determine the fate of the United States—and I think, therefore, the fate of the world—for generations to come.

There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

I know that the word "planning" is not looked upon with favor in some circles. In domestic affairs, tragic mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning; and, on the other hand, many great improvements in living, and many benefits to the human race, have been accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning—reclamation of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, provision for adequate housing.

The same will be true in relations between nations. For the second time, in the lives of most of us, this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objective, the nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not. The groundwork of a plan has now been furnished and has been submitted to humanity for discussion and decision.

No plan is perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Francisco will doubtless have to be amended time and again over the years, just as our own Constitution has been. No one can say exactly how long any plan will last. Peace can endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for it, and sacrifice for it.

Twenty-five years ago, American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for

which they fought and suffered. We failed them. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world to survive.

I think the Crimean Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells—and it ought to spell—the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, and spheres of influence, and balances of power, and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries and have always failed.

We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.

I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world in which our children and grandchildren—yours and mine, and the children and grandchildren of the whole world—must live, and can live.

And that, my friends, is the only message I can give you. I feel it very deeply as I know that all of you are feeling it today and are going to feel it in the future. [Applause.]

(The foregoing is a complete text of the President's speech as it appeared in "The Congressional Record" of March 1, 1945. In many instances he had deviated from his prepared speech. In one such instance, the prepared text read:

"I am well aware of the constitutional fact—as are all of the United Nations—that this charter must be approved by two thirds of the Senate of the United States—as will some of the other arrangements made at Yalta."

(In delivering the speech, the President rephrased the foregoing paragraph and omitted the following: ". . . as will some of the other arrangements made at Yalta.")

Charter for Inter-American League, Act of Chapultepec, Inter-America Conference at Mexico City

MARCH 3, 1945

Declarations on reciprocal assistance and American solidarity by the Governments represented at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and of Peace.

Whereas:

1. The peoples of the Americas, animated by a profound love of justice, remain sincerely devoted to the principles of international law;

2. It is their desire that such principles, notwithstanding the present difficult circumstances, may prevail with greater force in future international relations;

3. The Inter-American conferences have repeatedly proclaimed certain fundamental principles, but these must be reaffirmed at a time when the juridical bases of the community of nations are being established;

4. The new situation in the world makes more imperative than ever the union and solidarity of the American peoples, for the defense of their rights and the maintenance of international peace;

5. The American states have been incorporated in their international law, since 1890, by means of conventions, resolutions and declarations, the following principles:

(A) The proscription of territorial conquest and the nonrecognition of all acquisitions made by force. (First

Inter-American Conference of American States, 1890.)

(B) The condemnation of intervention by a state in the internal or external affairs of another. (Seventh International Conference of American States, 1933, and Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936.)

(C) The recognition that every war or threat of war affects directly or indirectly all civilized peoples, and endangers the great principles of liberty and justice which constitute the American ideal and the standard of its international policy. (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936.)

(D) The procedure of mutual consultation in order to find means of peaceful co-operation in the event of war or threat of war between American countries. (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936.)

(E) The recognition that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation. (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936.)

(F) That any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature of origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbi-

tration, or through the operation of international justice. (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 1936.)

(G) The recognition that respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of each American state constitutes the essence of international order sustained by continental solidarity, which historically has been expressed and sustained by declarations and treaties in force. (Eighth International Conference of American States, 1938.)

(H) The affirmation that respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitutes the indispensable rule for the development of peaceful relations between states, and treaties can only be revised by agreement of the contracting parties. (Declaration of American Principles, Eighth International Conference of American States, 1938.)

(I) That in case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American republic is threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, co-ordinating their respective sovereign will by means of the procedure of consultation, using the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable. (Declaration of Lima, Eighth International Conference of American States, 1938.)

(J) That any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against all the American states. (Declaration XV of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Havana, 1940.)

6. The furtherance of these principles, which the American states have practiced in order to secure peace and solidarity between the nations of the continent, constitutes an effective means of contributing to the general system of world security and of facilitating its establishment;

7. The security and solidarity of the continent are affected to the same extent by an act of aggression against any of the American states by a non-American state, as by an American state against one or more American states.

Part I—Declaration

First—That all sovereign states are juridically equal amongst themselves.

Second—That every state has the right to the respect of its individuality and independence, on the part of the other members of the international community.

Third—That every attack of a state against the integrity or the inviolability of territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state, shall, conformably to Part III hereof, be considered as an act of aggression against the other states which sign this Declaration. In any case, invasion by armed forces of one state into the territory of another, trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in accordance therewith, shall constitute an act of aggression.

Fourth—That in case that acts of aggression occur or there may be reasons to believe that an aggression is being prepared by any other state against the integrity

and inviolability of territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state, the states signatory to this Declaration will consult amongst themselves in order to agree upon measures they think that it may be advisable to take.

Fifth—That during the war and until treaty arrangements recommended in Part II hereof, the signatories of this Declaration recognize such threats and acts of aggression as indicated in Paragraphs Third and Fourth above, constitute an interference with the war effort of the United Nations calling for such procedures, within the scope of their general constitutional and war powers, as may be found necessary, including:

- Recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions;
- Breaking of diplomatic relations;
- Breaking of consular relations;
- Breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, radiotelephonic relations;
- Interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations;

Use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression.

Sixth—That the principles and procedure contained in this Declaration shall become effective immediately, inasmuch as any act of aggression or threat of aggression during the present state of war interferes with the war effort of the United Nations to obtain victory. Henceforth, and with the view that the principles and procedure herein stipulated shall conform with the constitutional principles of each republic, the respective governments shall take the necessary steps to perfect this instrument in order that it shall be in force at all times.

Part II—Recommendation

The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace recommends:

That for the purpose of meeting threats of acts of aggression against any American republic following the establishment of peace, the governments of the American republics should consider the conclusion, in accordance with their constitutional processes, of a treaty establishing procedures whereby such threats or acts may be met by:

- The use, by all or some of the signatories of said treaty thereto, of any one or more of the following measures:
- Recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions;
- Breaking of diplomatic relations;
- Breaking of consular relations;
- Breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, radiotelephonic relations;
- Interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations; use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression.

Part III

This Declaration and Recommendation provide for a regional arrangement for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in the Western Hemisphere and said arrangements and the activities and procedures referred to therein shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization when formed.

This Declaration and Recommendation shall be known by the name of Act of Chapultepec.

Invitation to San Francisco Conference and Voting Procedure for World Security Organization

MARCH 5, 1945

At the Crimea Conference the Government of the United States of America was authorized, on behalf of the three governments there represented, to consult the

Government of the Republic of China and the Provisional Government of the French Republic in order to invite them to sponsor invitations jointly with the governments

of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to a conference of United Nations called to meet at San Francisco on April 25, 1945.

Those consultations have now been held. The Government of the Republic of China has agreed to join in sponsoring invitations to the San Francisco Conference. The Provisional Government of the French Republic has agreed to participate in the Conference but, after consultation with the sponsoring governments, the Provisional Government—which did not participate in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations—is not joining in sponsoring the invitations.

Today, at noon Washington time, representatives of the Government of the United States of America stationed at various capitals throughout the world are presenting to the governments of thirty-nine different United Nations the following invitation:

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China, invites the Government of (name of Government invited was inserted here) to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting:—

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently. In the event that the Government of (name of Government invited was inserted here) desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments.

The invitation has been presented to the governments of the following United Nations:

Commonwealth of Australia	The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
Kingdom of Belgium	United Mexican States
Republic of Bolivia	The Kingdom of the Netherlands
United States of Brazil	Dominion of New Zealand
Canada	Republic of Nicaragua
Republic of Chile	Kingdom of Norway
Republic of Colombia	Republic of Panama
Republic of Costa Rica	Republic of Paraguay
Republic of Cuba	Republic of Peru
Czechoslovak Republic	Commonwealth of the Philippines
Dominican Republic	Republic of El Salvador
Republic of Ecuador	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Kingdom of Egypt	The Republic of Turkey
Empire of Ethiopia	Union of South Africa
Kingdom of Greece	Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Republic of Guatemala	United States of Venezuela
Republic of Haiti	Kingdom of Yugoslavia
Republic of Honduras	
India	
Empire of Iran	
Kingdom of Iraq	
The Republic of Liberia	

Statement by Secretary of State Stettinius on Voting Procedure in Security Council

MARCH 5, 1945

Today, with the issuance of the invitations to the San Francisco Conference, there have been made public the provisions of the text on voting procedure in the Security Council of the general international organization proposed at Dumbarton Oaks.

The practical effect of these provisions, taken together, is that a difference is made, so far as voting is concerned, between the quasi-judicial function of the Security Council in promoting the pacific settlement of disputes and the political function of the Council in taking action for the maintenance of peace and security.

Where the Council is engaged in performing its quasi-judicial function of promoting pacific settlement of disputes, no nation, large or small, should be above the law. This means that no nation, large or small, if a party to a dispute, would participate in the decisions of the Security Council on questions like the following:

(a) Whether a matter should be investigated;

(b) Whether the dispute or situation is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

(c) Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle a dispute by means of their own choice;

(d) Whether, if the dispute is referred to the Council, a recommendation should be made as to methods and procedures of settlement;

(e) Whether the Council should make such recommendations before the dispute is referred to it;

(f) What should be the nature of this recommendation;

(g) Whether the legal aspect of the dispute should be referred to the Court for advice;

(h) Whether a regional agency should be asked to concern itself with the dispute; and

(i) Whether the dispute should be referred to the General Assembly.

Where the Council is engaged in performing its political functions of action for maintenance of peace and security, a difference is made between the permanent members of the Council and other nations for the practical reason that the permanent members of the Council must, as a matter of necessity, bear the principal responsibility for action. Unanimous agreement among the permanent members of the Council is therefore re-

quisite. In such matters, therefore, the concurrence of all the permanent members would be required. Examples are:

- (a) Determination of the existence of a threat or breach of the peace;
- (b) Use of force or other enforcement measures;

(c) Approval of agreements for supply of armed forces;

(d) Matters relating to the regulation of armaments; and

(e) Matters concerning the suspension and expulsion of members, and the admission of new members.

Senator Vandenberg's Acceptance of Place as Delegate to San Francisco Conference

MARCH 5, 1945

Following an exchange of cordial and satisfactory personal letters with the President, clarifying my right of free action, I am glad to say that I have accepted his invitation to be an American delegate at the San Francisco Conference. I deeply appreciate his high consideration.

I wish to do everything within my power to establish a practical system of collective security as a basis for effective peace. I believe it indispensable in this scarred and fore-shortened world. I believe it indispensable in American self-interest. An excellent start has been made. I am frank to say that my chief anxiety about

the tentative Dumbarton Oaks formula is that, except in its brief World Court chapter, it does not once mention "justice" as a guiding objective or a rule of conduct.

In my opinion, no permanent peace is possible without a constant, conscious mandate to seek and to maintain "justice" as the basis of peace. I shall have concrete proposals to submit to my colleagues along these lines. It will be my prayer that the San Francisco Conference may be successful in promoting dependable peace, with organized justice, in a free world of free men. Civilization cannot survive World War No. Three.

Appendix

Covenant of the League of Nations, With All Amendments

The High Contracting Parties, in order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 1

The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval, and air forces and armaments.

Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

Article 2

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

Article 3

The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may not have more than three Representatives.

Article 4

The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Rep-

resentatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece shall be members of the Council.

With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.

The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility.

The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

Article 5

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

Article 6

The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Council.

The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly.

Article 7

The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

Article 8

The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

Article 9

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval, and air questions generally.

Article 10

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting

international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article 12

The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report by the Council.

In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article 13

The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.

For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

Article 14

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

Article 15

If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the

dispute, and, if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the Members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Article 16

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking

State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.

Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

Article 17

In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

Article 18

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article 19

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Article 20

The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

Article 21

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

Article 22

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sov-

ereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

Article 23

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of in-

ternational conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League: (a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations; (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; (c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; (d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest; (e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind; (f) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Article 24

There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaus or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

Article 25

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

Article 26

Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.



